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ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity i i i
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) encompasses a dynamic and diverse region. It has 
enjoyed remarkable economic growth in recent decades but has also witnessed rising inequality and the 
persistence of poor quality jobs. By 2015, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), envisioned as a single 
common market and production base, will become a reality. This will lead to the freer flow of goods, services, 
investment capital and skilled labour in the region. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers will be reduced which will 
have implications for intra-regional trade and investment. New opportunities for growth and prosperity are 
likely to emerge, but the challenge is to ensure that growth is inclusive and prosperity is shared. To that end, 
understanding the impact of the AEC on labour markets will be critical in making sound policy choices that 
can shape the lives of the 600 million women and men in the region. 
The President of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Director-General of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) signed a joint statement in December 2012, in which the two organizations pledged to 
strengthen their partnership to create decent work and address poverty, vulnerability and informal employ-
ment in the region. Exemplifying the spirit of that cooperation, this publication is a joint undertaking of 
the ADB and the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. It reflects the high-level commitment of 
both organizations to support the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Member States to build a people-centred 
ASEAN Community through better jobs and shared prosperity.
This publication provides an overview of recent economic and labour market trends in ASEAN, based on 
official national and international sources. It examines the impact of the ASEAN Economic Community 
on labour markets through model simulations and empirical and policy analyses, with the aim of offering 
evidence-based policy recommendations towards fostering better jobs and inclusive and balanced growth. 
The report highlights key priorities to address the challenges and opportunities of the AEC in terms of 
strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms, facilitating structural change and improving job quality, 
enhancing skills development, boosting productivity and wages, and managing labour migration.
We trust that readers will be inspired by this report, which presents the first ever analysis of the AEC impact on 
jobs, working conditions and lives of women and men in ASEAN. The recommendations in the report provide 
practical strategies and policy options that can assist policy makers in promoting inclusive and sustainable 
growth for women and men, not just in individual countries, but in the ASEAN region as a whole.
We also hope that this report will provide the basis for further policy dialogue and ideas that will advance 
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The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will create 
a single market and production base and new opportu-
nities for prosperity for the region’s 600 million women 
and men…
Strong economic performance has made 
ASEAN one of the world’s most dynamic regions 
(Chapter 1). Since 2007, while annual average 
growth	 in	 the	 global	 economy	 has	 been	 3.3	 per	
cent, in ASEAN it has been 5.1 per cent. This has 
boosted	living	standards:	between	1991	and	2013,	
83	million	workers	moved	out	of	poverty	into	the	
middle class. The region also has one of the world’s 
highest foreign investment inflows – attracted by 
its	 workforce	 of	 300	 million,	 growing	 consumer	
markets and expanding networks of infrastructure.
Despite progress, challenges remain. In some 
countries, poverty persists and economic growth has 
been accompanied by rising disparities in income 
and opportunities. Too many workers are trapped 
in	 poor	 quality	 jobs.	 Approximately	 179	 million	
workers (or three in five) are in vulnerable employ-
ment	and	92	million	earn	too	little	to	escape	poverty.	
Securing decent employment is particularly difficult 
for young people and women. These labour market 
concerns are exacerbated by limited commitments 
to labour standards and social protection.
…but unless managed properly the AEC may add to 
existing labour market deficits and increase inequality 
The AEC has the potential to accelerate growth 
– by increasing flows of trade and investment, 
enabling the freer movement of skilled workers, and 
by strengthening institutions. This will necessarily 
change the composition and distribution of jobs 
across the region. Consequently, ASEAN Member 
States will face challenges related to job gains and 
losses, skills development, wages and productivity, 
labour migration and social protection systems. 
Addressing these key issues will help ensure that 
more women and men benefit from deeper integra-
tion, and vulnerable groups are not left behind.
Building connectivity is key to the AEC vision of 
sustained growth and equitable development
Cross-border infrastructure has helped develop 
isolated areas and spread the economic benefits of 
integration more equitably (Chapter 2). Linking 
communities through physical networks facilitates 
the movement of goods, capital, labour and ideas 
and reduces overall transaction costs. Maximizing 
such benefits will require greater coordination 
among decision makers to provide the appropriate 
“hard” and “soft” infrastructure. 
In this regard, previous integration agreements 
provide the momentum for further cooperation. A 
variety of subregional economic zones have emerged 
since	 the	 1990s	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 transforming	
transnational but contiguous areas into attractive 
economic platforms. In addition, ASEAN has a 
series of trade agreements with prominent Asian 
partners such as Australia, China, India, Japan, 
Republic of Korea and New Zealand. As a result of 
these initiatives, ASEAN is in a dominant position 
to drive economic integration further.
The AEC will accelerate the pace of structural 
change…
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structural change from lower- to higher-produc-
tivity	 economic	 sectors	 (Chapter	 3).	 Reaping	 the	
potential benefits will depend on putting in place 
policies to manage this transformation, including 
employment policies for high-quality jobs, robust 
measures for social protection and support to 
smaller enterprises.
One ongoing structural change is a decline in 
the significance of agriculture – which accounts for 
40.0	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 employment,	 having	 been	
overtaken	 by	 services	 at	 40.6	 per	 cent,	 with	 the	
remaining	19.4	per	cent	accounted	for	by	industry.	
A challenge for some countries is that the bulk of 
job creation is taking place in sectors where levels 
of productivity are not significantly higher than in 
agriculture – and sometimes lower. 
...and could generate 14 million additional jobs, but 
the gains will not be distributed evenly across countries 
or sectors, or between women and men
Model simulations suggest that implementa-
tion of trade measures under the AEC could lead to 
a significant increase in output. By 2025, GDP in 
the ASEAN region could be higher relative to the 
baseline by 7.1 per cent, with the largest gains for 
lower-income ASEAN Member States. The model 
also	points	to	a	net	increase	of	14	million	jobs	in	six	
ASEAN economies, accompanied by the expansion 
and decline of specific sectors. However, some of 
the expanding sectors, such as trade and transport 
and construction, are often associated with vulner-
able employment and the informal economy.
Changes in the sectoral distribution of employ-
ment in the region would lead to shifts in occupations 
that are in demand. The largest absolute demand 
will continue to be for low- and medium-skill jobs. 
Nevertheless the occupations projected to grow 
fastest in some economies are high skill.
Demand will increase rapidly for some skills, but 
decrease for others… 
Chapter	 4	 examines	 employment	 growth	 for	
six economies where the labour market impact is 
modelled in detail (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines, Thailand 
and Viet Nam). Overall, for these countries between 
2010 and 2025, high-skill employment could grow 
by	 41.0	 per	 cent.	 Nearly	 one-half	 of	 those	 gains	
would be in Indonesia. However, growth in low-
skill employment could also remain strong – notably 
in Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
and Philippines – highlighting the continued 
importance of ensuring quality standards in basic 
education and training. 
…which necessitates moving up the skills ladder and 
addressing skills gaps by strengthening education and 
training systems
Becoming a regional production centre driven 
by skills, innovation and creativity requires more 
relevant secondary and tertiary education and voca-
tional training, particularly for young women and 
men from rural and poor households. Lacking job-
related skills, too many young people face a difficult 
transition from the classroom to the workplace. 
These challenges reflect broader skills shortages 
and mismatches throughout ASEAN. Employers 
are increasingly demanding a mix of technical 
competencies and core skills such as teamwork and 
communication. However, current trends indi-
cate that by 2025 more than half of all high-skill 
employment in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Philippines, Thailand and 
Viet Nam could be filled by workers with insufficient 
qualifications. Robust skills certification mecha-
nisms and stronger partnerships with employers’ 
and workers’ organizations would also help ASEAN 
Member States to address these skills gaps.
At the same time, enterprises will need to attract 
and retain skilled workers by offering better wages to 
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When rising skills and productivity trans-
late into higher wages, workers will want to spend 
their earnings – strengthening domestic demand 
and reducing the region’s dependency on exports 
(Chapter 5). Wages are also a key mechanism to 
ensure that growth translates into shared prosperity 
and equitable development. Across the ten ASEAN 
Member States, wages are now the main source of 
income for 117 million workers and their families. 
However, in many ASEAN Member States, while 
the purchasing power of wages has grown in recent 
years, the gaps between those at the bottom and at 
the top of the wage distribution have widened.
Furthermore, there are still large differences 
in wage levels between ASEAN Member States – 
ranging	 from	US$119	per	month	 in	Lao	People’s	
Democratic	 Republic	 to	 $3,547	 in	 Singapore.	
These partly reflect substantial differences in labour 
productivity. But in some instances, these produc-
tivity gains have by-passed workers altogether. 
…and stronger wage-setting institutions would 
help ensure that growth is inclusive and prosperity is 
shared
Model simulations indicate that between 2010 
and 2025, productivity in a number of economies 
could double under the AEC. But past trends 
suggest that productivity increases do not translate 
into gains for everyone without stronger wage-set-
ting institutions.
At present, in the private sector in most ASEAN 
Member States there is very little genuine collective 
bargaining between representative trade unions and 
employers. The main mechanism for setting wages 
has been the establishment of minimum wages – and 
if these are not adjusted regularly, industrial relations 
can erupt into conflict. To take due account of the 
interests of workers and employers alike, minimum 
wages should be assessed regularly through robust 
and evidence-based processes. By investing in their 
wage-setting institutions, ASEAN Member States 
can counter rising inequality and encourage enter-
prises to upgrade and enhance productivity.
Economic and demographic disparities are driving 
labour migration, which is primarily low-and 
medium-skilled...
Between	1990	and	2013,	intra-ASEAN	migra-
tion increased from 1.5 million to 6.5 million, with 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand emerging as 
major migration hubs (Chapter 6). Most migrant 
workers are low- and medium-skilled, and the main 
drivers are economic and demographic disparities 
among Member States. Some countries of origin 
have expanding youth populations, which places 
pressure on the labour market to create jobs and can 
lead to outmigration of young women and men. In 
the destination countries the demand for migrants 
has increased due to population ageing, which can 
lead to labour shortages. 
…but the AEC’s provisions for free mobility of high-
skilled workers are likely to have limited impact in the 
short term… 
Although most of the region’s migrant workers 
are low- or medium-skilled, current AEC policies 
for managing migration are confined to high-skill 
occupations. These have established mutual recog-
nition arrangements (MRAs) in eight occupational 
categories. But since these together account for a 
tiny share of total employment the AEC’s provisions 
on labour mobility may have limited short-term 
impact. 
…requiring a focus on skills recognition, social protec-
tion and safeguarding the rights of migrant workers
Migration of low- and medium-skilled workers 
is likely to continue and even increase. Policy makers 
could therefore make migration channels safer, and 
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scope of MRAs to encompass low- and medium-
skilled workers, such as those in the construction, 
garment, fishing and plantation sectors. 
If ASEAN Member States are to reap the 
benefits of labour mobility, they also will need to 
prioritize	three	other	critical	areas:	ratifying,	imple-
menting and enforcing international Conventions; 
extending the coverage and portability of social 
security; and implementing the ASEAN Declaration 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers.
To realize the full potential of the AEC to deliver more 
and better jobs, decisive action is necessary, including 
better management of structural change…
As Chapter 7 highlights, Member States 
will need to facilitate and manage the structural 
change resulting from the AEC. These measures 
include enhancing industrial and sectoral poli-
cies, supporting smaller enterprises, strengthening 
employment and skills policies and improving 
connectivity and infrastructure. At the same time, it 
is critical to build effective social protection systems, 
including for workers in vulnerable employment as 
well as for women and men who are at risk of losing 
their jobs and incomes as some economic sectors 
decline. This should start with the establishment of 
social protection floors.
…and ensuring that economic gains lead to shared 
prosperity… 
Deeper regional integration offers immense 
economic prospects, but translating these gains 
into shared prosperity and equitable develop-
ment requires robust labour market institutions. 
Governments can use these to make growth more 
inclusive and balanced. They can strengthen the 
productivity-wage link through appropriate mecha-
nisms for minimum wage setting and collective 
bargaining, promote gender equality and youth 
employment through access to skills training, and 
protect migrant workers and ensure their equal 
treatment. 
…while also strengthening regional cooperation and 
tripartite dialogue
Realizing the potential of greater integration will 
require deeper regional partnerships. This includes 
implementing landmark ASEAN agreements such 
as the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers and 
the ASEAN Declaration on Strengthening Social 
Protection. Other priorities for regional cooperation 
include expanding mutual recognition arrange-
ments, completing the ASEAN Qualifications 
Reference Framework and strengthening labour 
market information and analysis to help monitor 
the impact of the AEC on labour markets.
Such regional cooperation efforts will need to 
be consistent with national policies. Each Member 
State will need to identify the most appropriate 
sequence of policies for their own circumstances, 
while creating a level field for competition, such 
as through ratification of international labour 
standards. 
Ultimately, the success of ASEAN regional 
integration will depend on how it affects the labour 
market – and therefore on how it improves the 
quality of life of women and men in the region.
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AANZFTA ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area
ADB  Asian Development Bank
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AKFA ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area
ALM ASEAN Labour Ministers
APSC ASEAN Political Security Community
AQRF ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework
ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-6 Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
BIMP-EAGA Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-East ASEAN Growth Area
BPO business process outsourcing
CAFTA China-ASEAN Free Trade Area
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CGE computable general equilibrium
CLMV Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam
COMMIT Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EPS Employment Permit System
FDI foreign direct investment
GDP gross domestic product
GMS Greater Mekong Subregion
IAI Initiative for ASEAN Integration
ICT information and communications technology
ILO International Labour Organization
IMT-GT Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle
ISCO International Standard Classification of Occupations
LFS labour force survey
Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
Mercosur Common Market of the South
MNE multinational enterprise
MOU memorandum of understanding
MRA mutual recognition arrangement
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO non-governmental organization
Abbreviations
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NWC National Wage Council / National Wages Council [of Singapore]
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment
PPP purchasing power parity
PWM Progressive Wage Model
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
roro roll-on/roll-off
SADC Southern African Development Community
SIJORI Singapore-Johor-Riau
SME small and medium-sized enterprise
SRZ subregional economic zone
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TVET technical and vocational education and training
UCS Universal Coverage Scheme
UNDG United Nations Development Group
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WTO World Trade Organization














Strong economic performance has enabled all ten 
ASEAN Member States to achieve significantly 
higher living standards for its 600 million women 
and men. Nevertheless, pervasive vulnerability, 
gender disparities and high youth unemployment 
persist in the region’s labour markets. This contrasts 
with the overall purpose of the ASEAN Community 
to build a region with “sustained economic growth” 
accompanied by “lasting peace, security and stability 
as well as shared prosperity and social progress”. 1
An important part of the ASEAN Community 
vision is the establishment of a globally integrated 
and competitive single market and production 
base, built on the principles of equitable economic 
development and shared prosperity, through the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).2 The AEC 
reflects the contemporary economic challenges 
that Member States face including building 
resilience to global economic volatility, maintaining 
1 ASEAN Charter, Jakarta, Jan. 2008, chapter 1.
2 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, Singapore, Dec. 
2007. The AEC represents one of three pillars of the ASEAN 
Community, in addition to the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
competitiveness with the rise of China and India, 
promoting full and productive employment, and 
mitigating excessive inequality. However, ASEAN 
actions towards regional economic integration 
must not only respond to market-related changes 
in global and regional demand, investments, and 
supply chains. They must also constitute self-
determined and coherent efforts in delivering on 
the social objectives of the ASEAN Community. 
Whether or not the AEC accelerates social 
progress in the region will depend heavily on its 
labour market effects. The AEC will impact labour 
markets directly through the freer flow of skilled 
labour and indirectly through trade and investment 
liberalization measures. Increased openness will also 
have important implications for the structure of 
economies, jobs, skills, wages and labour mobility. 
Understanding this dynamic between the AEC and 
labour markets is critical in determining whether 
regional cooperation will benefit all women and 
men in ASEAN. 
The ASEAN Economic Community 
The AEC is an ambitious effort at deep market 
Over the past 50 years the economic landscape of Southeast Asia has been transformed 
by rapid economic growth and demographic transitions. But countries in the region 
have also been shaped by institutions for regional cooperation. The oldest and best 
known is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is now entering 
a new era as it reaches a major milestone in 2015 – the formation of the ASEAN 
Community.
ASEAN integration 
in the global context














integration, characterized by the free flow of goods, 
services and investment, a freer flow of finan-
cial capital, enhanced connectivity, and expanded 
opportunities for intra-regional labour migration. 
It can be seen as a significant step in the region’s 
post-1997	 reorientation	 –	 away	 from	 traditional	
economic partners, such as Japan, the United States 
and the European Union, and towards the region 
itself, as well as to emerging markets such as China 
and India.3
The current design of ASEAN regional 
economic cooperation has also been shaped by more 
recent global economic shocks, such as the collapse 
of the United States subprime mortgage market and 
the eurozone debt crisis. While ASEAN economies 
have weathered these storms, many of the world’s 
leading industrialized countries are struggling to 
shake off the effects of recession.
Each pillar of the ASEAN Community has a 
corresponding Blueprint that states the objectives 
and the planned actions to which Member States 
have committed. The Blueprint for the AEC is a 
binding Declaration containing 17 core elements 
and	176	priority	actions	which	rest	on	four	pillars:	
(i) a single market and production base; (ii) a 
highly competitive economic region; (iii) a region 
of equitable economic development; and (iv) a 
region fully integrated into the global economy.4 
Economic integration, as envisioned in the AEC 
Blueprint, is not limited to liberalization of trade 
and investment, but is rather a comprehensive 
and multifaceted effort which addresses disparities 
within and between countries, intra- and inter-state 
3	 The	 inward	 orientation	 of	 ASEAN	 has	 been	 described	 as	
a response to external shocks and a strategy to increase 
resilience.	 See	G.	Chin:	 “Asian	 regionalism	 after	 the	 global	
financial	 crisis”,	 in	 G.	 Capannelli	 and	 M.	 Kawai	 (eds.):	
The political economy of Asian regionalism (New York and 
London,	Springer,	2014),	pp.	39-58.	For	 further	discussion	
on	 increased	 ASEAN	 integration	 with	 China,	 see:	 K.	 Gu,	
and	 Q.	 Zhang:	 Prospects glimmer for China to be poised 
for CAFTA: Managing integration for shared prosperity 
and social progress, background paper prepared for ASEAN 
Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and 
shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
4	 ASEAN	Economic	Blueprint,	Singapore,	20	Dec.	2007.
infrastructure development, small and medium-
sized enterprise development, as well as the mobility 
of skilled labour (Box 1-1). The AEC Blueprint also 
addresses new areas of regional economic integra-
tion dealing with “behind-the-border” measures 
and domestic regulation.
The AEC Blueprint includes a strategic schedule 
of priority actions to be undertaken over four bien-
nials from 2008 to 2015, and progress is being 
monitored through a scorecard. Launched in 2008, 
this self-assessment tool tracks the actions that must 
be undertaken by ASEAN Member States, both 
individually and collectively, and registers the achieve-
ment of its milestones.5 Across the four components 
between 2008 and 2011, ASEAN achieved 67.5 per 
cent of the AEC targets (Table 1-1).
Economic progress
As a whole, ASEAN’s recent economic perform-
ance	has	been	remarkable.	In	2013,	ASEAN’s	gross	
domestic	 product	 (GDP)	 stood	 at	 $2.4	 trillion,	
accounting	for	3.3	per	cent	of	the	world’s	economy.	
During	 the	 period	 2007-13,	 ASEAN	 economies,	
with the exception of Brunei Darussalam, grew 
faster than the global average, proving relatively 
resilient to successive international crises in the late-
5	 ADB:	Asian Economic Integration Monitor – March 2013 
(Manila,	2013).




1. Single market and production base 65.9
2. Competitive economic region 67.9
3. Equitable economic development 66.7
4. Integration into the global economy 85.7
Total across four pillars 67.5
Note: As of Dec. 2011. 
Source: ASEAN: ASEAN Economic Blueprint Scorecard: Charting 
progress toward regional economic integration phase I (2008-09) and 
phase II (2010-11) (Jakarta, 2013).














Single market and production base: 
According to the AEC Blueprint, the single 
market and production base will comprise five 
core elements: the free flow of goods, services 
and investment, a freer flow of capital and the 
free flow of skilled labour. In regard to trade 
liberalization, significant achievements have 
been made in terms of tariff reductions through 
the 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement. 
More recently, trade facilitation efforts are 
underway, such as the pilot single window 
project in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Conversely, service 
sector trade liberalization has been modest 
and success in the removal of non-tariff trade 
barriers has been limited. In addition, despite 
the 2012 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement, only half the investment meas-
ures specified in the AEC Blueprint have been 
implemented. Finally, in terms of the free flow 
of skilled labour, Member States have adopted 
a framework for mutual recognition arrange-
ments for eight high-skill professions – though 
their impact on current migration trends may be 
limited (see Chapter 6). 
Competitive economic region: A single 
market and production base through the AEC 
will depend on fair competition, intellectual 
property policy, and infrastructure development. 
These elements contribute to the region’s busi-
ness environment, increase the attractiveness to 
foreign investment, and facilitate the establish-
ment of production networks. Most countries 
have enacted national competition statutes and 
there are regional guidelines on competition. 
In addition, in 2011, Member States adopted 
the ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Action 
Plan 2011-2015 – though this lacks a harmo-
nized enforcement system. Despite a number 
of agreements, many planned initiatives in the 
transportation sector remain incomplete. 
Equitable economic development: The 
AEC Blueprint outlines objectives in terms of 
narrowing development gaps between Member 
States and underscores the importance of 
protecting and promoting small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are important 
because they are prominent providers of employ-
ment and income, and contribute to gender 
and youth empowerment through business 
participation. However, increased competition 
may hinder SMEs if their specific needs and 
concerns (for example, access to information, 
markets, skills development, technology and 
finance) are not addressed. Initiatives aimed 
at increasing SME capacity to leverage ASEAN 
integration are guided by the Strategic Action 
Plan for ASEAN SME Development 2010-2015. 
To address intra-regional gaps and complement 
the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, in 2011, 
Member States adopted the ASEAN Framework 
for Equitable Economic Development which 
highlights the need to promote human devel-
opment, private sector industrial collaboration, 
SME development, job creation and improve 
the quality and coverage of systems of social 
protection. 
Integration in the global economy: ASEAN 
has concluded a series of trade agreements 
with regional partners, including Australia, 
China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and 
New Zealand. ASEAN’s international integration 
initiatives are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
Source: ASEAN: ASEAN Economic Blueprint Scorecard: Charting progress toward regional economic integration phase I (2008-09) and phase II 
(2010-11), op. cit.; ASEAN Economic Blueprint, op. cit.; ASEAN Strategic Action Plan for SME Development 2010-2015, Jakarta, 2010; S. Basu 
Das (ed.): The ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard: Performance and perception (Singapore, ISEAS Publishing, 2013); S. Basu Das et al. 
(eds.): The ASEAN Economic Community: A work in progress (Singapore, ISEAS Publishing, 2013).
Box 1-1 The state of the AEC














2000s.	 In	 2013,	GDP	 growth	 for	 the	world	 as	 a	
whole	was	3.0	per	cent,	but	for	ASEAN	it	was	4.9	
per cent.6
The recent lacklustre performance of the 
world’s largest economies – the European Union, 
6	 IMF:	World	Economic	Outlook	Database,	Apr.	2014.
Japan and the United States – has encouraged 
ASEAN Member States to look for other markets, 
particularly in developing Asia. Between 2000 and 
2012, the combined share of ASEAN total trade with 
the European Union and the United States fell from 
29.8	per	cent	to	17.9	per	cent,	while	China’s	share	
rose	from	4.4	per	cent	to	13.1	per	cent.	Moreover,	
Table 1-2 Intra-ASEAN trade, 2012 ($ million and per cent)
Country
Intra-ASEAN exports Intra-ASEAN imports Intra-ASEAN trade
Value
($ million)








Share of total 
trade (per cent)
Brunei Darussalam 1 564 13.1 3 021 45.2 4 586 24.6
Cambodia 1 319 16.8 8 974 58.6 10 293 44.5
Indonesia 41 831 22.0 53 661 28.0 95 492 25.0
Lao PDR 1 545 46.5 4 463 70.4 6 008 62.2
Malaysia 68 661 27.6 54 866 27.9 123 527 27.7
Myanmar 3 787 45.8 6 389 37.3 10 176 40.1
Philippines 9 801 18.9 15 523 22.9 25 324 21.1
Singapore 130 010 31.7 79 841 21.0 209 851 26.6
Thailand 56 155 24.6 40 603 16.1 96 758 20.2
Viet Nam 17 312 15.6 20 758 18.6 38 070 17.1
ASEAN 331 987 26.1 288 099 23.1 620 085 24.7
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF): Direction of Trade Statistics Database.
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Figure 1-1 FDI inflows to ASEAN and the world, 2006-12 (Index, 2006=100)
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while India’s share in 2012 was only 2.8 per cent 
it was still ASEAN’s ninth biggest trade partner. 
Table 1-2 shows that in 2012 intra-ASEAN trade as 
a	share	of	ASEAN’s	total	trade	was	24.7	per	cent	–	a	
rise from 22.7 per cent in 2000. This is similar to 
the combined shares of other major trading part-
ners:	China,	Japan	and	Republic	of	Korea	(29.0	per	
cent);	the	European	Union	and	United	States	(17.9	
per cent); and the rest of the world (25.6 per cent).7 
Among ASEAN Member States, trade with other 
ASEAN partners was the most important for Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic but the least impor-
tant for Viet Nam.
In recent years, ASEAN has seen a consistent 
surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, 
in contrast to the rest of the world (Figure 1-1). 
Following	the	crisis	years	of	2008	and	2009,	world	
FDI inflows plateaued while those to ASEAN rose 
by	two	per	cent	to	$111.3	billion	–	an	all-time	high	
and	a	30.0	per	cent	increase	from	the	2007	pre-crisis	
level. The share of ASEAN FDI inflows in world 
FDI inflows is now similar to that of China and 
substantially higher than that of India.8 In 2011, 
for the first time, the region’s main source of flows 
switched from the European Union to ASEAN 
itself. Between 2000 and 2012, intra-ASEAN flows 
as	a	proportion	of	total	FDI	rose	steadily	from	4.0	
per cent to 18.0 per cent – increasing in value by 
23	times.9 By contrast, during the same period FDI 
from non-ASEAN partners increased only by a 
factor of five.
In the last five years, ASEAN received over 
$400	billion	in	FDI	–	of	which	$271	billion	came	
from within Asia ($68 billion of this was intra-
ASEAN).10 In 2012, a large proportion of FDI going 
to Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic 




10	 ADB	estimates	based	on	ADB:	Asian Economic Integration 
Monitor – April 2014	(Manila,	2014).
Nam originated in Asia – shares of Asian FDI in 
total FDI ranged from 62.5 per cent (Myanmar) to 
89.8	per	cent	(Malaysia).	In	contrast,	FDI	inflows	
to Brunei Darussalam, Philippines and Singapore 
came mostly from outside Asia.
ASEAN’s role as an export base and its large 
domestic markets have also boosted other intra-
regional financial linkages. Due in part to the Asia 
Bond Markets Initiative there has been an expan-
sion in local currency bond markets, especially 
for corporate bonds – though intra-ASEAN bond 
and equity holdings are smaller than non-ASEAN 
investor holdings of ASEAN bonds and equities.11 
Since the global financial crisis there has also been 
an increase in intra-regional bank credit flows. 
Another important factor in ASEAN economic 
growth has been labour mobility. Since the early 
1990s,	 the	number	of	 intra-ASEAN	migrants	has	
increased from 1.5 million to 6.5 million.12 This 
issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
The social context 
Deeper market integration and economic 
progress have spurred important social develop-
ments. ASEAN’s middle-class workforce is rapidly 
expanding.	 Between	 1991	 and	 2013,	 83	 million	
workers rose to middle-class status in Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific, and the share of middle-class workers 
in	 total	 employment	 increased	 from	12.4	per	cent	
to	35.1	per	cent.13 Strong investment and sustained 
growth are expected to lead to a continued expan-
sion	of	the	middle	class	to	144	million	by	2017.	
Nevertheless, there remain significant levels 
of poverty. In some countries, while a smaller 
11	 ADB:	Asian Integration Monitor – March 2013, op. cit.
12	 UN:	 Trends	 in	 International	 Migrant	 Stock:	 The	 2013	
Revision Database.
13 The middle class is defined as those living in households with 
per	capita	income	of	$4	or	more	per	day.	Southeast	Asia	and	
the Pacific includes all ten ASEAN Member States as well as 
Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. S. 
Kapsos	and	E.	Bourmpoula:	Employment and economic class 
in the developing world, ILO Research Paper No. 6 (Geneva, 
ILO,	2013).














proportion of the workforce is now living in poor 
households, their absolute numbers have risen. For 
instance,	 in	 Cambodia	 between	 1994	 and	 2008	
the share of workers living on less than $2 per day 
declined	 from	 75.3	 per	 cent	 to	 49.6	 per	 cent	 of	
total employment, but the number of poor workers 
increased	 from	3.3	million	 to	 3.7	million.	 In	 the	
Philippines	between	1991	 and	2009,	 the	 share	of	
the	working	poor	fell	from	50.0	per	cent	to	37.2	per	
cent, but the number living on less than $2 per day 
rose	from	11.2	to	13	million.	In	addition,	there	has	
been an increase in both the share and the numbers 
of those living just above the poverty line, indicating 
that poverty alleviation gains may easily be reversed 
by sudden shocks and instability. 
Furthermore, in some ASEAN Member States 
economic growth has been accompanied by signifi-
cant disparities in income and expenditure. This is 
evident from the Gini coefficients which range from 
35.6	to	46.2	across	the	seven	economies	for	which	
data	are	available	(Table	1-3).	Another	indicator	of	
inequality is the quintile ratio – the ratio of the per 
capita expenditure of the top 20 per cent of house-
holds to that of the bottom 20 per cent. This ranged 
from	5.9	in	Viet	Nam	and	Lao	People’s	Democratic	
Republic	in	2008	to	11.3	in	Malaysia	in	2009.	Three	
out of the seven countries in the table experienced 
a rise in quintile ratios over the two decade period, 
indicating a rise in income inequality.
In the larger ASEAN economies, inequality is 
higher in urban areas. In Indonesia, for example, the 
2011	Gini	coefficient	for	rural	areas	was	34.0	while	
for	urban	areas	 it	was	42.2.14 Inequality may lead 
to the misallocation of capital and hamper poverty 
reduction and growth, possibly eroding social cohe-
sion, and institutional stability. It also runs counter 
to the AEC’s overarching goal of equitable growth 
with reduced development gaps between and within 
Member States. 
14	 ADB:	Asian Development Outlook 2012: Confronting rising 
inequality in Asia (Manila, 2012).
Another major issue for ASEAN has been dispar-
ities between the six more developed Member States, 
namely Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (ASEAN-6) 
and the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam). To 
address these disparities, the Initiative for ASEAN 
Integration (IAI), launched in 2000, focuses on 
gaps in priority areas such as infrastructure, human 
resource development, information and communi-
cations technologies, capacity building, and poverty 
reduction. The IAI has been reasonably successful. 
Between 2000 and 2011, the ratio between the 
per capita income of the ASEAN-6 and that of the 
CLMV	 countries	 fell	 from	 3.4	 to	 2.6.	 Similarly,	
between 2000 and 2010 the gap in primary school 
enrolment rates declined from 16.2 percentage points 
to	4.0	percentage	points.15 There has been significant 
progress, however much remains to be done.
15	 ASEAN:	ASEAN brief 2012: Progress towards the ASEAN 
Community	(Jakarta,	Mar.	2013).
Table 1-3 Inequality in ASEAN, earliest year in 
1990s and most recent year
































































Note: Gini coefficients and quintile ratios are based on per capita 
expenditure, except for Malaysia which is income-based. The quintile 
ratio is the ratio of the per capita expenditure of the top 20 per cent of 
households to that of the bottom 20 per cent.
Source: ADB: Asian Development Outlook 2012: Confronting rising 
inequality in Asia, op. cit.; World Bank: PovcalNet, Apr. 2013.














ASEAN’s population of approximately 600 million 
people accounts for 8.6 per cent of the world total. 
This is equivalent to the combined populations of 
Latin America and the Caribbean (606 million), 
considerably larger than the population of the 
European Union (506 million) and double that 
of	 the	 United	 States	 (312	 million).	 Since	 1990,	
ASEAN’s population has almost doubled, and by 
2025	is	expected	to	reach	694	million.	
ASEAN is experiencing significant demo-
graphic change – at both ends of the age spectrum 
– with declining proportions of young people ages 
15	 to	 24	 and	 increasing	 proportions	 of	 elderly	
people ages 65 and above (Figure 1-2 and Annex 
F, Figure F2-1b). However, the profile differs from 
country to country. In Indonesia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, and Philippines in 2025 
youth will account for more than 17 per cent of the 
population, while in Singapore and Thailand their 
share will be less than 11.5 per cent. Between 2010 
and 2025, the Philippines will see its working-age 
population	expand	by	35.0	per	cent.	In	Myanmar	
and Viet Nam, on the other hand, over the same 
period the working-age population will increase by 
only	14.0	per	cent	and	12.4	per	cent	 respectively,	
while in Thailand it will contract by 1.1 per cent. 
During this period, the proportion of the elderly in 
Thailand’s	population	will	have	risen	from	8.9	per	
cent	 to	16.1	per	 cent,	 and	 in	Singapore	 from	9.0	
per	cent	to	17.3	per	cent.	These	varied	ageing	trends	
will affect the labour supply and social protection 
expenditure, as well as labour migration.
As indicated in Figure 1-2, in the near future, 
the ASEAN region as a whole will experience lower 
birth rates and a rising share of the working-age 
population, with 68 million new entrants to the 
labour force until 2025, suggesting a potential 
demographic dividend. However, the situation will 
vary by country. In Indonesia and Viet Nam, for 
example, if appropriate social and economic poli-
cies are in place, lower birth rates and decreasing 
dependency ratios could facilitate accelerated growth 
and increases in per capita income. Conversely, 
in rapidly ageing societies such as Thailand, this 
window of opportunity will slowly narrow.
Another important demographic issue is the 
unprecedented speed of urbanization taking place 
in	 the	 ASEAN.	 Between	 1950	 and	 2011,	 the	
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tion of agriculture and new industries in urban areas 
offering higher-paying jobs, are attracting people 
from the countryside. However, the opportuni-
ties from urban agglomeration do not necessarily 
translate into better working and living conditions. 
Urbanization is often accompanied by an expan-
sion in informal and vulnerable employment, as 
urban labour markets struggle to absorb the rapidly 
increasing labour force. 
The labour market
ASEAN Member States differ markedly in terms 
of labour supply, skills, wages, and productivity 
(Table	 1-4).	The	 labour	 force	 varies	 widely	 from	
186,000 in Brunei Darussalam to 118.2 million 
in Indonesia. With respect to skills, most countries 
have high literacy rates among the working-age 
population. However, enrolment in technical 
and vocational education and training (TVET) 
programmes remains inadequate while increasing 
the relevance of higher education is a challenge in 
many countries. 
Productivity (the value added per worker) 
varies greatly and correlates with the skills of the 
workforce	 (see	Chapters	4	and	5).	Annual	output	
per worker in Thailand, for example, is nearly four 
times the level in Cambodia. Disparities are also 
marked when it comes to wages. For instance, a 
worker in Malaysia earns, on average, more than 
three times the monthly salary of an Indonesian 
worker. These differences partly explain patterns of 
regional labour migration (see Chapter 6). 
The region’s labour market also has pronounced 
gender	disparities.	Between	2010	and	2013	labour	
force participation rates remained steady at slightly 
more than 70 per cent (Annex F, Table F1-2). 
However,	 the	 rate	 for	women	was	 around	 59	 per	
cent, while that for men was about 82 per cent.17 In 
17 The gender gap in the labour force participation rates in ASEAN 
(23.0	per	cent)	is	significantly	higher	than	that	in	China	(12.3	
per cent), and developed economies and the European Union 
(14.5	per	cent).	Conversely,	gender	disparities	in	ASEAN	are	
considerably	lower	than	in	India	(54.0	per	cent).
Table 1-4 Selected labour market indicators in ASEAN, most recent year
Labour force 
(000s)(a)




















Brunei Darussalam 186  95.4  11.4  24.3 ... 100 015
Cambodia 7 400  73.9  2.3  15.8 121 3 989
Indonesia 118 193  92.8  18.0  27.2 174 9 848
Lao PDR 3 080  72.7  0.8  16.7 119 5 396
Malaysia 13 785  93.1  6.8  36.0 609 35 751
Myanmar  30 121  92.7  …  13.8 ... 2 828
Philippines 41 022  95.4  …  28.2 206 10 026
Singapore 3 444  95.9  11.6 ... 3 547 98 072
Thailand 39 398  93.5  15.4  51.4 357 14 754
Viet Nam 53 246  93.4  …  24.6 181 5 440
Note: “... “ = data not available. 2013 labour force data, except for Brunei Darussalam (2011), Cambodia (2012) and Lao PDR (2010).
Source: (a) Official national sources; ILO estimates; (b) Chapter 4, Table 4-1; (c) Annex F, Table F1-8; (d) Annex F, Table F2-4.















percentage points. Gender gap in wages is also stark. 
On average, women in Cambodia and Singapore, 
for instance, earn about one-quarter less than men 
(Annex F, Table F1-8). Moreover, as indicated in 
the next section, women in ASEAN are also at a 
disadvantage in securing decent employment. 
Employment trends
In recent years employment growth has slowed in 
ASEAN.	 In	 2012,	 employment	 grew	 by	 1.9	 per	
cent,	 and	 in	2013	by	 only	 1.5	per	 cent	 –	 on	par	
with	the	global	rate	of	1.4	per	cent.18 This is notably 
faster than in East Asia, where growth in total 




ASEAN has also seen a decline in its 
18	 ILO:	Trends	Econometric	Models,	Jan.	2014.
unemployment	 rate	 from	4.7	per	cent	 in	2010	to	
4.2	 per	 cent	 in	 2013	 –	 in	 line	 with	 other	 Asian	
subregions, and lower than the global rate of six per 
cent. However, the situation is more concerning 
for	young	women	and	men	(Figure	1-3).	ASEAN’s	
youth	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 2013	 was	 13.1	 per	
cent and higher in some larger economies – 21.6 
per cent in Indonesia, for example, and 16.6 per 
cent in the Philippines. Although ASEAN’s youth 
unemployment rate is similar to the global rate, it 
is higher than those in East Asia and South Asia 
(roughly ten per cent). High youth unemployment 
imposes social and economic costs and results in the 
loss of opportunities for economic growth.19
For those able to find employment, a major 
concern is poor job quality. Vulnerable employment, 
defined as own-account and contributing family 
workers, often entails less formal arrangements and 
19	 ILO:	 The youth employment crisis: A call for action, 
Resolution and conclusions of the International Labour 
Conference, 101st session (Geneva, 2012).
Note: Preliminary 2013 data, except for Cambodia (2012), Lao PDR (2010) and Malaysia (2012).
Source: Annex F, Tables F1-4 and F1-5.
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Figure 1-3 Unemployment rate, total and youth, most recent year (per cent)
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In September 2000, world leaders endorsed the 
Millennium Declaration, a commitment to work 
together to build a safer, more prosperous and 
equitable world. The Declaration was translated 
into a roadmap setting out eight time-bound and 
measurable goals to be reached by 2015, known 
as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The ILO takes the lead in reporting on the 
achievement of full and productive employment 
and decent work for all, including women and 
young people. This is covered by target 1B under 
the first MDG, on the eradication of poverty and 
hunger. Target 1B indicators are: (i) growth rate 
of GDP per person employed, or labour produc-
tivity; (ii) employment-to-population ratio; (iii) 
proportion of employed people living under $1 
(PPP) per day; and (iv) proportion of own-account 
and contributing family workers, defined as those 
vulnerably employed in total employment.
Source: ILO: The Millennium Declaration, the MDGs and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda: Overview (Geneva, 2010).
Box 1-2 The ILO and the Millennium Development Goals










Figure 1-4 Vulnerable employment as a share of total employment by sex, 
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Labour issues span all pillars of the ASEAN 
Community. The labour components of the 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) inter-
twine with and complement the AEC’s labour 
ramifications. These components include 
supporting decent work principles, ensuring 
adequate protection for migrant workers, and 
promoting investment in human resource and 
skills upgrading, particularly of vulnerable 
groups. Finally, labour issues in the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community (APSC) include 
the need to strengthen the criminal justice 
response to trafficking persons and provide 
better protection for victims of trafficking.
The ASEAN Labour Ministers’ Meeting leads 
the work on regional cooperation on labour and 
oversees labour-related initiatives to the AEC 
and ASCC. According to the ASEAN Labour 
Ministers’ (ALM) Work Programme 2010-2015, 
regional cooperation in labour aims at better 
equipping the labour force to benefit from and 
cope with the challenges from economic inte-
gration. The work programme identifies the legal 
protection of labour rights and working condi-
tions as a strategic priority, and underscores the 
importance of workforce development, decent 
employment opportunities and labour law, 
among other areas.
In addition, ASEAN has adopted regional 
Declarations in a series of critical areas. The 
initiatives with labour market implications 
include:
Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration on Youth 
Entrepreneurship and Employment: Persistently 
high youth unemployment has been a growing 
concern and directly threatens the goals of 
sustained growth, shared prosperity and equi-
table economic development of the ASEAN 
Community. In response, Member States 
adopted the Declaration at the 23rd ASEAN 
Summit, which recognizes the need to secure 
decent work and livelihood opportunities for 
young women and men.
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Rights of Migrant Workers: In 2007, 
Member States adopted the Declaration, which 
determines that all countries should strengthen 
the political, economic and social pillars of the 
ASEAN Community by safeguarding the rights 
of migrants in accordance with national laws 
and regulations.
Declaration on Strengthening Social 
Protection: In 2013 ASEAN leaders adopted the 
Declaration, laying out concrete actions towards 
improving the quality, coverage and sustain-
ability of social protection. The Declaration 
also refers to the ILO Social Protection Floor 
Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202), and the 
universal right to social security. However, it is 
important to note that the ILO Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 
102), has not yet been ratified by any ASEAN 
Member State.
Statement on Human Resources and 
Skills Development for Economic Recovery and 
Sustainable Growth: Recognizing the impor-
tance of human resources and the current 
global economic challenges, ASEAN leaders in 
Ha Noi in 2010 adopted the Statement, which 
stresses the need to foster technical coopera-
tion and capacity building to support the skill 
development of workers.
Source: ASEAN Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration on Youth Entrepreneurship and Employment, Bandar Seri Begawan, Oct. 2013; ASEAN 
Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection, Bandar Seri Begawan, Oct. 2013; ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers, Cebu, Jan. 2007; ASEAN Labour Ministers’ Work Programme, 2010-2015, Jakarta, Nov. 2013; ASEAN Leaders 
Statement on Human Resources and Skills Development for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth, Hanoi, Oct. 2010.
Box 1-3 Improving job quality through regional cooperation














inadequate working conditions and social protec-
tion. Their prevalence is associated with higher 
poverty, and therefore reducing vulnerable employ-
ment is critical towards achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (Box 1-2). According to the 
most recent data, 58.8 per cent of ASEAN workers 
(179	 million)	 were	 in	 vulnerable	 employment,	
compared	to	48.0	per	cent	of	the	world’s	workers.20
The significantly higher proportion of vulner-
able employment in ASEAN is marked by gender 
differences. In seven of the eight ASEAN Member 
States for which there are available data, the share of 
women vulnerably employed surpasses that of men 
(Figure	 1-4).	 Vulnerable	 employment	 in	 ASEAN	
may be explained by difficulties in transitioning 
from informal to formal employment. In Indonesia, 
Philippines and Viet Nam, approximately seven 
in ten non-agricultural workers are informally 
employed and lack basic social or legal protection 
20	 ILO:	Trends	Econometric	Models,	Jan.	2014.
and employment benefits.21
Low-quality employment is linked to low earn-
ings; hence, a considerable number of workers still 
earn	too	little	to	escape	poverty.	Approximately	92	
million ASEAN workers live on less than $2 per 
day	–	30.3	per	cent	of	all	workers.22 By comparison, 
the global rate is 26.7 per cent of total employment 
and in East Asia it is only 11.2 per cent, though 
it is much higher in South Asia at 61.5 per cent. 
Enhancing the quality of employment requires 
not only sound national policies but also stronger 
regional	cooperation	efforts	(Box	1-3).
Social protection 
Although all ASEAN Member States have relevant 
institutions in place, the provision of social protec-
tion remains limited (Figure 1-5). Globally, public 
21	 ILO:	 Statistical update on employment in the informal 
economy (Geneva, 2012).
22	 ILO:	Trends	Econometric	Models,	Jan.	2014.
Source: ILO: World Social Protection Report 2014/15: Building economic recovery, inclusive development and social justice, op. cit.
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Figure 1-5 Public social security expenditure, most recent year (per cent of GDP)
Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam
























investment in social protection programmes averages 
8.6 per cent of GDP.23 In ASEAN, the investment is 
much	lower:	the	highest	commitment	is	in	Thailand,	
at 7.2 per cent of GDP, while the lowest levels are in 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and 
Philippines, at less than two per cent.24 It will be 
important therefore to extend the coverage and level 
of benefits, especially to informal and rural workers. 
In the context of the AEC, social protection will 
play a particularly important role by compensating 
for the short-term loss of income in industries that 
lose competitive advantages. It can facilitate access to 
education and skills upgrading, with impacts on the 
overall productivity of the workforce and economic 
growth in the longer term, while also contributing 
to wider poverty reduction goals. In addition, social 
protection can contribute to resilience and facilitate 
quick recovery in the face of natural shocks.
23	 ILO:	 World Social Protection Report 2014/15: Building 
economic recovery, inclusive development and social justice 
(Geneva,	2014).
24 This includes public social security and health expenditures.
Recognizing that social protection is important 
to combat poverty, inequality and exclusion, certain 
ASEAN Member States have recently included social 
protection in their respective national economic 
development plans – as in Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Viet Nam. However, few countries 
have committed to ensuring basic and universal 
social protection, especially among the poor and 
those	from	rural	areas	(see	Box	1-4).	Furthermore,	
many people are left without social security coverage 
due to policy fragmentation and lack of institutional 
coordination. Ensuring access for all will mean 
extending the reach of social protection provisions.
Labour standards
ASEAN’s challenge of poor job quality is linked 
to the limited adoption and enforcement of inter-
nationally recognized labour standards. Although 
there	has	been	some	progress	since	1995,	ASEAN	
Member States lag behind world ratification rates 
of fundamental ILO Conventions – including 
those on freedom of association and the right to 
By law, all Thai citizens belong to one of the 
country’s social health protection systems, which 
include: (i) the Civil Servant Medical Benefit 
Scheme, for central government employees and 
other public servants; (ii) the Social Security 
Scheme, for private employees; and (iii) the 
Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS), which 
covers 76.0 per cent of the population, including 
those working in the informal economy. Thailand 
reached near-universal health coverage in 2002, 
shortly after the launch of the UCS.
The UCS provides a comprehensive benefit 
package, free at the point of service. Since its 
launch, the UCS has improved access to health 
care and reduced health care costs, especially for 
the poorest quintile. Thai citizens pay only 13.7 
per cent of total health care expenditure while 
the Government spends approximately $93 per 
person per year on healthcare, which represents 
14.5 per cent of the national budget. 
Amidst economic recession, Thailand 
financed the UCS by re-allocating public spending 
and increasing taxes on luxury goods, alcohol and 
tobacco. Though there is still room for improve-
ment, Thailand has demonstrated that investing 
in social protection need not wait for economic 
growth but can take place simultaneously. 
Source: L. Tessier: Thailand: Universal health coverage, Social Protection in Action: Innovative Experiences (Geneva, 2014); T. Sakunphanit and 
W. Suwanrada: “Thailand: The universal coverage scheme”, in UNDP, Global South-South Development Academy and ILO: Sharing innovative 
experiences: Successful social protection floor experiences, Vol. 18 (New York, UNDP, 2011), pp. 387-400. 
Box 1-4 Thailand’s universal health care system













text collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms 
of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of 
child labour, and the elimination of discrimination 
in	employment	and	occupation.	Globally,	74.6	per	
cent of ILO Member States have ratified the eight 
fundamental Conventions, but only three of the ten 
ASEAN Members States have done so.25
 The future of ASEAN and the success of the 
ASEAN Economic Community will depend on 
economic development that is accompanied by 
decent working conditions. Commitments on 
labour standards would contribute to the AEC 
25 C. Thamparipattra, ASEAN Member States and international 
labour standards: An information note with particular 
emphasis on fundamental ILO conventions, background 
paper prepared for ASEAN Community 2015: Managing 
integration for better jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, 
ILO, forthcoming).
in a number of ways.26 First, labour standards 
promote social development, social cohesion and 
poverty alleviation by safeguarding the basic rights 
of workers and ensuring that all have an oppor-
tunity to benefit from the economic gains from 
integration. Second, international labour standards 
can guide the management of short-term nega-
tive labour market effects in national sectors that 
have comparative disadvantages within the AEC. 
Third, internationally recognized standards level the 
playing field for enterprises and help avoid a “race 
to the bottom”. Although labour standards are not 
subject to multilateral trade rules and disciplines 
at the World Trade Organization, labour standards 
have been increasingly included in regional and 
26 C. Thamparipattra, op. cit.
Table 1-5 Ratification of core labour Conventions, year of ratification







Forced labour Discrimination Child labour
C87 C98 C29 C105 C100 C111 C138 C182
Brunei Darussalam … … … … … … 2011 2008 2 
Cambodia 1999 1999 1969 1999 1999 1999 1999 2006 8 
Indonesia 1998 1957 1950 1999 1958 1999 1999 2000 8 
Lao PDR … … 1964 … 2008 2008 2005 2005 5 
Malaysia … 1961 1957 1958 (a) 1997 … 1997 2000 5 
Myanmar 1955 … 1955 … … … … 2013 3 
Philippines 1953 1953 2005 1960 1953 1960 1998 2000 8 
Singapore … 1965 1965 1965 (a) 2002 … 2005 2001 5 
Thailand … … 1969 1969 1999 … 2004 2001 5 
Viet Nam … … 2007 … 1997 1997 2003 2000 5 
ASEAN 
(number of countries 
per Convention)
4 5 9 4 8 5 9 10 54 (b)
World 
(185 Member States)
153 164 177 174 171 172 167 179 1357 (c) 
Note: “…” indicates Convention not ratified; (a) C105 was denounced by Malaysia in 1990 and Singapore in 1979; (b) total number of ratifications out of 
80; (c) total number of ratifications out of 1,480. 
Source: ILO: NORMLEX Database, May 2014.
















Despite significant progress, ASEAN may not 
achieve all AEC targets by the December 2015 
deadline. Difficulties have arisen from structural 
differences among Member States and intra-re-
gional conflicts, as well as from the changing global 
economic and political landscape.28 Nevertheless, 
economic integration can be seen as a longer-term 
process for which ASEAN leaders have estab-
lished a solid base. Continued progress will require 
sustained political will, coordination, capacity 
building, and the strengthening of national and 
regional institutions.
As this chapter and the rest of the report make 
clear, the AEC is likely to have far-reaching conse-
quences for ASEAN workers given the breadth 
and depth of economic integration that has been 
planned and is being implemented. The AEC is 
expected to precipitate national and regional trans-
formation of economies, which in turn will force 
ASEAN Member States to confront key issues 
related to job gains and losses, skills development, 
wages, labour migration and the strengthening of 
social protection systems.
The true success of the AEC, however, will 
not be reflected in either the AEC implementation 
rate at the end of 2015 or the extent that the AEC 
increases regional trade and investment. It will ulti-
mately depend on how much each ASEAN citizen 
prospers from deeper economic integration. While 
the economic and political-security domains have 
taken precedence in prior ASEAN initiatives, the 
social and labour dimensions may now be critical 
27	 In	 the	 1996	World	Trade	Organization	 (WTO)	Ministerial	
Meeting in Singapore, the WTO recognized the importance 
of labour rights and standards, rejected the utilization of 
these for protectionist purposes and identified the ILO as the 
competent body.
28	 S.Y.	 Chia:	 The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, 
challenges, and prospects,	ADBI	Working	Paper	440	(Tokyo,	
ADBI,	2013).
in determining the success of current and future 
ASEAN region integration efforts.























All these extra-block regional initiatives contribute 
to the AEC goal of full integration in the global 
economy by promoting trade and investment 
creation and diversification as well as facilitating 
ASEAN’s engagement in global and regional supply 
chains. They also promote physical connectivity 
as a core strategy to lower barriers to trade and 
investment. 
Building physical connectivity
Many of the poor in the ASEAN region live 
in remote or isolated areas, often in regions close 
to their borders. Such communities can be better 
linked through cross-border infrastructure. The aim 
should be to connect contiguous areas of neigh-
bouring countries not just to commercial and 
industrial centres in their own countries but also to 
those in other countries and beyond. This kind of 
economic integration should however be carefully 
planned so as to ensure equitable distribution of the 
costs and benefits.
Better roads, railways, and airways as well as 
telecommunications, facilitate the movement of 
goods, capital, labour, people and ideas among coun-
tries and reduce overall transaction costs. They also 
increase employment – either immediately through 
work on the construction of physical infrastructure 
or through the labour required for the manufacture 
of core inputs such as cement, asphalt and steel. In 
addition, there could be more employment in agri-
culture, if farmers can rely on better roads to deliver 
their products, and in industry if better-integrated 
transport infrastructure enables manufacturers to 
reduce delivery costs. Employment is also boosted 
in service industries whose workers become more 
productive because of access to faster broadband. 
Maximizing such benefits will require coordi-
nation among national- or provincial-level decision 
makers, in providing not just the “hard” infra-
structure but also the institutions that form the 
appropriate “soft” infrastructure. Planning and 
implementation also need to involve full consulta-
tions with local communities and stakeholders.
To help develop such infrastructure, in 2010, 
Countries across the region have benefited from a broad range of initiatives – ASEAN, 
ASEAN+ and non-ASEAN – that help share the benefits of economic growth within 
the region. The previous chapter presented the rationale and objectives of ASEAN. 
This chapter covers ASEAN+ trade agreements and ASEAN-led partnerships with 
key regional partners as well as major non-ASEAN regional integration initiatives. 
The latter includes regional cooperation programmes supported by the ADB that are 
based on growth triangles or economic corridors. 
Connecting 
across borders 









ASEAN’s leaders adopted the Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) for the period 
2011-2015.1 This is designed to enhance physical 
infrastructure and strengthen institutional and 
people-to-people linkages at national and regional 
levels. It should also help synchronize ongoing 
1 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, Hanoi, Oct. 2010.
sectoral strategies and plans.
ASEAN’s Strategic Transport Plan (Brunei 
Action Plan) falls under MPAC. This also contains 
strategic actions to be implemented in the period 
2011-2015 towards the realization of the AEC. 
Notable	achievements	include:	signing	the	ASEAN	
Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalization 
of Passenger Air Services and its protocol, which 
Australia                  China                India                Japan                Korea, Rep. of                New Zealand
Source: ASEAN Secretariat: ASEANstats Database.
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provide a framework for the full realization of 
ASEAN Open Skies; formulating a basic strategy 
to establish an ASEAN Single Shipping Market; 
completing an inventory of all national route 
components of the ASEAN Highway Network; and 
adopting the ASEAN ICT Master Plan 2015.
ASEAN+ and other major trade 
agreements
ASEAN integration through the AEC is expected 
to have an impact on relationships – with indirect 
effects on trade and FDI – with prominent Asian 
partners, including Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand, and Republic of Korea. The levels of 
trade and foreign direct investment into ASEAN 
from selected partner countries, 2000-12, are indi-
cated in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2. 
ASEAN has concluded a series of ASEAN+ 
trade agreements with prominent Asian regional 
partners,	as	follows:	
China: Close cooperation between ASEAN 
and China was solidified with the 2001 China-
ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA). This covers 
the ten member states of ASEAN and China. 
The idea of CAFTA was first proposed in 
2000 by China’s former Prime Minister, Zhu 
Rongji. The initial framework agreement was 
signed in Phnom Penh in 2002 and CAFTA 
was formally established on 1 January 2010. 
CAFTA started by reducing to zero the tariffs 
on	7,881	product	categories,	covering	90.0	per	
cent of imported goods, between China and 
the six original members of ASEAN – Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. The agreement will be 
applied to the four new ASEAN member states 
(the CLMV countries) by 2015.2
2 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation between ASEAN and China, Phnom Penh, Nov. 
2002.
Prior to CAFTA, the Government of 
China had been encouraging foreign enter-
prises to invest in China and Chinese 
enterprises to invest abroad. This was expressed 
in	China’s	“Go	Out	Policy”	in	1999.	Following	
CAFTA, ASEAN became a major beneficiary 





million	 to	 $4,335	 million.3 The removal of 
trade impediments has lowered costs of trans-
actions and has helped in further increasing 
China-ASEAN	trade	volume	 (Figure	2-3).	As	
a result, trade between China and ASEAN has 
been higher than that between China and the 
rest of the world. ASEAN has replaced Japan 
as the third-biggest trade partner of China, 
while China has become ASEAN’s biggest 
trade partner. CAFTA is the world’s largest free 
trade zone in terms of population and has the 
third-largest trade volume, behind the North 
American Free Trade Area and the European 
Union.
In theory, with access to a larger and 
more integrated market, private sector firms 
in ASEAN will become more competitive. 
The region can also expect considerably more 
inward investment from developed countries, 
creating employment and increasing economic 
welfare. Nevertheless, industrial restructuring 
is a long and difficult process. Facing an influx 
of lower-cost Chinese products, some manufac-
turing sectors in Indonesia and Thailand, for 
example, expressed reservations about the wide-
ranging tariff cuts on Chinese imports under the 
CAFTA.4
3	 ASEAN	Secretariat:	ASEANstats	Database.
4	 S.	Tong	and	C.	Chong:	China-ASEAN Free Trade Area in 
2010: A regional perspective (Singapore, East Asian Institute, 
2010).









Since 2001, Chinese investment flows 
to ASEAN Member States have increased 
by	 a	 factor	 of	 30;	 in	 turn,	 bilateral	 trade	 has	
increased ten-fold.5 These trends have been 
triggered by China’s ongoing rapid structural 
transformation, which will assuredly impact 
ASEAN economies and labour markets. The 
absolute	 number	 of	 people	 aged	 15-64	 in	
China is expected to decline in the years to 
come, reducing the potential manufacturing 
workforce and narrowing the production 
base.6 Increasing land and labour prices have 
contributed to the development of a new 
Chinese growth model that is based on techno-
logical upgrading, increased productivity and 
stronger domestic consumption. China’s shift 
away from export-driven low-wage labour-
5	 ASEAN	Secretariat:	ASEANstats	Database.
6	 ILO:	 Global Employment Trends 2014: Risk of a jobless 
recovery?	(Geneva,	ILO,	2014).
intensive manufacturing, such as garments, 
towards domestic consumption and higher 
skill export industries, will raise competition 
with ASEAN in certain activities but induce 
more complementarity in others. This change 
creates opportunities for strategic partnerships 
to leverage China’s changing profile, which may 
be crucial for ASEAN’s long-term prosperity, 
employment and welfare as the region strives 
to move up the value chain. 
As wages and land prices rise, and China’s 
cheap labour advantage is reduced, countries 
such as Indonesia, Philippines, and Viet Nam, 
are emerging as attractive destinations for 
Chinese manufacturing. Closer bilateral rela-
tions also imply increased relevance of Chinese 
language skills. In recent years there has been a 
large surge in the number of ASEAN students 
studying in China, especially from Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam.
China inward                    ASEAN inward                    China outward                    ASEAN outward
Figure 2-3 Inward and outward FDI of China and ASEAN, 1983-2012 ($ million)
Source: UNCTAD: UNCTADstat Database.


















Australia: The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand 
Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) entered into force 
in	2009,	effectively	strengthening	bilateral	ties.	
The total trade volume between Australia and 
ASEAN	experienced	approximately	40	per	cent	
growth	(a	$17	billion	increase)	between	2009	and	
2010. Apart from AANZFTA, Australia has also 
contributed to ASEAN’s economic integration 
through the ASEAN-Australian Development 
Cooperation Program. From 2002 to 2008, the 
programme assisted ASEAN Member States in 
the development of goods, services, and invest-
ment markets, as well as on improvements to 
ASEAN labour market policies.
Japan:	Beginning	 in	 the	 late	1980s,	 Japanese	
multinational enterprises (MNEs) aggressively 
invested in ASEAN Member States, effectively 
turning ASEAN into a production base for 
Japan’s multinational firms. ASEAN integra-
tion will expand the region’s internal market 
and encourage Japanese MNEs to relocate their 
affiliates, resulting in gains to Japanese multi-
nationals from intra-industry agglomeration. 
Positive externalities associated with industry 
agglomeration will, in turn, result in specializa-
tion and enhanced competitiveness of Japanese 
firms. ASEAN integration is also projected to 
induce a resurgence of Japanese FDI in the 
region, as business environments in China 
wane and Japanese firms seek to diversify risk. 
Further removal of trade barriers will motivate 
Japanese MNEs to relocate unskilled, labour-in-
tensive products to the CLMV countries which 
is expected to lead to technical and knowledge 
spillovers as well as skills upgrading.7
Republic of Korea: Economic cooperation 
7	 S.	Hitoshi:	How can ASEAN and Japan mutually benefit from 
ASEAN integration,	 background	 paper	 for	 ADB	 and	 ILO:	
ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better 
jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
between ASEAN and the Republic of Korea 
reached a milestone in 2005 in the forging of 
the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFA). 
In the first five-year period following the 
implementation of the ASEAN-Korea Trade 
in Goods, bilateral trade volume increased 
over	 114	 per	 cent,	 from	$48	 billion	 to	 $103	
billion. Subsequently bilateral trade volume 
increased	 over	 23	 per	 cent.8 By 2015, intra-
trade and investment are projected to rise to 
$150 billion.9
India: Mutually beneficial cooperation can 
be enhanced by further removal of ASEAN 
external tariff rates through the Free Trade 
Agreement in Goods. Given the importance of 
greater economic connectivity, Indian policy 
makers have made a concerted effort to “Look 
East”. Of particular importance to India is its 
relationship with Myanmar due to the coun-
try’s strategic location and its potential as a land 
bridge to Southeast Asia and southern China. 
In addition, the recent political and economic 
opening of Myanmar, coupled with the rela-
tively low wages in the country, is likely to 
boost FDI inflows and technology transfers.10
New Zealand: In	 June	 2013,	 responsible	 for	
13.0	 per	 cent	 of	merchandise	 trade,	 ASEAN	
surpassed the European Union and became 
New Zealand’s third-largest trading partner, 
behind only Australia and China.11  Since the 
beginning of the 21st century, ASEAN’s rapidly 
expanding middle class presents a booming 
8	 ASEAN	 Secretariat:	 ASEAN-Korea	 Free	Trade	 Area,	 2012,	
http://akfta.asean.org	[accessed	4	Apr.	2014].
9	 Ibid.
10	 S.	 Sen:	 ASEAN-India integration, background paper for 
ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better 
jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming)
11 Analysis of New Zealand merchandise trade data, year ended 
June	2013.	See	New	Zealand	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	
Trade,	http://www.mfat.govt.nz/	[accessed	4	Apr.	2014].









market for New Zealand’s high quality products 
and services. Concomitantly, New Zealand, as 
a major trading partner, can play an impor-
tant role in helping Southeast Asian countries 
sustain their high economic growth.
Implications for non-ASEAN Member States 
echo to a large extent distributional effects in the 
ASEAN region itself. As ASEAN Member States 
further liberalize and integrate, non-ASEAN Member 
States will have a greater ability to shift production 
networks and manufacturing into ASEAN, especially 
the CLMV countries, creating winners and losers in 
their respective national contexts. 
In addition to CAFTA and other ASEAN+ 
initiatives, there are two major trade agreements – 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
– that stand to define the parameters of economic 
integration	in	Asia:	
The Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP): The RCEP initiative was 
announced by the ASEAN leaders in November 
2011.	 Negotiations	 started	 in	 2013	 and	 are	
expected to conclude at the end of 2015. This 
will be a 16-party ASEAN-led free trade agree-
ment with Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand, and Republic of Korea. The 
RCEP aims at greater economic integration by 
supporting equitable economic development 
and strengthening economic cooperation. It will 
cover trade in goods and services, investment, 
economic and technical cooperation, intellec-
tual property, competition, dispute settlement 
and other issues. To help ensure a comprehen-
sive and balanced outcome, the negotiations 
on trade in goods, trade in services, investment 
and other areas will be conducted in parallel. 
RCEP will create a free trade and investment 
area comprising over three billion people, with 
a combined GDP of roughly $21 trillion and 
27 per cent of total global trade.12
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): 
Launched in 2010, this is a proposed trade 
agreement which is still under negotiation. It has 
12 members – Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States, and 
Viet Nam. The TPP intends to enhance trade 
and investment, promote innovation, economic 
growth and development, and support the 
creation and retention of jobs. Through the 
TPP, the United States is seeking a trade and 
investment framework that will boost competi-
tiveness, expand trade and investment with the 
robust economies of Asia and the Pacific, and 
support the creation and retention of United 
States jobs, while promoting core United States 




initiatives in the form of subregional economic 
zones (SRZs). Although these cross national 
boundaries they do not cover all the territory of 
every participating country. Generally, they aim at 
maintaining competitiveness in exports by trans-
forming transnational but contiguous areas into 
attractive platforms for enhanced economic activity. 
ASEAN governments have embraced SRZs as a way 
of promoting regional integration without having 
to change national trade policies or integrate entire 
economies. SRZs can be established at relatively 
low cost within a short period of time. 
SRZs are most effective when the participating 
regions are economically complementary – with 














sufficiently large differentials in factor endowments. 
They must also be geographically close, to take 
advantage of cultural or linguistic affinities and have 
good physical connectivity so as to reduce transport 
and transaction costs. Participating countries must 
also be ready to forego some measure of sovereignty 
and be prepared to distribute the economic benefits 
as equitably as possible.14
Another form of limited integration is through 
economic corridors. These have most of the charac-
teristics of SRZs but encompass smaller geographic 
spaces. In most cases, they straddle a central transport 
artery such as a road, railway line, or canal.15 Along 
the corridor there are strategic nodes, especially at 
border crossings, that offer scope for regional coop-
eration. Corridors are more likely to be bilateral 
rather than multilateral and place greater emphasis 
on the careful spatial and physical planning of the 
corridor and its surrounding area, so as to concen-
trate infrastructure development.
Economic corridors involve both hard and 
soft infrastructure. Hard infrastructure provides 
physical connectivity through cross-border projects 
in transport and telecommunications. Soft infra-
structure involves, for example, effective border 
and customs procedures and border processing 
and transport agreements. It also includes laws and 
regulations, and systems and procedures; and the 
institutions to make hard infrastructure work prop-
erly. Soft infrastructure should be complemented 
with mechanisms for involving local or provincial 
communities and other stakeholders.
Singapore-Johor-Riau Triangle
The first SRZ in Southeast Asia was the Singapore-
Johor-Riau (SIJORI) triangle. This was based on 
the complementarity between Singapore, which has 
capital and technical capacity but very little land 
14	 M.	 Thant:	 Growth triangles in Asia: A new approach to 
regional economic cooperation	(Manila,	ADB,	1998).
15	 ADB:	Preinvestment study for the Greater Mekong Subregion, 
East-West Economic Corridor, Vol. 1 (Manila, 2001).
or labour, and neighbouring areas in Malaysia and 
Indonesia which are relatively abundant in land and 
have ample supplies of low-wage labour. In the late-
1980s,	 increased	 production	 costs,	 coupled	 with	
the appreciation of the Singapore dollar, dimin-
ished the competitiveness of Singapore’s traditional, 
labour-intensive manufacturing firms – pushing 
them to relocate to the state of Johor in Malaysia 
and to the islands of Batam and Bintan in the prov-




Batam.16 Some of the necessary physical infrastruc-
ture was already in place, with a causeway between 
Johor and Singapore, and it was easy to start ferry 
services to the Riau islands. Riau and Johor also had 
the advantage of good access to natural resources, 
particularly stable water supplies. Another impor-
tant catalyst was Indonesia’s unilateral decision in 
1978	to	make	Batam	a	duty-free	zone.	
In	 1994,	 the	 three	 participating	 countries	
signed a memorandum of understanding. But 
SIJORI does not have an official organization. It is 
viewed rather as an initiative involving two sets of 
ad	hoc	bilateral	relations:	Singapore-Indonesia	and	
Singapore-Malaysia.
Nevertheless, 20 years later, the SIJORI region 
is one of Southeast Asia’s major growth areas. 
There is no doubt that spillovers from Singapore 
are benefiting poorer neighbouring regions. Also, 
Malaysia has invested heavily, especially since 2006 
and the launch in southern Johor of the Iskandar 
Development Region – which is three times the size 
of Singapore, with about a third of the population. 
Greater Mekong Subregion
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) is a natural 
16	 R.	Pomfret	and	S.	Basu	Das:	“Subregional	zones	and	ASEAN	
Economic	Community”,	in	S.	Basu	Das	et	al.:	The ASEAN 
Economic Community, A work in progress (Manila, ADB and 
ISEAS,	2013),	pp.	279-320.









economic area bounded by the Mekong River. It is 
made up of Cambodia, China (specifically Yunnan 
province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region), Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The GMS 
has an area of 2.6 million square kilometres and a 
combined	population	of	about	326	million.
The GMS was established over a decade after 
hostilities ended in the region. It was intended 
to reinstate links between countries divided by 
conflicts and to facilitate reconstruction of infra-
structure.17 In contrast to SIJORI, GMS has largely 
been a top-down, governmental undertaking whose 
key strategies are defined and implemented by a 
multilateral institution. 
In	1992,	to	promote	economic	and	social	devel-
opment, the six countries of GMS, with assistance 
from the ADB and other development partners, 
launched the GMS Economic Cooperation Program 
(GMS Program). This aimed to link GMS countries 
through better infrastructure, improved competi-
tiveness, and a greater sense of community – and 
thereby promote trade and investment and stimu-
late economic growth. The countries also agreed to 
complement national efforts by jointly addressing, 
at the subregional level, other issues such as human 
resource development.18
In	 1998,	 the	 GMS	 Program	 initiated	 the	
economic corridor programme – identifying five 
corridors along which the six participating coun-
tries would coordinate improvements in hard and 
soft infrastructure. They also agreed to prioritize 
a 1,600-kilometre East-West Economic Corridor 
connecting Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
In 2002, the GMS countries prepared the 
GMS	strategic	framework.	This	has	five	thrusts:	(i)	
strengthening infrastructure linkages; (ii) facilitating 
17 Ibid.
18	 ADB:	 Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation 
Program: Overview (Manila, Mar. 2012).
cross-border trade, investment, and tourism; (iii) 
enhancing private sector participation and compet-
itiveness; (iv) developing human resources; and (v) 
protecting the environment and promoting the 
sustainable use of shared natural resources.
Subsequently, the GMS Program developed 
a transport sector strategy. Covering the period 
2006-2015 this identified nine economic corridors 
along with priority infrastructure investments.19 
The aim was to strengthen transport and logistics 
and to improve economic linkages with other coun-
tries and regions. The corridors are also expected to 
extend the benefits of improved transport linkages 
to remote and landlocked locations.
After slow progress in the first decade, the 
economic benefits of the corridors became more 
apparent following the upgrading and widening 
of major roads. Nevertheless, progress along the 
corridors has been uneven. The most dynamic is 
the North-South Corridor in the two richest GMS 
nations – linking Kunming to Bangkok via Chiang 
Rai. Progress has been slower in the East-West 
Corridor, the Southern Corridor and the Northern 
Corridor from Nanning to Ha Noi.
Over the past two decades, the GMS Program 
has mobilized more than $15 billion in financing. 
Total	resources	mobilized	were	more	than	3.5	times	
greater in the second decade than in the first. Most 
of this is for loan-financed projects in transport and 
energy. About one-third of the resources came from 
the ADB and the remainder from the GMS govern-
ments, official sources of development support, and 
private sector cofinancing.20
One constraint to the GMS Program has been 
19	 The	 six	 GMS	 countries	 have	 nine	 Corridors	 as	 follows:	 1)	
North-South	 Corridor:	 Kunming	 to	 Bangkok;	 2)	 Eastern	




Sattahip;	 7)	 Northern	 Corridor:	 Fangcheng	 to	 Tamu;	 8)	
Western	 Corridor:	Tamu	 to	Mawlamyine;	 9)	 Northeastern	
Corridor:	Thanh	Hoa	to	Bangkok/Laem	Chabang.
20	 ADB:	The Greater Mekong Subregion at 20: Progress and 
prospects (Manila, 2012).









weak coordination. Although the GMS has seen 
major developments in physical infrastructure, 
improvements in trade and transport links have 
been hampered by bureaucratic or other restric-
tions.21 More attention will be needed on soft 
infrastructure such as trade facilitation. This should 
include further strengthening of the GMS Cross 
Border Transport Facilitation Agreement which has 
been signed by all the GMS countries, although 
Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam have not fully 
ratified its annexes.22
The GMS has also been active in the fight 
against	 human	 trafficking.	 In	 2004,	 ministers	 of	
all six GMS countries signed a memorandum of 
understanding which established the Coordinated 
Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking 
(COMMIT). The secretariat is the United Nations 
Interagency Project on Human Trafficking in the 
Greater Mekong Subregion. In combating human 
trafficking, the governments have committed to 
meeting international standards – highlighting 
the need for multilateral, bilateral, and govern-
ment-NGO cooperation. They have also developed 
a follow-up subregional action plan and established 
the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative 
Against Trafficking (the COMMIT process) whose 
major strength has been its strong acceptance by 
governments.23
Facilitating safe labour migration is a priority 
for the GMS. The following key issues in labour 
migration	in	the	subregion	have	been	identified:24
•	 Transitioning	 toward	 a	 knowledge-based	
economy needs mechanisms to recognize the 
emerging skills and an environment attrac-
tive to highly skilled migrants. This will help 
21 R. Pomfret and S. Basu Das, op. cit.
22	 ADB:	Regional investment framework sector report: Transport 
and related services (Manila, 2012).
23	 ADB:	 Regional investment framework sector report: 
Facilitating safe labor migration in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (Manila, 2012).
24	 ADB:	Facilitating safe labor migration in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion	(Manila,	Apr.	2013).
to ensure GMS competitiveness as a whole. 
•	 Irregular	 migration	 should	 be	 limited	 by	
creating an environment in which regulariza-
tion is sustainable to migrants. 
•	 Rights	 and	 protection	 of	 migrant	 workers	
are not yet ensured, even if laws that address 
regular migrants exist.
•	 The	 feminization	 of	 migration	 should	 be	
mainstreamed into migration policies to 
protect women and children. 
•	 Knowledge	on	labour	migration	is	very	inad-
equate. Research, including both quantitative 
and qualitative surveys, should be supported 
to gain a deeper understanding of how migra-
tion works within the subregion.




•	 strengthen	 capacity	 and	 legal	 framework	 in	
managing labour migration;
•	 enhance	 social	 protection	 for	migrants	 and	
their families;
•	 promote	 ethical	 recruitment	 and	
employment;
•	 strengthen	 return	and	 reintegration	 support	
to migrants;
•	 increase	 knowledge	 management	 mecha-
nisms; and
•	 promote	effective	use	of	remittances.
The GMS aims to narrow the development 
divide in Southeast Asia. But in this respect progress 
has been limited. Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
has benefited from the North-South Corridor, 
through completion of the North-South Highway 
and progress on the North-South Rail Link. But 
other than this the poorer nations have seen little 
practical impact.25
Another concern is that, unlike in SIJORI, 
25 R. Pomfret and S. Basu Das, op. cit.









there has been little participation from the private 
sector. The exception has been in air connectivity 
for which the improvements were driven mainly by 
entrepreneurs and firms based elsewhere in ASEAN 
or beyond – AirAsia, SilkAir or Jetstar.26
The fast-changing economic and political land-
scape in the subregion is constantly affected by a 
complex interplay of factors, including economic 
disparities between countries and by demographic 
inequalities. This underscores the need to monitor 
the geopolitical situation in the GMS. Recent 
developments in Myanmar are expected to have a 
long-term impact on labour migration in the GMS 
26 Ibid.
as indicated in Box 2-1.
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth 
Triangle
In	 1993,	 three	 rapidly-growing	 middle-income	
ASEAN Member States formed the Indonesia-
Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT). 
The purpose was to accelerate the growth in poorer 
localities, especially in Sumatra in Indonesia, and in 
southern Thailand. Although IMT-GT was a govern-
mental project, it was intended to be driven by the 
private sector, especially since Malaysian businesses 
were keen to trade with northern Sumatra. Since its 
formation, IMT-GT has grown in geographic scope 
and activities. It now encompasses more than 70 
The opening up of Myanmar to the international 
community, which started in 2012, has long-
term implications for capital flows and labour 
migration in the ASEAN region and especially 
for Thailand. Thailand’s economy is highly 
dependent on cheap labour from neighbouring 
countries, especially Myanmar, mostly employed 
in the agriculture and agriculture-related sectors 
as well as in construction and fisheries. 
This pattern could change if enterprises in 
Thailand invest more in Myanmar to take advan-
tage of its abundant raw materials and young 
workforce. Thailand’s businesses currently face 
labour shortages, rising wage costs, environ-
mental dangers, and increasing political risks 
that have prompted companies to consider relo-
cating elsewhere, including to Myanmar. 
Myanmar has the potential to become a 
prime transportation hub for the region as it 
shares land borders with Bangladesh, China, 
India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Thailand as well as a coastline of 2,800 kilome-
tres that provides access to sea routes through 
the Bay of Bengal and to major inland waterways. 
China, India and multilateral institutions have 
already offered assistance to develop multimodal 
transport linkages across the country. 
Myanmar’s infrastructure programme is 
focused heavily on constructing deep sea ports 
along the coastline and strengthening north-
south connectivity via roads, railways and inland 
waterways. Such developments are expected 
to facilitate increased trade with China and 
Thailand (particularly at the borders) and to a 
lesser extent with India. Major projects linked to 
the development of economic corridors will also 
affect local communities along the connecting 
roads. Nevertheless, the impact of these develop-
ments on labour migration is difficult to forecast, 
particularly in view of the lack of skilled construc-
tion workers in Myanmar. Since 1992, Myanmar 
nationals have been migrating undocumented to 
Thailand where wages are many times higher. 
This has left Myanmar with a significantly smaller 
pool of both high- and low-skilled workers. 
Box 2-1 Myanmar’s opening will affect migration flows to Thailand










inces in southern Thailand, eight northern states in 
Peninsular Malaysia, and 10 provinces of Sumatra 
in Indonesia. 
Setting up the IMT-GT institutions was 
hampered	by	the	1997	Asian	financial	crisis.	Interest	
was renewed only after the onset of economic 
recovery in early 2000. At the first summit meeting 
in Malaysia in 2005, member governments, with 
the assistance of the ADB, formulated a five-year 
roadmap covering the period 2007-11. As a focus 
for major economic activities, the roadmap iden-
tified IMT-GT connectivity corridors – aiming to 
improve transport facilities and linkages, as well as 
other supporting infrastructure. The roadmap stated 
that IMT-GT should not only be consistent with, 
but also contribute to, the realization of the AEC.
By	 2009,	 however,	 the	 IMT-GT	 had	 shown	
only modest progress in sustaining economic 
exchanges and commercial ties among the partici-
pating states and provinces. The private sector had 
established well-functioning business networks that 
were helping to boost trade and investment in the 
subregion. But the IMT-GT participating states and 
provinces had achieved only zero or slow economic 
growth. Although the roadmap remained relevant, 
project implementation had been lagging.27
The roadmap identified more than 50 meas-
ures, programmes and projects. Construction has 
started in several infrastructure projects, but some 
of the planned projects have been delayed by tech-
nical, financial, and legal impediments. Moreover, 
there has been insufficient attention to the software 
aspects of infrastructure connectivity. While the 
IMT-GT subregional zone has centres of economic 
dynamism, it is unclear how much can be attrib-
uted to the SRZ structure. 
The IMT-GT roadmap has been succeeded by 
the Implementation Blueprint (2012-2016). This 
27	 ADB:	Mid-term review of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) roadmap for development 2007-
2011 (Manila, Nov. 2010).
reflects an action-oriented agenda with a more disci-
plined and better-informed process for identifying 
projects, based on well-defined concepts and ration-
ales. The Blueprint identifies 11 priority connectivity 
projects in the transport (toll road, ports) and power 
sectors, amounting to $5.2 billion.28  As regards the 
maritime subsector, IMT-GT promotes the devel-
opment of roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) services, especially 
across the Straits of Melaka and for ports in Sumatra 
and southern Thailand. A key strategic thrust is to 
develop human resources and skills and enhance 
labour mobility.
Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-
Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area
In	1994,	member	governments	established	the	Brunei	
Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-East 
ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). The purpose 
was to address the socioeconomic development 
of less developed, remote and marginalized areas, 
and narrow the development gaps. The subregion 
covers:	the	entire	Sultanate	of	Brunei	Darussalam;	
nine provinces in Kalimantan and Sulawesi, the 
island chain of Maluku, and Papua (Indonesia); the 
Federal States of Sabah and Sarawak and the Federal 
Territory of Labuan (Malaysia); all 26 provinces 
of the island of Mindanao in the Philippines and 
the island province of Palawan in the Philippines. 
These areas are among the poorest in their respec-
tive countries, but have a long history of trade and 
other economic links. 
BIMP-EAGA’s long-term goal is to help local 
communities move away from livelihoods based on 
resource extraction and shift towards higher-order 
resource processing, as well as to non- resource-
based activities. The engine of growth will be the 
private sector with the governments providing a 
conducive investment environment.
In	1996,	at	the	request	of	member	governments,	
28 Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle Implementation 
Blueprint 2012-2016, Phnom Penh, Apr. 2010.









the ADB commissioned a study, following which 
several national policies were modified. Among 
others, the four governments agreed to liberalize 
the transport sector. This resulted in the opening of 
new and direct commercial air and sea links. Several 
airport and seaport infrastructure facilities were 
upgraded to accommodate the expected increase in 
passenger and cargo traffic. 
In	1997,	however,	the	growth	momentum	was	
seriously disrupted by the Asian financial crisis as 
governments refocused on national issues. Interest 
in BIMP-EAGA cooperation was renewed only in 
2001, but the programme had only a limited impact. 
In response, member governments, with ADB 
support, formulated the BIMP-EAGA Roadmap to 
Development 2006–2010 which established broad 
strategic thrusts as well as targets for implementa-
tion. The roadmap identified priority sectors in 
agro-industry and natural resources, tourism, trans-
port, infrastructure and ICT – with an emphasis on 
the development of small and medium-sized enter-
prises. One of the key measures would be to improve 
infrastructure via air, sea, and land linkages. 
In 2007, to complement improvements in 
physical infrastructure, BIMP-EAGA leaders signed 
MOUs to improve air linkages, sea linkages, and 
bus services.29 These, for example, facilitated the 
expansion of ro-ro ferry services between Brunei 
Darussalam and Sabah, enabling container trucks 
and buses to travel smoothly from Pontianak to Kota 
Kinabalu or anywhere in Sabah, with a minimum 
number of border-crossing controls. There was also 
a positive response to these reforms from the private 
sector, especially among airlines and travel agencies, 
which significantly expanded air links.
According to a mid-term review, the roadmap 
achieved modest progress and its targets were more 
or less achieved.30 However it was noted that a 
29 Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East 
ASEAN Growth Area Roadmap to Development 2006-2010, 
Mar. 2012.
30 Ibid.
number of important routes still had weak trans-
port links – because of the lack of viable projects, 
and because governments had yet to formulate some 
important rules and regulations, including those for 
cross-border movement of buses and coaches. 
The Implementation Blueprint covers the 
period 2012–16. It sets out a framework for better 
project planning, and implementation in line with 
national and subregional objectives – taking into 
account the AEC in 2015 and potential benefits 
from establishing closer linkages between the two 
programmes.
Conclusion 
As a result of ASEAN, ASEAN+ and non-ASEAN 
initiatives, regional cooperation in Southeast Asia 
has been gathering momentum. Moreover, the fact 
that ASEAN Member States belong to different 
but related regional or subregional programmes 
gives ASEAN an overarching position in driving 
economic integration and regionalism in Asia. In 
many cases, such as the GMS, IMT-GT, and BIMP-
EAGA, they have the support of the ADB.
Nevertheless the results of these subregional 
programmes have been mixed. Progress has been 
slow in soft infrastructure due in part to rigid insti-
tutional structures and mechanisms, lack of political 
commitment, or inadequate overall resources at 
national and regional levels. To ensure that the full 
benefits of integration will be equitably distributed, 
ASEAN and the ADB must promote awareness of 
human resource development, particularly labour 
issues, as a crosscutting theme consistent with 
regional and national strategies and priorities.
The development of transport and ICT infra-
structure has helped reduce transaction costs and 
strengthen overall competitiveness. However, 
this does not automatically benefit labour – so 
these initiatives must be supported by reforms in 
the policy and institutional frameworks at the 
national and regional levels. In SIJORI, regional 
cooperation has been driven largely by the private 









sector. If private firms are to have similar roles in 
other regional integration initiatives – and provide 
more jobs, protection and opportunities for skills 
enhancement, especially for women – the roadmaps 
for these initiatives should include clear rationales 
for the involvement of the private sector and the 
promotion of a viable business environment. 
The rapid and complex developments in 
Southeast Asia have long-term implications for the 
labour market. ASEAN and the ADB could help 
subregional initiatives keep pace with increasing 
needs for coordination by supporting mechanisms 
for sharing and discussing regional and subregional 
masterplans, roadmaps and priority projects. These 
initiatives will need flexible and interactive govern-
ance structures that reformulate strategies and 
action plans in response to major events that affect 
the labour market. These potential effects are the 
subject of the next chapter.
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ASEAN economic integration will change the pace 
of structural change, with important implications for 
the	region’s	300	million	workers	and	their	families.	
As patterns of comparative advantage and produc-
tion alter, so workers will move from one economic 
sector to another. Using an innovative computable 
general equilibrium model, this chapter assesses 
the potential impacts on economies and labour 
markets. It also uses an occupational employment 
projections model to identify occupations that are 
likely to grow as ASEAN integration progresses.
The changing structure of employment
Since	1992	with	the	establishment	of	the	ASEAN	
Free	Trade	Area,	 and	 2003	when	ASEAN	 leaders	
at	 the	 9th	 ASEAN	 Summit	 resolved	 to	 establish	
the ASEAN Community, labour markets have 
undergone significant structural change. One conse-
quence has been a decline in the significance of 
agriculture.	Agriculture	now	accounts	for	40.0	per	
cent of total employment, having been overtaken 
by	 services	 at	40.6	per	 cent	–	with	 the	 remaining	
19.4	 per	 cent	 accounted	 for	 by	 industry	 (Annex	
F, Table F1-6). But the regional aggregates mask 
considerable	cross-country	variations	(Figure	3-1).	
Agriculture is still the largest employer in half of the 
ASEAN	Member	 States:	 Cambodia,	 Lao	 People’s	
Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand and 
Viet Nam. Moreover, the pace of change has varied 
among the countries, with the share of agricultural 
employment falling by more than 20 percentage 
points in Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam in the 
past two decades, whereas the Philippines experi-
enced a slower pace of decline.
Some countries have seen a striking increase in 
employment in industry. In Viet Nam, for example, 
between	 1996	 and	 2013,	 the	 share	 of	 employ-
ment in industry doubled from 10.6 per cent to 
21.2 per cent. On the other hand, Malaysia and 
Singapore experienced deindustrialization in the 
past two decades. In ASEAN Member States, with 
the exception of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Myanmar and Philippines, industry accounts for 
between 18.0 per cent and 28.0 per cent of total 
employment.
Recent decades have also seen a striking 
The ASEAN Economic Community has significant potential to spur structural change 
from low- to higher-productivity sectors. This chapter models the potential labour 
market impact of increased trade integration – identifying the sectors and occupations 
likely to grow. Reaping the potential benefits will depend on putting in place policies 
to manage structural change, including employment policies for high-quality jobs, 
robust measures for social protection and support for smaller enterprises.
Managing structural 
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increase	 in	 the	 share	of	 services.	 In	2013,	 services	
accounted for the largest share of employment 
in Brunei Darussalam (77.2 per cent in 2001), 
Singapore	(80.1	per	cent),	Malaysia	(59.7	per	cent),	
Philippines	 (53.4	 per	 cent)	 and	 Indonesia	 (45.0	
per cent). Whereas all ASEAN Member States have 
seen their shares of services in total employment rise 
significantly in recent years, in Cambodia, the share 
has	remained	steady	at	30.0	per	cent.1
1 Data are based on the Cambodia Socio-Economic Surveys, 
which provide time-series data, rather than the labour force 


































































Source: ILO estimates based on national labour force surveys, with the exception of Brunei Darussalam (Population Census), 
Cambodia (Socio-Economic Survey), and Myanmar (Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey).  
Figure 3-1 Employment by sector, circa 1992, 2003 and 2013 (per cent) 
Agriculture                    Industry                   Services
Brunei
Darussalam
Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam
Table 3-1 Ratio of labour productivity by subsector to that of agriculture, 2012















Cambodia 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.3 2.8 0.8
Indonesia 4.2 4.0 1.6 3.6 7.3 1.7
Lao PDR 4.8 5.4 5.0 8.0 10.6 3.0
Malaysia 1.7 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.9 0.7
Philippines 6.7 2.7 2.1 2.2 11.2 2.1
Thailand 7.4 1.6 3.0 8.5 15.1 4.0
Viet Nam 3.0 2.1 2.5 2.6 16.9 2.1
Note: Lao PDR figures refer to 2010.
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One challenge for some countries is that while 
they have increased manufacturing employment, 
their manufacturing bases remain narrow. Textiles 
and apparel, for example, account for 60.7 per cent 
of total manufacturing employment in Cambodia, 
and	in	Viet	Nam	35.2	per	cent	(Figure	3-2).	In	Lao	
People’s Democratic Republic, a third of manufac-
turing employment is in food processing. These 
labour-intensive industries (textiles, apparel, and 
food) are critical in these countries to productively 
absorb jobseekers, including those leaving agricul-
ture. Nevertheless efforts are also required to lay and 
strengthen the foundations for higher productivity 
manufacturing industries.2
Structural shifts in the labour market have 
played an important role in raising aggregate 
labour	productivity.	For	seven	countries,	Table	3-1	
compares labour productivity (GDP per worker) in 
each subsector with that of agriculture – showing 
that it is highest in finance, insurance and real 
estate. A key challenge for some countries is that 
2	 For	 a	 comprehensive	 discussion,	 see	 UNIDO:	 Industrial 
Development Report 2013: Sustaining employment growth: 
The role of manufacturing and structural change (Vienna, 
2013).
the bulk of job creation in recent years has taken 
place in subsectors where levels of productivity are 
not significantly higher than in agriculture – and 
sometimes lower. In the case of Cambodia, whereas 
labour productivity is highest in services subsectors, 
the bulk of job creation has taken place in manufac-
turing, where levels of productivity are marginally 
lower than in agriculture. In Malaysia, services have 
accounted for the bulk of job creation in recent 
years, but levels of productivity in wholesale and 
retail trade, hotels and restaurants and community, 
social, personal and other services are also lower than 
in agriculture or in manufacturing, whose share of 
total employment has declined. In Indonesia and 
the Philippines, the bulk of job growth has also been 
in wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 
and community, social, personal and other services, 




additional jobs created, while in the Philippines 
they	accounted	for	54.8	per	cent.	
The wide differences in levels of productivity 
between sectors reveal opportunities for structural 
Food   Textiles and apparel  Wood products Chemicals Metals
Vehicles Electrical equipment Machinery  Other manufacturing







Figure 3-2 Share of total manufacturing employment by subsector, various years (per cent)
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Poverty is predominantly rural and more than 
half of ASEAN’s population reside in rural areas. 
The combination of agricultural productivity gains 
and off-farm employment opportunities can 
help reduce poverty and improve labour market 
outcomes, while at the same time supporting 
structural change in an inclusive manner.
As illustrated in Box Figure 3-1, value added 
per worker in agriculture in China more than 
doubled between 1993 and 2012, while the inci-
dence of poverty at the $2-a-day line fell from 78.6 
per cent in 1993 to 27.2 per cent in 2009. Among 
the ASEAN Member States in the figure, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Viet Nam also experienced relatively 
fast growth, with productivity rising by more than 
50 per cent between 1993 and 2012. 
At the same time, poverty can be reduced 
by off-farm employment opportunities, such as 
in agro-processing and tourism – by supple-
menting incomes from on-farm activities, while 
also drawing workers away from agriculture. In 
China for example, remarkable poverty reduc-
tion has come in tandem with a shift towards 
non-farm incomes and employment opportuni-
ties: between 1980 and 2001, the proportion of 
rural household incomes from on-farm activities, 
declined from almost 80 per cent to less than 
half (see Box Table 3-1).
Box Table 3-1 Composition of rural household incomes and headcount poverty in China (per cent)
Proportion of income earned from Headcount 
poverty (national 
poverty line)Agriculture Industry Services Other
1980 78.2 10.1 0.0 11.7 75.7
1995 63.2 18.2 12.4 6.2 20.4
2001 49.2 22.5 22.6 5.7 12.5
Source: Modified from A. de Janvry, E. Sadoulet and N. Zhou: The role of non-farm incomes in reducing rural poverty and inequality in China, 
CUDARE Working Paper 1001 (Berkeley, University of California, 2005), table 1.
Box 3-1 Agricultural productivity and off-farm employment 
Source: ILO estimates based on World Bank: World Development Indicators, 2013.
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change to further boost productivity and competi-
tiveness. Policymakers in the region, in consultation 
with employers’ and workers’ organizations, can 
facilitate such structural change. Further investment 
in agriculture, with a view to significantly accelerate 
agricultural productivity and promote off-farm 
activities in rural areas, is particularly important in 
the ASEAN Member States where the majority of 
labour	and	the	poor	are	 in	agriculture	(Box	3-1).3 
3	 On	the	importance	of	agriculture,	see	ILO:	World Employment 
Report 2004-05: Employment, productivity and poverty 
reduction	(Geneva,	2005);	World	Bank:	World Development 
Report 2008: Agriculture for development (Washington, DC, 
2007).
At the same time, it will be important to support 
the growth of manufacturing and services linked to 
agriculture (such as agro-businesses), in particular 
so as to provide a stepping stone for those workers 
leaving agriculture.
For the higher-income ASEAN Member States, 
concerted policy attention will be required to move 
to higher-value-added manufacturing activities – to 
ensure that the bulk of job creation is not concen-
trated in low-productivity services but is broad 
based.	As	illustrated	in	Figure	3-3,	the	likelihood	of	
vulnerable employment (own-account workers and 
contributing family workers) in wholesale and retail 
Malaysia’s Economic Transformation 
Programme recognizes the importance of 
increasing agricultural productivity, including 
through strengthening the skills of agricultural 
workers and enhancing farm efficiency – while 
at the same time better linking upstream primary 
production with downstream processing. The 
Rural Transformation Centres established in 
two areas in Malaysia serve as centres for the 
collection, distribution and marketing of the 
processed agricultural products. These prod-
ucts are often produced by SMEs, and the Rural 
Transformation Centres also seek to provide the 
SMEs with better access to local markets and 
springboards into international markets. 
Source: Malaysia Productivity Corporation: Productivity Report 2012/2013 (Selangor, 2013).
Note: Indonesia figures refer to 2013 and Philippine figures refer to 2012.
Source: ILO estimates based on official national sources.
 Finance, insurance, real estate
and business services 
Figure 3-3 Share of vulnerable employment by subsector, various years (per cent)
Indonesia
Philippines
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trade, restaurants and hotels is not significantly 
different to that of agriculture. Workers in vulner-
able employment are less likely to have formal work 
arrangements, and are therefore more likely to lack 
elements associated with decent employment, such 
as adequate social security and a voice at work. 
Hence, structural change dominated by lower-pro-
ductivity services is unlikely to make a significant 
contribution towards efforts to address the high 
rates of vulnerable employment (see Chapter 1, 
Figure	1-4)	or	to	promote	decent	jobs.
ASEAN integration, bringing together a 
population of 600 million and a rapidly growing 
middle-class workforce, offers opportunities for 
countries to strengthen their manufacturing 
bases.4 As a result of rising wages and purchasing 
power, developing economies and regions are fast 
becoming centres of demand for manufactured 
products, rather than mere suppliers of the goods.5 










trends as a result of the global trend towards “next-
shoring” – companies re-allocating production less 
on the basis of lower labour costs and more on the 
basis of ready sources of demand and innovation.6 
Furthermore, the productivity gaps between 
sectors reflect in part the characteristics of enter-
prises found in each sector. In ASEAN Member 
States, smaller firms account for a large proportion 
of total employment, but a significantly smaller 
proportion of value-added, pointing to substantial 
productivity gaps between smaller and larger firms. 
As	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 3-4,	 there	 are	 also	 clear	
differences in the sectors in which smaller and larger 
enterprises tend to operate. In the case of Indonesia, 
more than half of micro-enterprises operate in the 
primary sector (agriculture, livestock, forestry and 
fisheries),	whereas	another	28.4	per	cent	are	found	
in	trade	and	hotels/restaurants.7  On the other hand, 
less than one per cent of small and medium-sized 
6 For further information on “next-shoring”, see McKinsey & 
Company, op. cit.
7 In the case of Indonesia, micro-enterprises are defined as 
those with assets less than or equal to 50 million Indonesian 
rupiahs, small enterprises are defined as those with assets 
greater than 50 million Indonesian rupiahs but less than 
or equal to 500 million Indonesian rupiahs, and medium 
enterprises are defined as those with assets greater than 500 
million Indonesian rupiahs but less than or equal to 2.5 
billion Indonesian rupiahs.
Source: ILO estimates based on official national sources. 
Figure 3-4 Distribution of micro-enterprises and SMEs in Indonesia by sector, 2008 (per cent)
Micro-enterprises SMEs Agriculture, livestock, 
forestry and fisheries
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas and water
Mining and excavation
Trade and hotels/restaurants
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The global fragmentation of production activities 
across borders has become an increasingly impor-
tant feature of global trade. The creation of global 
value chains, coordinated by multinational enter-
prises (MNEs), has allowed the entire production 
process to be split so that each activity is completed 
wherever the cost of factors of production is most 
competitive. Many ASEAN Member States partici-
pate actively in global value chains. In 2009, 40.0 
per cent to 70.0 per cent of exports in the ASEAN 
region either used imported inputs or were used 
as inputs by other countries (see Box Figure 3-2). 
The demand for specialized intermediate goods 
and services has facilitated the growth of specific 
industries in the region including, for example, 
the electronics sector in Malaysia, the automobile 
sector in Thailand, footwear in Indonesia, and the 
garment sector in Cambodia. 
Participation in global value chains can 
provide opportunities for SMEs to grow, further 
contributing to a country’s income, employment 
and exports. Nonetheless such participation is a 
challenge for many SMEs in ASEAN and other 
developing countries, whether as a result of lack 
of finance and skills or the inability to meet stand-
ards and certification requirements. 
To help SMEs participate in the global value 
chain by improving productivity and working 
conditions, the ILO’s Sustaining Competitive and 
Responsible Enterprises programme strengthens 
the capacities of SMEs in the areas of work-
place cooperation, quality management, clean 
production, human resource management, and 
occupational health and safety. The Better Work 
programme, a partnership between the ILO and 
the International Finance Corporation, also aims 
to improve both labour standard compliance and 
competitiveness in global supply chains.
Box 3-2 Strengthening capacities of SMEs to participate in global production chains
Note: The participation index is expressed as the share of foreign inputs and domestically produced inputs used 
in third countries’ exports in a country’s exports.
Source: OECD: Global Value Chains Indicators, 2013. 















































Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): Integrating developing countries’ SMEs into global value chains (New 
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Source: ILO estimates based on M. Plummer, P. Petri and F. Zhai: Assessing the impacts of ASEAN economic integration on labour markets, 
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Source: ILO estimates based on M. Plummer, P. Petri and F. Zhai, op. cit. 
Figure 3-6 Change in consumption, investment, exports and imports under the AEC scenario relative 
     to the baseline, 2025 (per cent)
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enterprises	(SMEs)	are	in	agriculture	while	71.9	per	
cent	are	in	trade	and	hotels/restaurants.	Facilitating	
structural change will consequently require strength-
ening the capacities of micro-firms and SMEs to 
seize opportunities in higher value added activities 
and sectors, including through good management 
and	improved	labour	practices	(Box	3-2),	facilitated	
access to finance, tax incentives, business develop-
ment services, partnerships with larger enterprises, 
and integration into the formal economy. 
Impact of ASEAN trade integration on 
labour markets
ASEAN Member States have made substantial progress 
in realizing the ASEAN Economic Community (see 
Chapter 1). Nonetheless, as noted by the ASEAN 
Community Progress Monitoring System, there 
remain significant barriers to integration.8 In recog-
nition,	ASEAN	leaders	agreed	at	 the	23rd	Summit	
to intensify efforts to deepen and broaden economic 
integration.9 They also agreed to develop a post-2015 
vision for the ASEAN Community.10
What are the economic and labour market impli-
cations of such deepening ASEAN trade integration? 
To answer this question, this report has used an 
innovative computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model.11 This simulates the economic and labour 
market impact of an AEC scenario that, over time, 
includes:	(i)	removal	of	the	remaining	intra-regional	
tariffs; (ii) liberalization of non-tariff barriers for goods 
8	 ASEAN:	ASEAN Community Progress Monitoring System: 
Full report 2012: Measuring progress towards the ASEAN 




10 Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration on the ASEAN Community’s 
post	2015	vision,	Bandar	Seri	Begawan,	Oct.	2013.
11 The CGE model employed in this study was developed by 
Michael Plummer, Peter A. Petri and Fan Zhai in collaboration 
with the ILO. More detailed results of the model simulations 
are	available	 in	M.	Plummer,	P.	Petri	 and	F.	Zhai:	Assessing 
the impacts of ASEAN integration on Labour Markets, 
background paper prepared for ASEAN Community 2015: 
Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity 
(Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
and services by 50.0 per cent; and (iii) trade facilita-
tion in the form of a 20.0 per cent reduction in fixed 
trade costs.12 The AEC scenario is then compared 
to a baseline scenario, which is what is expected to 
happen in the absence of the above policy measures. 
This model is novel in that it represents more realisti-
cally the way labour markets in developing ASEAN 
Member States operate. In particular, it decomposes 
the supply of labour according to skill levels, sex and 
industry. There are varying impacts on wage rates 
depending on the skill level (see Annex A for details 
of the model, including its assumptions).
As	 indicated	 in	 Figure	 3-5,	 GDP	 in	 the	
ASEAN region would be 5.0 per cent higher than 
the	baseline	in	2015,	6.3	per	cent	higher	in	2020,	
and 7.1 per cent higher in 2025.13 Nonetheless, the 
gains differ substantially by country. Cambodia, for 
example,	stands	to	benefit	the	most	by	2025	(19.9	
per cent) and Indonesia and “Other ASEAN” the 
least (2.5 per cent).14 The lower-income ASEAN 
Member States in general see the largest increases in 
GDP relative to the baseline – in part as consumers 
and producers in these countries face relatively high 
trade barriers and costs, and thus stand to gain most 
from increased international trade.
Strong export growth underpins the expansion 
12 The model has been calibrated to 2007 data. For tariff rates, the 
status quo of applied intra-ASEAN tariffs as of 2007 has been 
applied. Non-tariff barriers are estimated via the disaggregated 
trade restrictiveness indexes constructed by the World Bank for 
goods and the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
for services, and modelled using both rent-generated tariff 
equivalent and “iceberg” costs approaches. Reductions are linearly 
implemented within the eight years of 2008-15. The policy shock 
induced in the model is limited to trade measures. Investment 
measures are also a core component of ASEAN integration but 
are not simulated explicitly while often there is a close nexus 
between trade and investment (see for example P. Athukorala and 
J.	Menon:	 “AFTA	 and	 the	 investment-trade	 nexus”,	 in	World 
Economy	(1997,	Vol.	20,	No.	2),	pp.	159-74.
13 Measuring changes in economic welfare using the equivalent 
variation technique, which measures the income equivalent of 
the increase in utility due to change in prices, yields similar 
results as those of GDP.
14 Due to data limitations, Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar 
are grouped under “Other ASEAN”. Furthermore, GDP is 
simulated to decrease in some non-ASEAN Member States 
relative to the baseline as a result of trade diversion, notably in 
Republic	of	Korea	(by	-0.3	per	cent),	China	(by	-0.2	per	cent),	
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of output relative to the baseline. At the ASEAN 
aggregate level, exports would be 15.7 per cent above 
the baseline while imports rise by 15.5 per cent 
(Figure	 3-6).15 Investment in the ASEAN region 
under the AEC scenario in 2025 is 8.0 per cent 
15 In this model, the trade balance is exogenous, and thus imports 
rise with exports to maintain the exogenously determined 
trade balance.
higher than the baseline, while private consumption 
is	7.4	per	cent	above	the	baseline	–	though	again	with	
significant differences between countries. In essence, 
international trade allows for specialization based 
on comparative advantage, which leads to higher 
aggregate consumption and investment possibili-
ties. Among the trade policy measures simulated, the 
removal of non-tariff barriers contributes the most 
Source: ILO estimates based on M. Plummer, P. Petri and F. Zhai, op. cit.
Figure 3-7 Change in employment under the AEC scenario relative to the baseline, 2025 
     (thousand and per cent of total employment)
Change in thousand, male (left axis)            Change in thousand, female (left axis)           Change in per cent of total employment (right axis)
























Figure 3-8 Vulnerable employment as a share of the additional job gains 
      under the AEC scenario relative to the baseline, 2025 (per cent)
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to the gains; excluding this factor would indicate 
substantially smaller gains in output. 
In addition to showing improvements in output, 
investment and consumption, the model also points 
to increases in total employment in 2025 relative to 
the	baseline.	This	is	illustrated	in	Figure	3-7	for	the	
six ASEAN Member States for which sufficiently 
detailed labour market information is available – 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam.16 
In Cambodia, total employment in 2025 under 
the AEC scenario would be 1.1 million above the 
baseline.	Such	a	gain	represents	9.8	per	cent	of	total	
employment in 2025. In Viet Nam, the additional 
jobs over the baseline are 6.0 million, representing 
9.5	per	cent	of	total	employment.	Indonesia	gains	
16 For the decomposition of labour in the model, micro-data files 
of labour force surveys are required but such files were made 
available to the ILO only in the six ASEAN Member States.
an	additional	1.9	million	jobs	over	the	baseline,	but	
this	 represents	 only	 1.3	per	 cent	 of	 total	 employ-
ment. An important factor behind these variations 
across the countries is the degree of economic and 
labour market dependence on international trade, 
given that the model is simulating the economic 
and labour market impact of trade measures. In 
Cambodia and Viet Nam, total international trade 
(exports and imports) accounted for 87.8 per cent 
and 155.0 per cent of GDP respectively in 2007 
(the base year of the model), whereas in Indonesia, 
the	corresponding	share	was	43.8	per	cent.17
There	are	also	gender	differences:	in	Cambodia	
and Viet Nam women account for half or more of 
potential job gains, but in Indonesia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Philippines and Thailand 
17	 ASEAN:	 ASEAN Community in Figures (ACIF) 2010 
(Jakarta, 2011). 
In 2013, ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN 
Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection, 
which reiterated their commitment to accelerate 
the extension of social protection. This should 
start with a social protection floor for all residents 
that will gradually expand towards more compre-
hensive social security systems. 
The establishment of social protection floors 
has increasingly been recognized by all ASEAN 
Member States as an efficient approach to 
combating poverty, inequality, and exclusion and 
as a key element of national development strat-
egies. Social protection contributes not only to 
the social dimension of sustainable development 
(it contributes to reducing poverty, social exclu-
sion, and inequalities), but also to the economic 
dimension (it has a positive impact on human 
capital development, acts as a stabilizer in times 
of crisis, and facilitates economic growth) and to 
the environmental dimension (it makes people 
more resilient to natural shocks and helps facili-
tate quick recovery).
The primary objective of social protection 
floors is to guarantee access to necessary goods 
and services (essential health care, maternity care, 
nutrition, education, and child care) and provide 
income security throughout the life cycle. To 
achieve this, countries need to combine interven-
tions with measures to guarantee the availability, 
and acceptable quality, of social services. 
The social protection floor approach calls for 
universal coverage of all residents and children, 
but specific support may be needed for disad-
vantaged groups and people with special needs. 
Once a floor has been established, countries 
should seek to provide higher levels of protection 
to as many people as possible, and as soon as 
possible.
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Note: Agriculture includes paddy rice, other grains, other crops, livestock and natural resources.
Source: ILO estimates based on M. Plummer, P. Petri and F. Zhai, op. cit. 
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they	account	for	40	per	cent	or	less.	Given	women’s	
low labour force participation rates across ASEAN 
Member States (see Annex F, Table F1-2), the results 
highlight the need to carefully monitor and manage 
the gender impacts of ASEAN integration and 
further support women’s efforts to enter and stay in 
the labour force. Furthermore, vulnerable employ-
ment accounts for over half of the additional job 
gains in all six economies except in the Philippines 
(Figure	3-8).18 The prospect of large gains in such 
jobs calls for coordinated labour market poli-
cies to improve working conditions and reduce 
vulnerability. Critical in this context is the estab-
lishment of social protection floors as highlighted 
in the ASEAN Declaration on Strengthening Social 
Protection	(Box	3-3).
18 Results assume that the share of vulnerable employment in 
each specific economic subsector in the base year remains 
constant.
The automobile industry in ASEAN is a corner-
stone of the regional production network, 
contributing significantly to value added, exports 
and employment. In 2013, ASEAN’s auto assem-
blers produced 4.4 million vehicles. Perhaps more 
importantly, investments and policies aimed at 
linking multinational manufacturers with suppliers 
have led to the development of domestic suppliers 
and support industries. Further improvements of 
customs and standards harmonization, transport 
and logistics, and investment liberalization and 
facilitation that are part of the AEC are expected 
to deepen regionalization of production networks 
and broaden regional supply chains, particularly 
to the CLMV countries.
The adoption of an ASEAN single market, 
with the entailing consolidation of production 
networks, also provides opportunities for the 
more developed ASEAN economies. Indonesia, 
for example, can build on the knowledge transfer 
between multinational enterprises, particularly 
Japanese firms, and domestic firms that has 
taken place in the past decades to further develop 
the capacities of domestic firms to participate in 
regional production networks. Malaysia will need 
a new impetus in industrial upgrading and inter-
national competitiveness to nudge the industry 
towards a more strategic productive coalition with 
multiple stakeholders, including trade unions. The 
Philippines is already involved in the production 
of automotive parts and components, and further 
building of capacities is required to explore the 
wider market resulting from the AEC. 
In Thailand, the AEC could induce suppliers 
to relocate manufacturing to countries bordering 
Thailand that have accessible road networks – 
while Thailand becomes a regional focal point, 
controlling satellite automobile production in the 
CLMV and neighbouring countries. The AEC thus 
presents opportunities to Thailand to produce 
higher-value-added products and become 
increasingly involved with process and product 
engineering as well as with research and devel-
opment. Consequently, the Federation of Thai 
Industries is optimistic about the future of the 
automobile industry, with the Federation projecting 
total production output to rise to between 3.5 
million and four million units by 2020. 
Box 3-4 The automobile industry in ASEAN
Source: S.Y. Chia: The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, challenges, and prospects, ADBI Working Paper Series No. 440 (Tokyo, Oct. 
2013); D. Irawati and R. Rutten: “The Indonesian automotive industry in the global–local production networks of ASEAN”, in D. Irawati and R. 
Rutten (ed.): Emerging knowledge economies in Asia: Current trends in ASEAN 5 (New York, Routledge, 2014), pp. 75-94; M.A.D. Rosellon 
and E.M. Medalla: “ASEAN+1 FTAs and global value chains in East Asia: The case of the Philippine automotive and electronics sectors”, in C. 
Findlay (ed.): ASEAN+1 FTAs and global value chains in East Asia (Jakarta, ERIA, 2011), pp. 275-320; K. Techakanont: ASEAN Community 2015: 
Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity: A case of Thailand’s automotive sector, background paper for ASEAN Community 
2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming). P. Wad and V.G.R. Chandran Govindaraju: 
“Automotive industry in Malaysia: An assessment of its development”, in International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management (2011, 
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The model also indicates changes in the distri-
bution of employment between sectors. In general, 
the additional jobs relative to the baseline are in 
agriculture, trade and transportation, and construc-
tion	(Figure	3-9).	Trade	and	transportation	accounts	
for about half the increase in Viet Nam, around a 
third in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Philippines 
and around a fifth in Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Thailand. Agriculture, on the other 
hand, accounts for the largest share of the job gains 
in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines 
and Thailand.19 In Cambodia and Indonesia, the 
construction sector accounts for a relatively large 
share of the job gains, at around 20 per cent.
In addition, the simulation results point to rela-
tively	large	gains	over	the	baseline	in	other	sectors:	
in textiles, apparel and chemicals in Cambodia; 
in metals, chemicals and textiles in Indonesia; in 
vehicles, metals and private services in Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic; in private services, food 
processing and vehicles in the Philippines; in food 
processing, vehicles, machinery in Thailand; and in 
apparel and food processing in Viet Nam (see Box 
3-4	for	a	discussion	on	the	automobile	industry	in	
ASEAN). On the other hand, comparatively large 
job losses relative to the baseline could take place in 
food processing in Cambodia, Indonesia and Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic. Such potential job 
losses suggest that the upstream and downstream 
linkages with agriculture remain relatively weak in 
these countries and call for support in strengthening 
these ties. In Thailand and Viet Nam, job losses 
relative to the baseline could take place in private 
services, while in the Philippines losses could be 
seen in chemicals and mining.
The potential job gains and losses relative to 
the baseline have the potential to slow or accelerate 
19 Furthermore, there will be redistribution of employment 
within a sector. For example, in the Philippines, there is a 
concern about the decline in the sugar subsector as a result of 
the	AEC.	See	S.B.	Tabladillo:	Decent work in an integrated 
ASEAN context: The case of the Philippine sugarcane industry 
(Geneva,	Institute	of	Labor	Studies,	2013).
structural change in the six ASEAN Member States 
(see Annex A, Table A1). In Cambodia, for example, 
under the baseline scenario the share of agriculture in 
total employment would decline from 55.0 per cent 
in 2010 to 50.0 per cent in 2025, but the implemen-
tation of the outlined AEC scenario measures has the 
potential to further reduce the share of agricultural 
employment	 to	 48.3	 per	 cent	 in	 2025	 (a	 further	
reduction of 1.7 percentage points). Despite the abso-
lute gains in agricultural employment in 2025 in all 
six countries, the share of agriculture in total employ-
ment declines further in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam – as job 
gains in non-agricultural employment are larger than 
those in agriculture. In Thailand and the Philippines, 
the share of agricultural employment declines 
between 2010 and 2025 but the implementation of 
the AEC trade measures is simulated to slow the pace 
of decline.
In Cambodia, between 2010 and 2025 under 
the baseline scenario, the share of industry in total 
employment	 increases	 from	14.9	per	cent	 to	18.1	
per	cent,	but	under	the	AEC	scenario	it	rises	to	19.4	
per	cent	(or	by	1.3	percentage	points).	This	growth	
is driven primarily by construction. For services the 
share increases under the baseline scenario by 1.8 
percentage points, driven by trade and transporta-
tion;	under	the	AEC	scenario	it	rises	a	further	0.4	
percentage points.
In Indonesia and Thailand, the share of 
industry and services in total employment continues 
to increase under the baseline scenario, driven by 
construction and by trade and transportation. In 
Indonesia, the situation does not change much 
under the AEC scenario. In Thailand, on the other 
hand, under the AEC scenario the share of employ-
ment in trade and transportation could decline by 
0.7 percentage points, and in private services by 0.6 
percentage points.
In Lao People’s Democratic Republic structural 
change is slower. Between 2010 and 2025 under the 
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in total employment would increase by only 1.0 
percentage point and under the AEC scenario by 
another half a percentage point. The largest growth 
is in wood products.
In both the Philippines and Viet Nam, the share 
of services employment continues to increase under 
the	baseline	scenario	–	by	5.4	percentage	points	in	
the Philippines and 7.8 percentage points in Viet 
Nam. In the Philippines, the AEC trade measures 
do not have a significant impact. In Viet Nam, 
however, they would increase the share of employ-
ment in trade and transportation by 2.0 percentage 
points in 2025, while the share of private services 
would decrease by 1.0 percentage point. 
Taken together, these models highlight the 
potential rise and decline of specific sectors as 
a result of trade measures. But it is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN Member States also have at 
their disposal a wide range of policies to influence 
patterns of structural change, including industrial 
policies aimed at supporting the growth of specific 
sectors.	 Box	 3-5	 highlights	 the	 potential	 role	 of	
industrial policies to support structural change, 
higher quality jobs and growth.
The business process outsourcing (BPO) sector 
in the Philippines has seen remarkable growth 
in the past decade. Export revenues from the 
sector grew ten-fold from $1.3 billion in 2004 to 
$13.3 billion in 2013, while employment in the 
sector grew nine-fold from around 101,000 in 
2004 to around 900,000 in 2013, representing 
around three per cent of total employment. An 
industrial policy aimed at supporting the growth 
of the sector has played an important role in 
such developments. 
As the BPO sector in the Philippines began 
to grow, the Philippines Government in 2001 
established the Information Technology and 
E-Commerce Council to develop the country as 
an E-services hub. In 2005, the Government 
also launched the Philippine Cyberservices 
Corridor, covering a number of urban centres. 
Furthermore, in 2006, the Training for Work 
Scholarship Program significantly focused on 
the IT industry to provide educational grants for 
the training of BPO applicants. The Government 
has also worked closely with the Business 
Processing Association of the Philippines to 
highlight the Philippines as a prime destination 
for BPO investors and has provided a number 
of incentives including income tax holidays, tax 
and duty exemption on imported capital equip-
ment, the ability to employ foreign nationals, 
and simplified export and import procedures. 
The Philippine Development Plan 2011-16 has 
also identified the BPO sector as one of the top 
ten priority development areas with the highest 
potential to contribute to both growth and job 
creation.
While call centres have contributed the most 
to the growth of the sector, the Government has 
recognized the need to nurture higher produc-
tivity segments including back-office services, 
design process delivery, and services for tran-
scription, animation, and game development. 
This involves strengthening the skills base, 
developing infrastructure and offering targeted 
fiscal and non-fiscal incentives. 
Box 3-5 Industrial policy and the business process outsourcing sector in the Philippines 
Source: “Economic update: The Philippines’ revenues from BPO set to rise 15 per cent in 2014”, in Oxford Business Group, 9 Feb. 2014; N. 
Magtibay-Ramos, G, Estrada and J. Felipe: An analysis of the Philippine business process outsourcing industry, Economics and Research 
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Note: Change reflects both expansion and replacement demand.
Source: ILO estimates based on S. El Achkar Hilal: The impact of ASEAN economic integration on occupational outlooks and skills demand, 
background paper for ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
Figure 3-10 Projected ten occupations with highest demand under the AEC scenario, 
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Note: Change reflects only replacement demand.
Source: ILO estimates based on S. El Achkar Hilal: The impact of ASEAN economic integration on occupational outlooks and skills demand, op. cit.
Figure 3-11 Projected ten occupations with highest demand under the AEC scenario, 
       by percentage change, 2010-25 (per cent) 
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The changing structure of the labour market, 
spurred further by economic integration, will have 
an impact on the occupational composition of the 
labour market. Which occupations will grow or 
decline with the implementation of the ASEAN 
Economic	 Community?	 Figure	 3-10	 projects	 the	
potential occupational demand in six ASEAN 
Member States assuming the sectoral structure of 
the labour market under the AEC scenario in 2025, 
based on an occupational employment projec-
tions model developed for the report (see Annex 
B for details of the model).20 The largest absolute 
demand is generally for low- and medium-skill 
occupations.21 
Nonetheless,	 as	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 3-11,	
the occupations projected to grow fastest in some 
countries are generally medium- and high-skilled. 
For example in Cambodia, retail and wholesale 
trade managers and electrical equipment installers 
and repairers are projected to grow fastest, while 
in Indonesia, the highest growth rate is projected 
for hotel and restaurant managers, and locomotive 
engine drivers and related workers. In Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, wood treaters, cabinet makers 
and related trades workers and rubber, plastic and 
paper products machine operators are projected 
to be the fastest growing occupations while in the 
20 The occupational employment projections model was 
developed by Souleima El Achkar Hilal in collaboration 
with	 the	 ILO.	Occupational	 demand	has	 two	 components:	
expansion demand attributable to growth in sectoral output 
and	employment	and/or	shifts	in	the	occupational	structures	
of industries, and replacement demand, attributable to 
factors such as deaths, retirements, inter-occupational and 
geographical labour mobility. In this model the share of 
workers aged 65 years and older for each occupation is used 
as an estimate of replacement demand for each occupation. 
Detailed results of the model are available in S. El Achkar 
Hilal:	 The Impact of ASEAN Economic Integration on 
Occupational Outlooks and Skills Demand, background 
paper prepared for ASEAN Community 2015: Managing 
integration for better jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, 
ILO, forthcoming).
21 Skill level definitions are based on International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) major groups. See 
Chapter	4	for	further	information.
Philippines the top five include ships’ deck crews 
and related workers, sports and fitness workers, 
managing directors and chief executives, database 
and network professionals and librarians, archivists 
and curators. In Thailand, hotel and restaurant 
managers and waiters and bartenders are the two 
occupations that are projected to experience the 
fastest pace of growth while in Viet Nam, the fastest 
growth is for other craft and related workers and 
heavy truck and bus drivers.
Conclusion
Trade integration is expected to change the pattern 
of structural transformation. If this is towards 
productive economic activities, structural change 
can help raise living standards and increase aggregate 
labour productivity – decreasing working poverty 
and the incidence of vulnerable employment, and 
supporting the growth of decent jobs. ASEAN 
Member States will want to facilitate such changes 
but ensure that they take place in a fair and inclu-
sive manner, and respect fundamental principles 
and rights at work. Furthermore, although ASEAN 
economic integration increases welfare, wages, and 
employment, the benefits are distributed unevenly 
among countries and sectors, and between men and 
women. Coordinated and coherent policies will be 
needed at both regional and national levels to ensure 
inclusive and fair outcomes (see Chapter 5).
The model results presented in this chapter 
highlight the prospects for specific sectors and 
occupations. Agriculture as a share of total employ-
ment is expected to decline, but agriculture will 
continue to be a dominant employer in some 
ASEAN Member States. Of particular concern is 
the potential of trade integration to weaken the 
food processing sectors in some of these countries, 
notably Cambodia, Indonesia and Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic. Concerted policy efforts will 
be required to strengthen the value chains associ-
ated with agriculture.
Some countries will see a rise in trade, 
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construction and private services as a share of total 
employment. In developing ASEAN Member 
States, these sectors, and some occupations in 
these sectors, are often associated with vulnerable 
employment and the informal economy. Continued 
efforts will be required to strengthen labour market 
policies and institutions to address informality and 
protect vulnerable groups of workers. To absorb 
those leaving agriculture, as well as the five million 
new entrants to ASEAN’s labour force each year, 
governments will need well-designed industrial 
and sectoral policies. These should be coordinated 
with employment policies and based on tripartite 
dialogue with a view to supporting employment 
growth in higher-productivity services and manu-
facturing. In some countries, this has involved 
expanding employment in textiles and apparel, 
but efforts are required to diversify employment to 
other manufacturing subsectors. 
Structural change will entail considerable 
churning in the labour market. This brings risks for 
vulnerable workers, highlighting the need for imple-
mentation of the measures identified in the ASEAN 
Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection – to 
improve the quality, coverage, and sustainability of 
social protection, starting with the establishment of 
a social protection floor for all. Productive structural 
change will also depend on the ability of micro-
firms and SMEs to seize opportunities in higher 
value-added activities, including in the regional and 
global production networks in the ASEAN region, 
underscoring the need to strengthen their capacities, 
including through good management and improved 
labour practices. With structural change pointing 
to an increase in the demand for higher skills – the 
fastest growing occupations are likely to be in semi- 
to high-skilled jobs – further investments in skills 
and	training	will	be	required.	Chapter	4	considers	
the priorities as ASEAN Member States move to 
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The ASEAN Economic Community has numerous 
implications for human resource development. 
The structural change it encourages will increase 
the demand for some skills while reducing that for 
others.1 Countries will need labour market policies 
that not only ensure the relevance and quality of 
skills, but also offer a degree of social protection for 
those who lose their jobs – mitigating adjustment 
costs and helping sustain a dynamic development 
process.2
At the national level, the education and skills of 
the workforce are critical factors in attracting FDI, 
enabling structural transformation and providing a 
1 In this report, unless noted otherwise, high-skill occupations 
are defined as International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO) groups 1 (managers), 2 (professionals) 
and	3	 (technicians	 and	associate	professionals).	Medium-skill	
occupations	include	ISCO	groups	4	(clerks),	5	(service	and	sales	
workers), 6 (skilled agricultural and fishery workers), 7 (craft 
and related trade workers) and 8 (plant and machine operators 
and assemblers). Low-skill occupations consist of ISCO group 
9	 (elementary	 occupations).	 See	 ILO:	 International Standard 
Classification of Occupations: ISCO-08: Volume 1: Structure, 
group definitions and correspondence tables (Geneva, 2012).
2	 ILO:	 Skills for improved productivity, employment growth 
and development, Report V, International Labour Conference, 
97th	Session	(Geneva,	2008).
pathway for the most vulnerable segments of the 
labour market to access better-quality jobs. For enter-
prises, being competitive depends heavily on the 
ability to attract and retain skilled human resources 
that can accelerate the adoption of innovative 
business practices and sophisticated technologies, 
boosting both productivity and profitability.
The ASEAN Leaders Statement on Human 
Resources and Skills Development for Economic 
Recovery and Sustainable Growth, adopted in Ha 
Noi in October 2010, provides a sound blueprint 
for regional cooperation and national action for 
upgrading skills.3 But priorities will vary according 
to each country’s economic structure and goals 
and level of development. Some will still focus on 
primary education and literacy skills. Others will 
look to improve secondary education and vocational 
and technical training. And the more industrialized 
ASEAN Member States will aim to enhance the 
relevance of tertiary education and foster cognitive 
3	 ASEAN	Leaders	Statement	on	Human	Resources	and	Skills	
Development for Economic Recovery and Sustainable 
Growth, Hanoi, Oct. 2010.
The ASEAN Economic Community will increase the demand for skilled workers. 
This will require stronger education and training policies, with curricula that match 
national development priorities and meet the needs of the most vulnerable, women 
and young people. Employers’ and workers’ organizations must be key partners in 
tackling the skills challenge. But governments in the region can also cooperate to 
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and specialized skills in mathematics, science and 
engineering. 
Skill-intensive economies
ASEAN Member States have already been moving 
towards more skill-intensive production and 
exports, reflecting higher labour productivity. But 
the pattern of change varies considerably across the 
region	(Figure	4-1).	In	Singapore,	the	region’s	high-
est-skill production base, between 2000 and 2012, 
the share of high-skill and technology-intensive 
manufacturing	exports	increased	from	36	per	cent	
to	48	per	cent.	But	Cambodia,	at	the	other	end	of	
the scale, has made limited progress since 2000 in 
its efforts to diversify from agriculture and labour-
intensive garment manufacturing. 
Singapore accounts for around half of ASEAN’s 
high-skill manufacturing exports, with Thailand 
and	 Malaysia	 respectively	 contributing	 19.6	 per	
cent and 15.7 per cent. Elsewhere, high-skill manu-
factured exports are limited. Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Myanmar collectively account for less than one per 
cent of the ASEAN aggregate.
 
The demand for diverse skills
Structural change as a result of the AEC is likely 
to increase the demand for a mix of managerial, 
technical and core employability skills. A back-
ground paper for this report has estimated the 
scale of future demand for Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines, 
Thailand and Viet Nam (Annex B). For high-skill 
employment the model indicates that in these econ-
omies between 2010 and 2025 demand could grow 
by	 41.0	 per	 cent,	 or	 14	 million	 workers	 (Figure	
4-2).	Nearly	 one-half	 of	 those	 gains	 would	 be	 in	
Indonesia. However there will also be significant 
expansion	in	the	Philippines	by	60.0	per	cent	(4.4	
million). Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic	too	will	see	significant	growth	at	45.0	per	
cent	 and	53.0	per	 cent,	 respectively,	 though	 their	
Note: Manufacturing corresponds to Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC), Rev. 3 major groups 5, 6, 7 and 8. High-skill and 
technology-intensive manufacturing corresponds to electronics, parts and components for electrical and electronic goods and other related goods 
(SITC 751, 752, 759, 761, 762, 763, 764 and 776).
Source: ILO estimates based on UNCTAD: UNCTADstat Database.
Figure 4-1 Share of high-skill and technology-intensive manufacturing in total manufacturing exports, 
     2000 and 2012 (per cent) and share of total ASEAN high-skill and technology-intensive 
     manufacturing export volume, 2012 (per cent)
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Source: ILO estimates based on S. El Achkar Hilal: The impact of ASEAN economic integration on occupational outlooks and skills demand, 
background paper for ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
Figure 4-2 Estimated change in employment by skill level, 2010–25 (thousand and per cent) 
Additional change under AEC in thousand (left axis)  Change under baseline in thousand (left axis)
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Brunei Darussalam 95.4 91.7  94.7  11.4  49.6  24.3  3.3 
Cambodia 73.9 98.4  38.2  2.3  47.0  15.8  2.6 
Indonesia 92.8 93.7  74.8  18.0  42.0  27.2  2.8 
Lao PDR 72.7 95.9  41.4  0.8  54.0  16.7  2.8 
Malaysia 93.1 97.0  66.3  6.8  42.5  36.0  5.9 
Myanmar 92.7  …  47.0  …  …  13.8  0.8 
Philippines 95.4 88.2  61.4  …  …  28.2  2.7 
Singapore 95.9  …  …  11.6  35.1  …  3.2 
Thailand 93.5 95.6  79.5  15.4  41.5  51.4  5.8 
Viet Nam 93.4 98.1  …  …  …  24.6  6.3 
Note: “... “ = data not available. Education expenditure figures refer to percentage of GDP.
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absolute increases are smaller. 
For demand in medium-skill employment the 
aggregate percentage growth is lower at 22.0 per cent 
though	 this	 would	 still	 represent	 38	 million	 jobs.	
Also, the estimated impact of the AEC is greatest on 
medium-skill jobs, particularly in Thailand where it 
would reverse decreases under the baseline scenario 
and in Viet Nam where it would more than double 
the expansion in medium-skill employment. For 
low-skill occupations the growth in demand would 
be	12.4	million	or	24.0	per	cent,	driven	partly	by	a	
contraction in Indonesia. Nevertheless such employ-
ment remains important in a number of countries. In 
Cambodia the demand will grow by 71.0 per cent, in 
Lao	People’s	Democratic	Republic	by	119.0	per	cent	
and in the Philippines by 62.0 per cent, highlighting 
the continued importance of ensuring quality stand-
ards in basic education and training.
The AEC can certainly generate higher-skill and 
more productive employment. This would allow 
low- and middle-income ASEAN Member States to 
move up the productivity and skills ladder so as to 
be competitive and not rely on a low-skill workforce 
to drive exports and growth. But this process will 
not happen automatically. Realizing these oppor-
tunities requires strengthening national education 
and training systems and ensuring that the most 
vulnerable have the qualifications and competencies 
needed to compete for these jobs.
Sound education and training
Regardless of a country’s stage of development, the 
foundation for this should be a sound basic educa-
tion that provides the essential skills of literacy and 
numeracy. In this respect ASEAN Member States 
are in a fairly strong position. Literacy rates are quite 
high among the working-age populations – except 
in Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
where	 they	 are	 less	 than	 75	 per	 cent	 (Table	 4-1).	
Throughout the region, however, women consist-
ently lag behind men in literacy, in part reflecting 
gender disparities in access to primary education.
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
Figure 4-3 Out-of-school children of primary school age, 2012 or most recent year (thousand and per cent)
Out-of-school children in thousand (left axis)  Per cent of children of primary school age (right axis)
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ASEAN Member States have achieved 
almost universal enrolment in primary education. 
Nevertheless in the region as a whole nearly three 
million children of primary school age are not in 
school – having never enrolled or having dropped 
out	 early	 (Figure	 4-3).	They	 risk	 becoming	 child	
labourers and are unlikely to acquire the literacy 
and numeracy skills to subsequently secure decent 
employment. More than 80 per cent of these chil-
dren are in Indonesia and the Philippines. The 
Philippines also has the highest proportion of chil-
dren	out	of	school,	at	11.4	per	cent,	though	the	rate	
is also more than four per cent in Brunei Darussalam, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Thailand. To 
address the remaining gaps in universal basic educa-
tion, targeting early school leavers is critical as well 
as vulnerable boys and girls who have been left out 
of the formal school system. This would not only 
advance social development but also create the basis 
for	a	high-quality	workforce	(Box	4-1).
Beyond primary schooling, developing the 
future workforce in many low- and middle-income 
ASEAN Member States involves greater access to 
secondary education, as well as to technical and voca-
tional education and training (TVET). This will be 
particularly important for young people from rural 
and poor households, providing them with the core 
employability and cognitive skills to move success-
fully from the classroom to the workplace. 
The greatest secondary education deficits are in 
Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Myanmar, where net enrolment rates are less than 
50 per cent. In Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand participation is notably higher but still not 
universal. Vocational education enrolment is also 
weak in most ASEAN Member States, particularly 
among young women. TVET can provide students 
with practical alternatives that help develop job-
specific competencies and increase employability 
(Box	4-2).
The Philippines can break intergenerational poverty 
cycles by increasing access to quality basic educa-
tion and decent work. The country has had rapid 
population growth, persistently high poverty rates, 
and large numbers of out-of-school children and 
youth, particularly from the poorest households.
Recent measures to develop human capital 
will improve the education of the workforce and, 
as the AEC proceeds, should increase the resil-
ience of domestic firms to external competition. 
An important reform is the K-to-12 programme. 
Enacted into law in July 2013, this extends basic 
education from 10 to 12 years and should enhance 
young people’s cognitive and analytical skills and 
improve trainability upon graduation. Another 
measure is the Responsible Parenthood and 
Reproductive Health Act. Signed in December 
2012, this bill increases access to sexual health 
education, contraception and reproductive health 
services, with the aim of decelerating population 
growth and ultimately decreasing labour market 
pressure. These two measures are comple-
mented by the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino 
Program. Established in 2008, this conditional 
cash transfer programme focuses on improving 
access to health and education services for 
infants and children from poor households and 
has yielded positive results.
Source: ILO: Key Indicators of the Labour Market, eighth edition, 2013; World Bank: Philippines conditional cash transfer program: Impact 
evaluation 2012 (Washington, DC, 2013); J. Yap: ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity: The case 
of the Philippines, background paper for ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, 
forthcoming).
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In this regard, Viet Nam has increased lower 
secondary enrolment among ethnic minorities and 
girls in disadvantaged regions by building new 
schools and teacher housing, developing classroom 
materials in ethnic minority languages and piloting 
a school feeding programme, among other meas-
ures.4 Likewise, Indonesia boosted lower secondary 
4	 ADB:	Viet Nam: Increasing girls’ access to lower secondary 
education in the most disadvantaged regions – 2013, Gender 
and	Development	Case	Studies	(June	2013).
enrolment for girls in poor rural areas through 
grants managed by school committees that provided 
scholarships, supplementary feeding, assistance with 
transportation and separate sanitation facilities.5
In addition to access, it will be even more 
important for the future to improve the quality of 
education and make it relevant to fast-changing 
5	 ADB:	 Indonesia: Reaching the unreached through the 
decentralized basic education project – 2010, Gender and 
Development	Case	Studies	(May	2013).
A responsive technical and vocational education 
and training (TVET) system is critical for work-
force development and helps fill gaps in skills and 
competencies not provided by tertiary education. 
TVET provides pathways to develop knowledge, 
attitudes and skills from a variety of courses and 
training programmes that ease the transition from 
secondary education to the workplace. Completion 
of the more advanced technical courses can lead 
to a high-skill job or provide a bridge for students 
to pursue a tertiary education if they aspire to 
higher-level professions.
Throughout ASEAN, however, TVET accounts 
for a small share of secondary school enrolment, 
from 0.8 per cent in Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic to 18.0 per cent in Indonesia (Table 
4-1). TVET institutions in some countries face 
challenges related to the relevance of curricula, 
poor-quality instruction and infrastructure and the 
absence of certification frameworks that meet the 
standards of employers. Also, gender stereotyping 
hinders young women from choosing some voca-
tional tracks.
In this regard, a focus on improving TVET 
quality and relevance through stronger linkages to 
industry demand is paramount, as is expanding 
access for poor and rural populations, integrating 
core skills, developing tools for the recognition of 
continuous and prior learning, and enhancing 
the availability of reliable labour market infor-
mation and vocational guidance. Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, for instance, is developing 
a Labour Market Information System and a TVET 
Education Management Information System 
that will enhance assessment of skills demand 
and strengthen employment services for TVET 
students and jobseekers.
Efforts to improve TVET would also be 
bolstered by enhanced skills standards and 
recognition systems. A robust quality assurance 
framework can promote the development of a 
transparent mechanism acceptable to private 
industry which can assess, certify and recognize 
prior learning and experience irrespective of where 
they are acquired.1 Collectively, these measures 
would help ASEAN Member States reduce skill 
mismatches, facilitate mutual skills recognition 
in the context of regional labour migration and 
improve dialogue between employers, workers 
and training providers. 
1  ILO Human Resources Development Recommendation, 2004 (No. 195).
Source: S. El Achkar Hilal: Lao People’s Democratic Republic: TVET assessment (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming); S. El Achkar Hilal: TVET in Viet Nam: 
Situational assessment and inputs for the legal reform process (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming); Q. Huang: Comprehensive research on the general 
assessment of the current skills systems and delivery: Research study on Thailand (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming); L. Lanzona: A review of the TVET 
system in the Philippines (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming); LSE Enterprise: Assessment study of technical and vocational education and training in 
Myanmar (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming); D. Lythe: Assessment of the readiness of ASEAN Member States for implementation of the commitment to 
the free flow of skilled labour within the AEC from 2015 (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
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labour markets. ASEAN’s move towards higher 
value-added industries calls for excellence in science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics.6 In this 
respect some countries are lagging. This is evident 
from the results of the most recent Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) (Figure 
4-4).	 In	 mathematics	 and	 science,	 for	 example,	
compared with the OECD average, Indonesian 
students	 scored	 119	 points	 lower	 –	 equivalent	 to	
almost three fewer years of schooling. Results for 
Malaysian students were 77 points lower, and Thai 
students 62 points lower. Singapore, by contrast, 
ranked second overall out of 65 economies, with a 
composite score that outpaced the OECD average 
6	 C.	 Martinez-Fernandez	 and	 K.	 Choi:	 Skills development 
pathways in Asia, OECD Local Economic and Employment 
Development	 (LEED)	 Working	 Papers	 2012/12	 (Paris,	
OECD, 2012).
by 65 points – equivalent to 1.5 years of addi-
tional	schooling.	Viet	Nam	also	did	relatively	well:	
15-year-olds scored higher than the OECD average, 
indicating that even at lower stages of economic 
development it is possible to achieve strong educa-
tional outcomes.
Middle- and high-income ASEAN economies 
are also facing challenges related to the disconnect 
between tertiary education and the needs of employ-
ers.7 The share of tertiary graduates with a diploma 
in engineering, manufacturing and construction 
remains	 low	 overall	 –	 at	 9.3	 per	 cent	 in	 Brunei	
Darussalam,	 15.6	 per	 cent	 in	Thailand	 and	 27.3	
per cent in Malaysia – and significantly lower for 
7	 World	Bank:	Putting higher education to work: Skills and 
research for growth in East Asia (Washington, DC, 2012).
Note: Programme for International Student Assessment results from standardized international assessments in mathematics and science of 
15-year-olds in 65 economies, including all 34 OECD member countries. Approximately 40 points is the equivalent of one year of schooling.
Source: OECD: PISA 2012 Results in Focus: What 15-year-olds know and what they can do with what they know (Paris, 2013).
Figure 4-4 Mean score in mathematics and science, PISA, 2012
Composite average in mathematics and science (non-ASEAN) Composite average in mathematics and science (ASEAN) 
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women.8 Thailand, for example, has an oversupply 
of social science graduates and too few specialists in 
science, technology, and health. As a result around 
80 per cent of firms in Thailand experience difficul-
ties in filling job vacancies because most graduates 
lack relevant technical skills.9 
Investing in education reform
Various measures could help reform education 
systems and strengthen learning outcomes. Recent 
efforts in Thailand have helped improve the quality 
of secondary school instruction. These initiatives 
include establishing a teacher licensing system, 
extending pre-service and in-service training, 
recognizing outstanding teacher performance and 
improving teachers’ compensation.10 Similarly, 
Malaysia bolstered the quality of its secondary 
education by establishing a benchmark system for 
quality standards, reorienting learning practices 
towards the information and knowledge economy, 
and teaching mathematics and science in English, as 
well as upgrading teachers’ qualifications and pay.11 
Curriculum reform is also vital. Instead of 
requiring students to memorize content, curricula 
that nurture cognitive, problem-solving and job-
relevant skills, and promote the versatility and 
relevance of vocational education would better 
prepare the ASEAN workforce. Fostering excellence 
in science and mathematics while being sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate other emerging topics will 
be increasingly important.12 Viet Nam, for instance, 
8 UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
9	 World	Bank:	Thailand Social Monitor: Towards a competitive 
higher education system in a global economy (Washington, 
DC, 2011).
10	 R.	Atagi:	Secondary teacher policy research in Asia: Secondary 
teachers in Thailand (Bangkok, UNESCO, 2011).
11	 S.	Eshah	Mokshein,	H.	Haji	Ahmad	and	A.	Vongalis-Macrow:	
Secondary teacher policy research in Asia: Towards providing 
quality secondary education: Training and retaining quality 
teachers in Malaysia	(Bangkok,	UNESCO,	2009).
12	 D.	 Bloom:	 “Getting	 past	 the	 basics:	 Pursuing	 secondary	
education”,	in	World	Economic	Forum:	Education and skills 
2.0: New targets and innovative approaches	(Geneva,	2014),	
pp.	59-63.
is adapting an innovative model from Colombia 
called Escuela Nueva which prioritizes group 
learning and problem-solving over memorization. 
The initial results in 1,500 pilot primary schools are 
promising, and plans are underway to advance the 
programme to lower secondary education.13
Achieving higher educational outcomes will 
require more efficient public investment. This 
entails directing expenditure to where it is needed 
most – targeting children and youth from poor 
and vulnerable households, improving the quality 
of instruction and institutional performance and 
motivating both girls and boys to study subjects 
that are relevant to employers, irrespective of stere-
otypes. In some countries greater fiscal resources 
are essential to this end. In Myanmar, for instance, 
public expenditure on education is less than one 
per cent of GDP, significantly lower than the three 
per cent in the majority of ASEAN Member States 
(Table	4-1).	
From the classroom to the workplace
As economies generate insufficient demand, young 
people lacking job-related skills struggle to find 
decent work. Across the region the jobseekers most 




highest unemployment rates for young people were 
in Indonesia, at 21.6 per cent, and the Philippines, 
at 16.6 per cent (Annex F, Table F1-5). 
Education is a critical factor for employment. 
In Cambodia graduates with university degrees 
on average find satisfactory work within two years 
while those with a secondary education spend an 
average of nearly five years in this transition.14 
13	 World	 Bank:	Vietnam Development Report 2014: Skilling 
up Vietnam: Preparing the workforce for a modern market 
economy	(Washington,	DC,	2013).
14	 H.	 Kanol,	 K.	 Khemarin	 and	 S.	 Elder:	 Labour market 
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Likewise, one-half of working Cambodian youth are 
in informal employment and two-fifths are undere-
ducated for the job that they hold. In Viet Nam, 
only one-quarter of working youth are able to find 
formal	employment,	where	wages	are	45.0	per	cent	
higher than earnings in informal employment.15
In some cases, young people are out of work 
because their education does not match industry 
requirements. But others may reject work that 
does not meet their aspirations; young people from 
wealthier families can afford to wait for the “ideal” 
job. Supporting the transition of young women into 
occupations and industries traditionally perceived 
to be male-oriented would help improve their 
employment opportunities and wages and decrease 
the gender pay gap. This strategy requires not only 
ensuring that women have the relevant skills but 
also lowering the resistance from employers, male 
15	 E.	 Shehu	 and	 B.	 Nilsson:	 Informal employment among 
youth: Evidence from 20 school-to-work transition surveys, 
Work4Youth	Publication	Series	No.	8	(Geneva,	ILO,	2014).
workers and consumers.16
In addition, many students also lack sound 
career guidance and reliable labour market infor-
mation and statistics that could help identify the 
current needs of employers and the skills that must 
be cultivated to improve job prospects. They could 
also benefit from apprenticeships, particularly those 
that involve medium and high skills, which link 
education and training institutions with the private 
sector. Such systems are, however, underdeveloped 
and inadequately resourced, hampering the oppor-
tunities for students to complement classroom 
knowledge with practical, on-the-job experience. 
The skills gaps
The difficulties facing young women and men 
reflect broader skills gaps and mismatches. This was 
confirmed	in	a	2013	ILO	survey	of	ASEAN	enter-
prises and business associations (Annex C). Fewer 
16	 ADB	and	ILO:	Good global economic and social practices to 
promote gender equality in the labour market (Manila, ADB, 
2013).
Note: ASEAN regional averages exclude Brunei Darussalam, Thailand and Viet Nam.
Source: ILO: Survey of ASEAN Employers on Skills and Competitiveness (2013).
Figure 4-5 Share of respondents who agree that skills of secondary, tertiary and vocational 
     graduates match enterprise needs, 2013 (per cent) 
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than one in three respondents agreed that secondary 
school graduates were equipped with the relevant 
skills needed by their enterprises, with scores ranging 
from less than one in ten in Myanmar to seven in 
ten	in	Singapore	(Figure	4-5).	By	comparison,	for	
tertiary graduates in ASEAN overall, the skills were 
viewed as better aligned with industry requirements 
(one in two respondents agreeing). In this case the 
most positive responses came from the Philippines 
and Singapore – around four in five. In terms of 
vocational education and training systems, around 
half the respondents felt that these met their busi-
ness needs. The proportion was highest in Singapore 
(nine in ten) but significantly lower in Cambodia 
and Myanmar (fewer than two in five).
This employer survey also identified the greatest 
skills gaps. The training thought to be most widely 
needed	was	in	management	and	leadership	(29.0	per	
cent of responses) followed by vocational training 
(17.0 per cent) and customer service training (15.0 
per cent). Separately, in Cambodia another survey 
of more than 500 enterprises found in addition to 
vocation-specific competencies there were consid-
erable shortages in communication and foreign 
language skills.17 Likewise, in Viet Nam a World 
Bank survey of employers identified gaps in job-
related technical skills, as well as in cognitive skills 
such as problem solving and critical thinking, and 
core skills such as teamwork and communication.18 
Unless these shortages are addressed, employers 
will face high staff turnover, recruit skilled workers 
from abroad and fill some hard-to-fill vacancies 
with less skilled professionals, which can reduce 
productivity.19
17	 M.	Bruni,	L.	Luch	and	S.	Kuoch:	Skills shortages and skills 
gaps in the Cambodian labour market: Evidence from 
employer skills needs survey, ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper 
Series	(Bangkok,	ILO,	2013).
18	 World	 Bank:	Vietnam Development Report 2014: Skilling 
up Vietnam: Preparing the workforce for a modern market 
economy, op. cit.
19	 M.	 Aring:	 Enhancing competitiveness and employability 
through skill development, background paper prepared for 
ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better 
jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
Source: ILO estimates based on S. El Achkar Hilal: ASEAN occupational projections: The impact of ASEAN economic integration 
on occupational outlooks and skills demand, op. cit.
Figure 4-6 Estimated skills and educational mismatch in high-skill occupations, 2025 (thousand and per cent) 
Additional underqualified workers under AEC in thousand (left axis)            Underqualified workers under baseline in thousand (left axis)
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The extent of potential skills and educational 
mismatches has been estimated in a modelling exercise 
that matches the growth in the demand for high-skill 
occupations with historical patterns in workforce 
educational qualifications.20 These results suggest that 
in 2025, under the AEC, in Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines, 
Thailand and Viet Nam more than half of all high-skill 
employment could be filled by workers with insuffi-
cient	qualifications	(Figure	4-6).	These	six	economies	
collectively could face a mismatch in high-skill jobs 
of 25.6 million, of which the AEC scenario would 
account for around 800,000. Indonesia could face 
the challenge of having the largest number of under-
qualified	workers	in	high-skill	jobs	(13.3	million	or	
63.0	per	cent).	By	comparison,	in	Cambodia	and	Lao	
People’s Democratic Republic, the number of under-




Hilal:	 ASEAN occupational projections: The impact of 
ASEAN economic integration on occupational outlooks and 
skills demand, op. cit.
cent of the 1.5 million high-skill jobs. These trends 
underline the importance of improving higher educa-
tion and training to ease possible future constraints 
on growth and investment. 
Moreover, these skills gaps may be exacerbated 
in countries such as Singapore and Thailand where 
the population is ageing and there is a decline in 
the growth of the labour force. These countries can 
retain older workers by promoting lifelong learning 
and providing other incentives. Enterprises can, 
for example, invest more in on-the-job training to 
ensure that mature workers remain adaptable and 
productive. They can also recruit and reskill mature 
workers and retirees for new roles, and leverage their 
extensive knowledge and experience to mentor and 
prepare younger workers.21 An older society will 
also accelerate demand for medical and health serv-
ices, for instance, and for training workers in the 
necessary skills. The prospect of rapid ageing and 
widening skills gaps should also spur better manage-
ment of regional labour migration (Chapter 6).
21	 P.	Milligan	and	P.	Sung:	“Older	and	wiser:	Tapping	the	 full	
potential of the mature workforce”, in World Economic 
Forum:	Education and skills 2.0: New targets and innovative 
approaches, op. cit., pp. 70-77.
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Overall, closely aligning strategies for economic 
development with those for workforce development 
will be integral to meet the shifting demand for 
skills. This must be underpinned by stronger insti-
tutional coordination between relevant government 
agencies, such as ministries of labour, planning and 
statistics, commerce, and education and youth, 
and partnerships with employers and trade unions. 
ASEAN Member States already have national policy 
frameworks that identify priority economic sectors 
and stress the importance of human resources (Table 
4-2).	But	achieving	their	bold	economic	and	social	
development goals requires skills development in 
specific areas.
Despite the region’s continued structural shift 
away from agriculture, it remains critical for food 
security and employment. In more than half of 
ASEAN Member States agriculture is a develop-
ment priority. If countries are to raise agricultural 
productivity, competencies for adopting innova-
tive farming processes and technologies are critical, 
particularly with the aim of upgrading and greening 
the sector. Thailand, for example, has organized 
training in the production and use of bio-fertilizers 
and better practices in packaging products with 
eco-friendly materials.22
The majority of ASEAN Member States are also 
prioritizing transport, construction and infrastruc-
ture. This calls for expanding the supply of workers 
with sound competencies in engineering and 
construction skills such as welding, electrical wiring 
and bricklaying. Efforts towards environmental 
sustainability also require specialized engineers and 
architects with training in energy-efficient construc-
tion and in retrofitting and renewable energy.23
22	 O.	Strietska-Ilina	et	al.:	Skills for green jobs: A global view: Synthesis 
report based on 21 country studies (Geneva, ILO, 2011).
23	 R.	 Maclean,	 S.	 Jagannathan	 and	 J.	 Sarvi	 (eds.):	 Skills 
development for inclusive and sustainable growth in 
developing Asia-Pacific, Technical and Vocational Education 
and	 Training:	 Issues,	 Concerns	 and	 Prospects	 Volume	 19	
(ADB	and	Springer,	2013).
In Cambodia and Viet Nam, upgrading skills 
in the garment and textile industry would help 
ensure the sector remains vital for exports and jobs. 
Many multinational clothing brands are making 
sourcing decisions based on improved product 
quality, labour productivity and compliance with 
labour standards. Enterprises that wish to remain 
competitive will therefore need specialized skills to 
allow them to supply more sophisticated apparel 
products and offer higher value-added services such 
as research, product design and marketing.24
Middle- and high-income ASEAN Member 
States such as Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand are targeting high-skill manufacturing 
(such as automotive parts and electronics) as well 
as knowledge-based services (including information 
technology and financial services). This necessitates 
investing in workforce qualifications in science, 
technology and mathematics. Achieving higher 
levels of teamwork, creativity and innovation also 
means fostering core employability or soft skills.25
An estimation model for the occupational 
demands in six ASEAN economies for 2025 indi-
cates the likely need for particular types of workers 
(Chapter	 3,	 Figure	 3-10).	 In	 all	 six,	 demand	will	
increase	 for	 construction	 workers,	 3.3	 million	
in total, with two-thirds of that expansion in the 
Philippines and Viet Nam. Cambodia and Viet Nam 
will need more textile machine operators. Thailand 
will face strong demand for waiters and bartenders 
in the hospitality sector. In Indonesia, workers in 
food processing will see notable, albeit moderating, 
demand. These trends are consistent with their 
respective national development priorities.
Noteworthy is the sizeable increase in demand 
for street and market salespersons. They are often 
employed informally – which indicates scope for 
24	 G.	 Lopez-Acevedo	 and	 R.	 Robertson	 (eds.):	 Sewing success? 
Employment, wages, and poverty following the end of the Multi-
fibre Arrangement (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2012).
25	 L.	 Brewer:	 Enhancing the employability of disadvantaged 
youth: What? Why? and How? Guide to core work skills 
(Geneva,	ILO,	2013);	M.	Aring,	op.	cit.
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skills training and entrepreneurship education, 
along with improved access to finance and business 
support services. This would help them move into 
formal jobs or establish businesses that emphasize 
customer service. There will also be more demand 
for skilled and low-skilled agricultural workers; 
quality basic education and greater investments 
in rural infrastructure could improve their skills 
and productivity.26 Supporting the introduction 
of agricultural enterprise development into school 
curricula, as witnessed in the Republic of Korea, 
could help to foster entrepreneurship and career 
interest in the sector among young people.
Certifying skills
Robust frameworks for certifying skills and quality 
assurance mechanisms that can be trusted by 
employers are critical for enhancing training systems. 
Skills certification schemes validate skills and 
competencies regardless of how they are acquired, 
allow employers to compare skills across the labour 
market, support occupational mobility, and promote 
lifelong learning. At present national qualifications 
frameworks in ASEAN have considerable gaps espe-
cially among the CLMV countries.27 In this regard, 
countries could draw on the experiences of Brunei 
Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore, 
for example, in linking technical training systems 
to national development priorities and establishing 
unified qualifications arrangements. 
This can be a long and costly endeavour. Some 
ASEAN Member States could therefore pursue a 
gradual approach by first certifying key occupations 
and skills. To that end, the ASEAN Secretariat, with 
technical expertise from the ADB and the ILO, can 
play a prominent coordination role. The Secretariat 
could help ensure that qualification frameworks 
are benchmarked incrementally with the ASEAN 
26	 ILO:	Skills for rural employment and development, Skills for 
Employment	Policy	Brief	(Geneva,	2014).
27 D. Lythe, op. cit.
Qualifications Reference Framework that is under 
development.28 Technical assistance at the regional 
level should also focus on developing regional model 
competency standards as benchmarking tools for 
developing ASEAN Member States. Regional coop-
eration efforts could also promote growth sectors 
like construction and tourism and help protect 
vulnerable groups such as domestic workers, while 
expanding mutual recognition arrangements that 
would help facilitate intra-regional labour migra-
tion (Chapter 6).
Enhancing partnerships
All these efforts to better prepare ASEAN’s work-
force would be more effective if based on strong 
partnerships with employers’ and workers’ organiza-
tions. Collaboration between education and training 
providers and the private sector would help ensure 
that curricula are practical and aligned with market 
demand, for example if based on skills needs assess-
ments of enterprises. Employers can also develop 
complementary apprenticeship schemes through 
which young people can gain practical experience 
and job-specific skills that would ease the school-to-
work transition. In this regard, Singapore’s Institute 
of Technical Education provides an effective model 
of leveraging public-private partnerships. Its 
governance structure is tripartite and close industry 
involvement in strategic planning helps enhance 
the relevance of curricula and integrate high-quality 
apprenticeships with coursework.29
Increasingly, there has been a trend in ASEAN 
Member States towards establishing and developing 
28 The ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework aims to 
provide a common reference point while accommodating 
the diversity of national training and qualifications systems, 
promote good international policies and practices in human 
resources development and facilitate labour migration through 
fair and mutual recognition of skills, among other objectives. 
See:	D.	Lythe,	op.	cit.
29	 L.	Song	Seng:	Case study on national policies linking TVET 
with economic expansion: Lessons from Singapore, Paper 
commissioned for the Education for All Global Monitoring 
Report 2012 (UNESCO, 2011); Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation	 (APEC):	Case study on Institute of Technical 
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sectoral lead bodies (or sector skills councils) to 
formally bridge the gap between education and 
vocational training providers and the labour market. 
The goal is to create an environment which will 
increase employer participation and investment in 
skills, promote enterprise competitiveness and foster 
industry dynamism. In Malaysia, for example, 16 
industry lead bodies covering sectors ranging from 
agriculture to financial services have helped codify 
industry-specific competencies expected of skilled 
workers at various occupational levels.30 Notably, 
Myanmar plans to adopt a similar approach of 
establishing sector skills councils as mandated in its 
new Employment and Skill Development Law. 
Moreover, encouraging businesses to expand 
firm-level training would reduce skills gaps, boost 
workplace productivity and support lifelong learning, 
given the significant positive association between 
increasing private investment in staff training and 
the	 easing	 of	 skills	 bottlenecks	 (Figure	 4-7).	The	
impact of such investments would be enhanced by 
working closely with workers’ representatives who 
30 D. Lythe, op. cit.
can help identify crucial workplace training needs.
Conclusion
The prospects of deeper regional integration are 
vast. But whether the economic gains from deeper 
integration benefit all women and men will depend 
heavily on skills development policies. If the quality 
of education and training systems are enhanced and 
better aligned with national development objectives, 
ASEAN could become a regional production centre 
driven by skills, innovation and creativity. Strong 
partnerships with employers’ and workers’ organi-
zations are critical in this process – helping ensure 
the relevance of curricula, improve apprentice-
ships systems and increase investment in firm-level 
training. Regional cooperation is also essential for 
developing and benchmarking skills recognition 
frameworks and for sharing best practices that can 
help address skills gaps.
As workers move to higher levels of skills 
and drive higher productivity, they should benefit 
through higher wages. This is the subject of the next 
chapter.
Note: Ease of finding skilled employees is based on responses by business executives to the question, “In your country, how easy is it for companies to find 
employees with the required skills for their business needs?” Extent companies invest in training and staff development is based on the question, “To what 
extent do companies in your country invest in training and employee development?” The responses for both questions range from 1 (low) to 7 (high).
Source: World Economic Forum: Executive Opinion Survey, 2013–14 (Geneva, 2013); World Economic Forum: The human capital report (Geneva, 2013).
Figure 4-7 Private investment in staff training and ease of finding skilled employees
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The economic transformation of the ASEAN region 
has seen millions of people migrate from the rural 
areas and take paid jobs in factories and the service 
sector. As a result, across the ten ASEAN Member 
States wages are now the main source of income for 
116.9	million	workers	and	their	families.1 In Brunei 
Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore, some three-
quarters or more of all workers now depend on 
wages – a proportion typical of developed econo-
mies. Meanwhile, the share of wage employees in 
total employment has also been growing strongly 
in other countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Viet Nam (Table 5-1).
 
Rising real wages
As more people depend on wages for their liveli-
hoods, wages and their purchasing power assume 
greater significance – for workers as a source of 
income, and in turn for economies across the region 
as a source of demand. Overall, the picture has been 
positive:	since	2005,	there	has	been	modest	growth	
1	 ILO:	Trends	Econometric	Models,	Jan.	2014.
in real wages (after allowing for inflation). In the 
past two years, driven partly by substantial increases 
in minimum wages, real wage growth has acceler-
ated in a number of countries, notably Indonesia, 
Thailand and Viet Nam. This led to wage growth in 
excess of three per cent in 2012 and, according to 
preliminary	estimates,	also	in	2013	(Figure	5-1).
Though wages have been growing across 
ASEAN, there remain large differences in levels 
between Member States (Figure 5-2). Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Cambodia, for example, 
have	 the	 region’s	 lowest	 wages,	 with	 only	 $119	
and $121 respectively, while the average worker in 
Singapore	earns	$3,547	per	month.	Between	these	
extremes	 lie	 Indonesia	 ($174),	Viet	Nam	 ($181),	
Philippines	($206),	Thailand	($357)	and	Malaysia	
($609).	 Although	 wages	 in	 the	 CLMV	 countries	
have been growing faster than in the more advanced 
ASEAN Member States in recent years, this catch-up 
process will not bridge the gap in the near future. 
Wage differences will therefore continue 
to encourage labour migration, for example, to 
Malaysia from neighbouring Indonesia, and into 
ASEAN Member States will increasingly compete in the global economy on the basis 
of a more productive workforce, and enterprises will need to attract and retain workers 
by offering better wages. Indeed the best way to ensure equitable development and 
to decrease dependency on exports is to link rises in productivity with increases in 
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Thailand from next-door Cambodia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Myanmar (see Chapter 
6). These migration flows help destination coun-
tries to fill labour shortages, while source countries 
benefit from remittances. However, large migra-
tion flows can depress the wages of local workers 
in labour-intensive industries. Governments can 
avoid such downward pressure on wages by setting 
a common wage floor for all enterprises in the form 
of minimum wages that apply to both local and 
foreign workers, hence preventing one group from 
undercutting the other. 



























Note: 2013 figure is a preliminary estimate based on available data that do not always cover the full year. For methodology, see ILO: Global Wage 
Report 2012/13: Wages and equitable growth (Geneva, 2012), appendix 1.
Source: ILO estimates based on ILO: Global Wage Database.
Table 5-1 Share of wage employees in total employment, 1993-2013 (per cent)
 Share of wage and salaried workers
in total employment (per cent)
Percentage point change, 
1993-2003
Percentage point change, 
2003-13
 1993 2003 2013
Brunei Darussalam 94.9 … … … …
Cambodia 10.3 22.9 40.6 +12.6 +17.7
Indonesia 31.0 34.9 46.5 +3.9 +11.6
Lao PDR 9.7 11.7 15.6 +2.1 +3.9
Malaysia 71.4 76.2 73.9 +4.8 -2.4
Myanmar … … 36.5 … …
Philippines … 50.1 58.2 … +8.1
Singapore 85.4 85.1 85.1 -0.3 ±0.0
Thailand 34.3 40.5 41.4 +6.2 +0.9
Viet Nam 16.8 21.9 34.8 +5.1 +12.9
Note: “... “ = data not available. Data are not always strictly comparable across time and between countries. The Brunei Darussalam figure refers to 1991; 
Cambodia figures are based on the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey and refer to 1993/94 (ages ten and above), 2004 and 2013 (ages 15-64); Indonesia 
figures include casual employees; Lao PDR figures refer to 1995, 2005 and 2010, respectively; the latest figure for Myanmar refers to 2009/10 and covers 
regular employees and casual labourers; the latest figure for the Philippines refers to the first three quarters only; data for Singapore refer to permanent 
residents; data for Thailand refer to quarter three in all years; the first observation for Viet Nam refers to 1996.
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Note: With the exception of Singapore, where data based on administrative records from the Central Provident Fund Board are used, only broadly 
comparable figures based on national labour force surveys have been included in the comparison. Data for Lao PDR refer to 2010 and to wage 
workers who receive monthly wages. No data are available for Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar.
Source: ILO estimates based on official national sources; ILO: Global Wage Database.
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Large wage differences between ASEAN Member 
States partly reflect substantial differences in labour 
productivity – the value added per worker, or per 
hour worked. As countries adopt new technology, 
invest in infrastructure and improve the skills of 
their workforce, they lay the foundations for enter-
prises to become more efficient – and to move into 
activities with a higher value added. Efficiency gains 
and structural transformation jointly increase labour 
productivity, and hence the “economic pie” grows. 
A slice of these gains will be retained by 
enterprises through rising profits, but workers are 
generally compensated for their contribution in 
the form of better working conditions, including 
through	higher	wages.	Figure	5-3	shows	for	a	selec-
tion of Asian economies a close correlation between 
labour productivity and wages. In the lower left-
hand corner are the less-developed economies, 
which combine low labour productivity with low 
wages, while at the opposite end of the spectrum 
are Singapore and other advanced economies 
which have high labour productivity and high 
wages. Several other ASEAN economies, including 
Thailand and Malaysia, have travelled a good part 
of the journey towards high-income status.
Linking wage growth to productivity growth 
is	 sound	 policy	 advice	 for	 two	 reasons:	 firstly,	 it	
ensures that economic growth benefits workers in 
the form of rising real incomes. Secondly, it ensures 
that enterprises can increase their gross operating 
surplus in line with productivity growth. This 
enables them to reinvest in their operations, for 
instance to replace outdated machinery and expand 
capacity. The National Wages Council of Singapore, 
for	 instance,	 follows	 the	maxim	 that:	 “To	 enable	
our workers to benefit from their share of produc-
tivity improvements and at the same time allow our 
businesses to remain competitive, real wages should 
increase in line with productivity growth over the 
long term”.2
2	 See	National	Wages	Council	of	Singapore:	NWC Guidelines 
2012/2013 (Singapore, Ministry of Manpower, 2012), para. 
10.
Thailand has successfully established itself as 
a regional hub for several key manufacturing 
industries, such as food processing and the 
manufacture of cars or chemicals. Manufacturing 
employed more than 5.4 million workers and in 
2012 contributed 29.1 per cent of GDP – $114 
billion.1 Crucial to the sector’s success was an 
impressive increase in labour productivity which, 
since 2001, has risen by more than 50 per cent.
However, workers in the manufacturing 
sector have not seen corresponding gains: their 
real wages remained flat until 2011 (see Box 
Figure 5-1, Panel A). The result is a dramatic 
decline in the labour share, the proportion of 
value added received by workers in the form 
of wages and employers’ contributions to the 
social security system. Between 2001 and 2012, 
it declined from 45.3 per cent to 32.7 per cent 
(see Box Figure 5-1, Panel B).
Why this disconnect between productivity 
and wages? One answer could be that manufac-
turing has become more capital-intensive. This 
would justify a smaller share of value added going 
to workers, and a greater share to the owners of 
capital. However, the data do not support this 
explanation. Panel B shows the trend in the net 
capital stock relative to value added, indicating 
that the capital-output ratio has fallen since the 
late 1990s.2 Hence, manufacturing has in fact 
become less capital-intensive.
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The orthodox explanation for falling labour 
shares therefore does not hold. Instead, gains 
in productivity have only boosted profits, rather 
than wages. Since the late-1990s, as measured 
by the net operating surplus (after allowing for 
depreciation of assets), annual returns on the net 
capital stock have increased from 15.0 per cent 
to around 25 per cent.3 In other words, the profits 
reaped from a given investment were two-thirds 
higher in 2011 than a decade earlier, whereas the 
real wages earned by workers remained virtually 
unchanged.
What accounts for this lopsided distribu-
tion of productivity gains? Researchers from 
Chulalongkorn University argue that the expla-
nation can largely be found in Thailand’s weak 
labour market institutions.4 Only a small frac-
tion of the workforce is unionized and collective 
bargaining is virtually unknown. This enables 
employers to set wages unilaterally. It was only in 
2012 and 2013 with an increase in the minimum 
wage, that they were forced to pass on some 
of the productivity gains to their workers. The 
bargaining power of workers is also weakened 
through the extensive use of subcontracting and 
the employment of foreign migrant labour.
Box Figure 5-1 Wages, productivity and related indicators for manufacturing in Thailand
Panel A: Labour productivity and average wages, 
 2001-13 (Index, 2001=100)














































































Labour share, unadjusted, in per cent (left axis)
Rate of return, net, in per cent (left axis)
Capital-output ratio (right axis)
Labour productivity                  
Average real wages
Note: Real wages are nominal wages adjusted for purchasing power, using the consumer price index. Labour productivity is measured in real terms. The labour share is 
measured as the compensation of employees over value added; the net rate of return is measured as net operating surplus (including mixed income) over net capital stock 
at current replacement cost; the capital-output ratio is measured as net capital stock over GDP at factor cost. The labour share is presented in unadjusted form. However, 
since the proportion of paid employees has remained constant at roughly 75 per cent since 2000, the commonly used adjustment techniques would not change the trend.
Source: Bank of Thailand, table EC_EI_029 and table EC_EI_027; National Statistical Office: Labour Force Survey (Bangkok, various years), table 14. National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB): Capital Stock of Thailand 2012 (Bangkok, n.d.) and NESDB: National Accounts of Thailand 2012 (Bangkok, n.d.).
1 See NESDB: National Accounts of Thailand 2012 (Bangkok, NESDB, n.d.).
2 An analysis by the National Economic and Social Development Board confirms this finding. The incremental capital output ratio, or the investment 
needed to increase GDP by one unit, has been below one since the beginning of the 9th national plan in 2002. In the two previous plans, the 
incremental capital output ratio was 1.7, signaling increasing capital intensity. See NESDB: Capital Stock of Thailand 2012 (Bangkok, n.d.), table 4.
3 While this figure includes the mixed income of owner-operated businesses the composition of the sector’s employment has not changed 
significantly since 2000. Hence, the trend remains unaffected by possible adjustments.
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However, the correlation between labour produc-
tivity and wages is far from perfect, as countries differ 
in how they translate the fruits of economic progress 
into wage growth.3 Globally, wages have often 
lagged productivity gains over the past two decades, 
with China, Germany, and the United States being 
the most prominent examples.4 However, a similar 
trend can be seen in ASEAN Member States, where 
real wages have fallen behind productivity growth 
since	2005	(Figure	5-4).	However,	the	gap	becomes	
even more apparent in specific sectors, such as 
manufacturing in Thailand (see Box 5-1). It is clear 
that, while higher labour productivity growth is a 
precondition for sustainable wage growth, it does 
not guarantee parallel wage growth.
The transition to high-productivity 
economies
As	 indicated	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 this	 report	 has	 used	
a modelling exercise to examine the impact of 
3	 Under	 the	System	of	National	Accounts	 (SNA-2008),	gross	
value added (or GDP) is distributed between compensation 
of employees, net taxes and subsidies, and gross operating 
surplus.
4	 See	ILO:	Global Wage Report 2012/13: Wages and equitable 
growth (Geneva, ILO, 2012).
economic integration as a consequence of the 
ASEAN Economic Community. One of the key 
outcomes is the prospective rise in labour produc-
tivity. For the period 2010-25, for the countries with 
sufficient data, the model shows the potential for 
substantial progress – with an extra boost from the 
AEC. Under the scenario with deepened regional 
integration, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Viet Nam could at least 
double their output per worker, with the Philippines 
and Thailand not far behind (see Figure 5-5). 
These gains reflect rising labour productivity in 
each of the three broad sectors – agriculture, industry 
and services. However, productivity growth is usually 
higher for the economy as a whole. This is because 
workers are moving from agriculture to higher-value-
added activities in industry and services. As discussed 
in	Chapter	3,	the	accelerated	structural	transforma-
tion under AEC imposes a cost on workers who lose 
jobs in declining sectors, but it also offers potentially 
large rewards if increased labour productivity trans-
lates into higher real wages.
For the more developed ASEAN Member 
States, such a transition offers an opportunity 
to avoid the middle-income trap. Thailand, for 
example, could join the ranks of the upper-middle 
income countries while Malaysia, which aspires to 
reach high-income status by 2020, could climb the 
next step in the development ladder and realize this 
ambition. Similarly, the CLMV countries should 
be better able to compete in global markets not 
only on the basis of low wages, but through higher 
productivity.
Strategies for higher productivity
Realizing this potential will depend on supportive 
national and regional policies – as well as on invest-
ments in public infrastructure (Chapter 2) and 
the skills needed for a highly productive work-
force	(Chapter	4).	For	instance,	a	recent	diagnostic	
study for Indonesia argued that improvements in 
infrastructure, better governance institutions and 
Note: The figure for 2013 is a preliminary estimate, based on 
available data that do not always cover the full year. 
For the methodology, see ILO: Global Wage Report 2012/13: 
Wages and equitable growth, op. cit., pp. 67-75. 
Source: ILO estimates based on ILO: Global Wage Database.
Figure 5-4 Growth of labour productivity and 
     real average monthly wages in ASEAN, 
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broader access to high-quality education could help 
to unlock the country’s full economic potential.5
But raising productivity will also demand 
5	 ADB,	 ILO,	 and	 IDB:	 Indonesia: Critical development 
constraints (Mandaluyong City, ADB, 2010).
investments by enterprises and profound changes 
in the way they operate. The ILO survey among 
ASEAN business leaders (see Annex C) offers some 
insights into their preferred strategies to compete 
successfully	in	this	new	environment.	These	include:	
innovation to improve the quality of products and 
Source: ILO estimates based on M. Plummer, P. Petri and F. Zhai, op. cit. 



















Note: Respondents were asked “To make your enterprise more competitive within ASEAN, how likely will your enterprise adopt the following measures?”
Source: ILO: Survey of ASEAN Employers on Skills and Competitiveness (2013).
Figure 5-6 Strategies to increase competitiveness by ASEAN enterprises, 2013 (responses in per cent)
Very likely                     Likely                    Unlikely                    Very unlikely
Reduce other production costs
Reduce labour cost
by paying lower wages
Innovate and increase quality of
products and services




Invest in better skills
training for workers
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services; investments in skills training; and updating 
machinery and production technology. A majority 
of respondents considered these measures “likely” 
or “very likely” (Figure 5-6). 
Interestingly, respondents from across the 
region	also	had	a	clear	view	on	the	impact	on	wages:	
88.0 per cent said they were “likely” or “very likely” 
to increase wages to attract and retain workers, while 
only a small minority said they would reduce wages 
to cut costs. While the survey is not representa-
tive of the entire business community, it illustrates 
that business leaders share the view that successful 
competition in the future is likely to be based on a 
high-road strategy where higher productivity goes 
hand-in-hand with higher wages. 
Competing for skilled workers 
As companies upgrade their operations, they will 
compete more fiercely for scarce talent – giving a 
disproportionate boost to the incomes of those who 
have the right skills. As the simulations carried out 
for this report show, higher-skilled workers such as 
managers, professionals and associate professionals 
are likely to see their wages rise the most as a result 
of closer economic integration under the AEC 
(Figure 5-7). 
High-skilled workers in the CLMV countries 
are likely to see the greatest additional wage gain 
under	the	AEC	scenario:	in	Cambodia	by	20.1	per	
cent; in Lao People’s Democratic Republic by 17.8 
per	cent;	and	in	Viet	Nam	by	14.2	per	cent.	However,	
it should be noted that in these countries all wages 
– including those for skilled workers – are starting 
from a much lower base than elsewhere (Figure 
5-2). High-skilled workers in the Philippines and 
Thailand are also expected to benefit substantially, 
and, to a lesser extent, those in Indonesia. Likewise, 
medium-skilled workers should benefit from the 
AEC, though consistently less across all countries. 
The simulation assumes little upward pressure on 
the wages for low-skilled workers, but increased job 
opportunities in newly emerging sectors. 
The wage shifts are largely driven by economic 
restructuring towards technology- and skill-intensive 
production. Interviews with experts in various fields 
confirm these likely trends – companies are gearing 
Figure 5-7 Change in wages under the AEC scenario relative to the baseline, 2025 (per cent)
Viet NamThailandPhilippinesLao PDRIndonesiaCambodia







Note: The figure shows model results for the marginal impact of the AEC on wages in 2025, as compared to a baseline scenario without closer 
regional integration. For the model simulations, high-skilled workers are defined as those ISCO-08 major group 1 (managers), major group 2 
(professionals) and major group 3 (technicians and associate professionals). Medium-skilled workers refer to ISCO-08 major group 4 (clerks), 
major group 5 (service and sales workers), major group 7 (craft and related trade workers) and major group 8 (plant and machine operators and 
assemblers). For further discussion, see ILO: International Standard Classification of Occupations: ISCO-08: Volume 1: Structure, group 
definitions and correspondence tables, op. cit.
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up to scramble for talent (see Box 5-2). Likewise, the 
ILO survey among ASEAN employers found that 
nearly half of enterprises expect that they will have 
to offer higher wages to retain skilled workers and to 
prevent them from pursuing opportunities in other 
ASEAN	Member	States	(see	Figure	5-8).	Only	13.0	
per cent anticipated that their ability to recruit skilled 
workers from other ASEAN Member States would 
result in falling wages. The remainder believed that 
mobility would not have a significant impact on the 
wages of skilled workers. Mobility is likely, however, 
to be limited to relatively few workers from selected 
occupational groups (see Chapter 6). 
Wage inequality
If the wages of skilled workers grow faster than 
those at the bottom end of the wage ladder, this will 
widen wage disparities within countries. The find-
ings therefore highlight the risk of greater inequality 
– an outcome that would run counter to the ASEAN 
objective of equitable economic development and 
inclusive growth.6 Many ASEAN Member States are 
already seeing rises in wage inequality. In Singapore, 
for instance, the wages of those near the bottom of 
the distribution have hardly risen in real terms over 
the past decade and a half, while top earners have 
seen	substantial	gains	(see	Box	5-3).	
One way to measure wage inequality is to 
compare the monthly earnings of those near the 
top	 (90th	 percentile)	 to	 those	 near	 the	 bottom	
(10th percentile). This ratio has reached almost 
ten in Singapore, and roughly seven in Indonesia, 
Philippines	 and	Thailand	 (see	 Figure	 5-9).	 With	
ratios of around four, the wage distribution is still 
more compressed in Cambodia and Viet Nam. 
By comparison, earnings dispersion for full-time 
employees	 in	 OECD	 countries	 ranges	 from	 2.3	
(Belgium) to 5.2 (Israel) under this measure.7 
6 See ASEAN Framework for Equitable Economic 
Development, Bali, Nov. 2011.
7	 See	OECD:	Divided we stand: Why inequality keeps rising 
(Paris, OECD, 2011).
Gender disparities are one dimension of wage 
inequality. With the exception of the Philippines, 
women earn less than men in all ASEAN Member 
States for which data are available. The gap is modest 
in Malaysia and Thailand, but reaches ten per cent 
in Viet Nam and roughly one-quarter in Cambodia 
and Singapore (see Annex F, Table F1-8).
These gaps are caused by a number of factors, 
including differences in education and training, 
“Yes, companies will have to pay more and 
offer more training and internal growth to 
compete with regional companies, or go out 
of business.”
Senior Education Specialist,
Regional Development Bank, 
the Philippines
“Companies will invest in what makes them 
grow, and minimum salaries are growing all 
across ASEAN. You want to capture the growth, 
so you need to increase everything related to 
productivity. Companies will be willing to invest 
in trainings, machinery and higher wages for 
talent, since these are the ones that increase 
production and growth.”
Market Business Leader, 
Multinational Human Resources Agency, 
Singapore
“Reducing wages and incentives will just 
kill enterprises. Skilled people are costly, so 
better invest in the people who are already in 
the enterprise. Hiring people with higher skill 
should apply only for a temporary period of 
time to train and transfer the knowledge.”
Executive, Garment Industry Association,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Box 5-2 Expert views on wages, skills and 
competitiveness in ASEAN
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work experience and working time.8 However, they 
also reflect differences in access to good jobs. For 
Cambodia, a recent ILO-ADB study found that 
women are more often in low-wage employment 
than men, and less likely to hold better-paid posi-
tions in the public service.9  
Various forms of discrimination can aggravate 
the problem. For instance, men and women who 
perform very similar tasks often hold different job 
titles and receive different remuneration. Ending 
such unfair practices and implementing the prin-
ciple of equal remuneration for men and women 
for work of equal value is hence the primary objec-
tive of the ILO’s Equal Remuneration Convention, 
1951	 (No.	100),	which	has	been	 ratified	by	eight	
of the ten ASEAN Members States (see Chapter 1, 
Table 1-5).
8	 M.	Olez	 et	 al.:	Equal pay: An introductory guide (Geneva, 
ILO,	2013).
9	 ADB	 and	 ILO:	 Gender equality in the labor market in 
Cambodia	(Mandaluyong	City,	ADB,	2013).
The twin objectives of containing inequality and 
linking wages to productivity call for stronger wage 
setting institutions, including collective bargaining 
and minimum wage setting.
Figure 5-8 Enterprise expectations on the impact of mobility on the wages of high-skilled workers, 
     2013 (responses in per cent)
ASEANSingaporePhilippinesMyanmarMalaysiaLao PDRIndonesiaCambodia
Companies will pay lower wages by recruiting skilled workers from other ASEAN Member States
No impact on the wages of skilled workers









Note: Respondents were asked “What is the likely impact of the greater mobility of high-skilled workers on the wages that your enterprise will pay?”
Source: ILO: Survey of ASEAN Employers on Skills and Competitiveness (2013).
Note: Only broadly comparable figures based on national labour force 
surveys have been included. Data refer to 2010 (Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
and Thailand), 2011 (the Philippines) and 2012 (Cambodia and Singapore).
Source: ILO estimates based on official national sources; 
H.W. Tat and R. Toh: Growth with equity in Singapore: Challenges 
and prospects, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 48 
(Geneva, ILO, 2014).
Figure 5-9 Wage dispersion, various years 
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In many respects, Singapore is admired by workers 
and employers elsewhere in the region: the city 
state ranks high in international competitiveness 
rankings, unemployment is low, labour productivity 
is high, and average wages far exceed those else-
where in ASEAN. However, on closer inspection, 
two of the adverse wage trends discussed in this 
chapter manifest themselves even in Singapore. 
Firstly, workers’ wages have been lagging 
behind productivity growth – despite Singapore’s 
stated policy that real wages should increase in 
line with productivity growth in the long term. Over 
the decade from 2002 to 2012, real wages rose by 
1.2 per cent per annum, short of the annual gains 
in labour productivity of 1.6 per cent.1 While the 
annual difference is small, the compound effect 
means that the gap between wages and produc-
tivity is opening up over time.
Secondly, wage inequality has grown rapidly, 
making Singapore the country with the largest 
wage gaps in ASEAN (see Figure 5-9). At the very 
top end of the distribution (the 95th percentile), 
real wages grew by 46.0 per cent between 1996 
and 2012. The fortunate  few now earn 10,711 
Singapore dollars (SGD) per month (in 2009 
prices). But those who occupy the bottom rungs 
of the labour market have hardly seen any gains: 
over the past decade, Singapore’s economic 
success has by-passed the bottom 40 per cent of 
its residents (see Box Figure 5-3).2
Box 5-3 Wage inequality in Singapore and the Progressive Wage Model
10th percentile 20th percentile 30th percentile 40th percentile
50th percentile 80th percentile 90th percentile 95th percentile










































Note: No data are available for 2000 and 2005 and values for these two years have been interpolated. 
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Effective collective bargaining can help to rebalance 
the gains from economic growth, reduce inequality, 
and ensure an orderly transition towards more 
productive economies. At present, most ASEAN 
Member States have some way to go to strengthen 
their systems for collective negotiations between 
employers and workers. The pay-offs from building 
stronger institutions have been demonstrated in 
the OECD countries, where collective bargaining 
has facilitated economic restructuring – helping 
enterprises to cope with unexpected events and 
strengthen training and skill formation. 
Collective bargaining can also standardize 
employment conditions across enterprises and 
reduce the potential for a downward spiral of wage 
competition between enterprises. This danger can be 
addressed by negotiations between union federations 
Low wages are particularly frequent in some 
service occupations. Among employed resi-
dents who work as cleaners, labourers or related 
workers, more than 50 per cent earned less than 
SGD1,000 in 2013. Of those in other occupa-
tions, only seven per cent had such low wages.3 
Given the high cost of living in Singapore, the 
problem of working poverty – defined as earning 
insufficient income despite having a job – has 
sparked a lively debate in one of the richest 
countries in the world.4 
In its guidelines for 2012/13, Singapore’s 
National Wages Council (NWC) therefore recom-
mended that enterprises give all workers who earn 
less than SGD1,000 a wage increase of at least 
SGD50 per month.5 However, the NWC’s guide-
lines are non-binding and only three out of every 
ten enterprises had followed them by December 
2012.6 One reason is that many enterprises in 
low-wage sectors compete fiercely against each 
other on the basis of low costs, especially for 
outsourced services such as cleaning, security 
and landscape gardening.
Championed by the National Trades Union 
Congress, the Progressive Wage Model (PWM) 
aims to address this by establishing a common 
wage floor for enterprises in these three indus-
tries, combined with training and career 
progression. Pioneered as a voluntary initiative 
designed by the Tripartite Cluster for Cleaners, 
the minimum monthly pay of SGD1,000 for 
entry-level workers and the other elements of the 
PWM became mandatory in 2014 for cleaning 
companies under the licencing regime.7 
By making specific wage rates compulsory 
for all enterprises in a sector, the PWM breaks 
with Singapore’s tradition of non-binding recom-
mendations. Hence, some commentators have 
wondered whether the PWM is a sectoral minimum 
wage in disguise.8 In fact, some economists have 
argued that “the context of the Singapore labour 
market provides a strong case for the introduc-
tion of a statutory minimum wage”, which could 
help to raise productivity, lessen dependency on 
foreign labour and contribute towards greater 
equity at the same time.9 
1 See National Wages Council of Singapore: NWC Guidelines 2013/2014 (Singapore, Ministry of Manpower, 2013), para. 8.
2 For a more detailed discussion, see H.W. Tat and R. Toh, op. cit.
3 Calculations based on Ministry of Manpower: Labour Force in Singapore, 2013 (Singapore, 2014), table 22. These figures exclude foreign 
domestic workers and other low-paid migrant workers without residency status.
4 See J. Donaldson et al.: “Measuring poverty in Singapore: Frameworks for consideration”, in Social Space (2013, Issue 6), pp. 58-66. 
5 See National Wages Council of Singapore: NWC Guidelines 2012/2013 (Singapore, Ministry of Manpower, 2012).
6 Ibid., para. 19.
7 Higher-skilled workers, such as supervisors, attract higher wage rates of up to SGD1,700 per month.
8 The mandatory nature of the pay floor in the PWM meets the ILO’s definition of minimum wage as “the minimum sum payable to a worker for 
work performed or services rendered […] which may not be reduced either by individual or collective agreement”. See ILO: General Survey of the 
reports on the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131), and the Minimum Wage Fixing Recommendation, 1970 (No. 135), Report III 
(Part 1B), International Labour Conference, 103rd Session, Geneva, 2014, para. 53. The closest parallel to the PWM might be found in Germany, 
where the Government has made collective agreements mandatory for all employers in the cleaning sector.
9 See W.T. Hui: “Economic growth and inequality in Singapore: The case for a minimum wage”, in International Labour Review (2013, Vol. 152), pp. 107-123.
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and employers’ organizations that set minimum 
conditions for an entire sector (multi-employer 
bargaining), and to a lesser extent through agreements 
between individual companies and company-level 
trade unions (single-employer bargaining).10  
In some advanced countries, collective 
bargaining institutions cover more than half of the 
workforce. Collective bargaining coverage in most 
ASEAN Member States lags far behind, however, 
and such agreements apply to far fewer workers. 
A statistical overview by the ILO showed that in 
the Philippines in 2008, for example, only 2.2 
per cent of wage workers were covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements, and that in Malaysia in 
2007	only	2.4	per	cent	of	private	sector	employees	
were covered. By contrast, Singapore had a coverage 
rate	of	17.3	per	cent.11
As a result of weak institutions for collective 
negotiations and dispute resolution, industrial rela-
tions often erupt into conflict. Genuine collective 
bargaining between representative trade unions 
and employers in the private sector is practically 
non-existent in countries such as Viet Nam and 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic. In Viet Nam, 
workers have instead resorted to wildcat strikes 
to achieve improvements in wages and working 
conditions.12
In Indonesia, the inability of workers and 
employers to bargain over wages at the level of 
enterprises or sectors creates a strong incentive for 
unions to try to achieve all wage gains through 
the minimum wage-fixing system. The practice of 
most employers to link the wages of all workers to 
the minimum wage has added to the importance 
of minimum wages, and politicized industrial 
conflicts. In effect, the heads of local government 
10	 OECD:	OECD Employment Outlook	(Paris,	1994),	pp.	167-
188.
11	 S.	Hayter	and	V.	Stoevska:	Social dialogue indicators: International 
statistical inquiry 2008-09 (Geneva, ILO, 2011).
12	 Y.	 Yoon:	 A comparative study on industrial relations and 
collective bargaining in East Asian countries (Geneva, ILO, 
2009).
have the final say about most wages. Decisions 
are therefore often driven by political, rather than 
economic and social considerations. Strengthening 
collective bargaining and bipartite dispute resolu-
tion is an obvious option to avoid excessive reliance 
on minimum wage-setting.13
Cambodia offers an interesting control experi-
ment. The country’s minimum wage applies only to 
the garment and footwear sector, which is currently 
the largest private sector employer. Weaknesses of 
the minimum wage setting institutions have led to 
large-scale strikes and violence in the recent past. 
However, in Cambodia’s large unionized hotels and 
airports, wages are fixed entirely through collective 
bargaining. The process has been largely peaceful 
and productive; strikes have only occurred in 
instances of alleged anti-union discrimination.
Setting minimum wages
In the absence of effective collective bargaining, 
the main mechanism for setting wages in ASEAN 
Member States has been the establishment of 
minimum wages. The core objective of such policies 
should be to protect workers who lack bargaining 
power – and help translate the benefits of closer 
regional integration into shared prosperity for all. 
Since some of the main beneficiaries of the AEC are 
likely to be skilled workers, minimum wages can 
reduce the risk that wage disparities grow further, 
leaving low-skilled workers behind. 
In recent years, a number of ASEAN Member 
States have modernized their institutions for setting 
minimum	wages.	For	example,	in	2013,	Viet	Nam	
established a National Wage Council to give trade 
unions and employers’ representatives a direct stake 
in	 minimum	 wage	 negotiations.	 Also	 in	 2013,	
Malaysia introduced its first national minimum 
wage and the National Wages Consultative Council 
is currently undertaking its first review. In the 
13	 See,	for	instance,	the	recommendations	made	in	World	Bank:	
Indonesia jobs report: Towards better jobs and security for all 
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Philippines, the Regional Tripartite Wages and 
Productivity Boards have begun to implement a 
two-tier wage system that places greater emphasis 
on productivity-related pay. Likewise, Myanmar 
has created a tripartite National Minimum Wage 
Setting Committee that will recommend a new 
minimum	wage	during	the	course	of	2014.
In total, seven of the ten ASEAN Member 
States now set minimum wages (Myanmar will 
bring the number to eight). The minimum wage 
rates differ substantially, both between and within 
countries. The lowest national minimum wage can 
be found in Lao People’s Democratic Republic ($78 
per month), followed by Cambodia’s minimum 
wage of $100 for the garment and footwear sector 
(see Figure 5-10). Minimum wages in neighbouring 
Thailand	are	substantially	higher	($237),	explaining	
some of the attraction of the country for migrant 
workers (see Chapter 6).14 
14 However, Thailand’s minimum wage does not cover domestic 
workers, an occupation that is dominated by migrant workers 
from Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Myanmar. 
Among the countries that set several minimum 
wage rates, the regional differences are relatively 
small	 in	 Viet	 Nam	 (ranging	 from	 $90	 to	 $128)	
and	Malaysia	 (with	 two	 rates	of	$244	and	$275).	
Both countries have centralized minimum wage 
setting institutions. By contrast, the decentraliza-
tion of minimum wage setting in Indonesia and 
the Philippines has led to large differences within 
these countries. For instance, minimum wages in 
Indonesia	range	from	$74	in	the	Purworejo	regency	
to	 $199	 in	 Jakarta.	 Likewise,	 the	 Philippines	 has	
some of the lowest and highest minimum wages in 
ASEAN.
While countries have begun to address insti-
tutional weaknesses of minimum wage setting 
mechanisms, there are many remaining issues. In 
Cambodia	 early	 in	 2014,	 for	 example,	 conflicts	
about minimum wage adjustments sparked indus-
trial unrest, leading to violent clashes, the death of 
several demonstrators and the temporary closure of 
garment factories. This has raised concerns among 
major international garment buyers, and prompted 
the Government to collaborate with the ILO to 
Figure 5-10 Monthly minimum wages, 2014 ($)
Philippines MalaysiaThailandLao PDR IndonesiaViet NamCambodia
Lowest rate Highest rate
Note: For countries with several different minimum wages, the chart presents the highest and lowest rate applicable to employees in the private 
sector as of 1 Jan. 2014. Cambodia’s minimum wage applies only to workers in the garment and footwear sector and came into effect on 1 Feb. 
2014. Rates for Indonesia refer to provincial minimum wages, and to regency minimum wages for provinces that do net set provincial minimum 
wages. Daily rates for the Philippines and Thailand have been converted into monthly equivalents based on the assumption of a six-day working 
week (by multiplying by six days and 52 weeks, and then dividing by 12 months). Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Myanmar had no statutory 
minimum wage as of 1 Jan. 2014.
Source: ILO compilation based on official national sources; converted from national currencies into current $ using IMF: Exchange Rate Archives: 
Representative rates for selected currencies (valid on 2 Jan. 2014), except for Lao PDR and Viet Nam which were converted using the official rates 
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establish a more robust and evidence-based mini-
mum-wage-setting process that takes due account 
of the interests of workers and employers. 
Another concern is that minimum wages may 
not be adjusted regularly. In Thailand, for example, 
sizeable	 adjustments	 in	 2012-13	 followed	 a	 long	
period of stagnation. Despite strong economic 
growth and substantial gains in labour productivity, 
the purchasing power of minimum wages had 
remained practically unchanged over the 2000s, 
indeed	 it	 had	 fallen	 below	 the	 1995	 level	 (Figure	
5-11, Panel A). Minimum wage earners also fell 
behind average wages (Panel B). In both respects 
therefore, the large increase in the minimum wage 
to	 300	 baht	 per	 day	 (roughly	 $10)	 represented	 a	
catch-up after more than a decade of neglect. 
   
How enterprises adapt to rising wages 
Wage increases help share the benefits of growth and 
productivity gains with workers, but how do they 
affect enterprises? From their perspective, wages 
are a major cost of doing business and increases 
in wages are likely to prompt them to re-examine 
their business models and staffing levels. Hence the 
academic literature has long discussed the impact 
of minimum wages and general wage increases on 
employment. While the findings remain somewhat 
contradictory, a recent review suggests that the 
employment impact is usually modest and can go 
either way.15
Abrupt and unforeseeable wage increases can 
doubtless have adverse impacts, but if the changes 
are gradual and predictable then enterprises will be 
better able to adjust to the new conditions – and 
choose the best way to do so. When asked how 
they would respond to a ten per cent increase in the 
minimum wage, employers from ASEAN Member 
States predominantly opted for measures to enhance 
productivity, such as upgrading technology, 
investing in training, and reorganizing production 
processes to enhance efficiency (Figure 5-12). Very 
few thought it likely or very likely that they would 
close their business (12.7 per cent), relocate their 
business (20.5 per cent) or simply carry on as before 
(17.3	per	cent).
15	 G.	Betcherman:	Labor market institutions: A Review of the 
literature (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2012).
Figure 5-11 Growth of the real minimum wage compared to labour productivity and average real wages 
       in Thailand, 1995-2013 (Index, 1995=100)
Source: ILO: Global Wage Database.
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When wage pressure leads enterprises to upgrade 
and enhance productivity, this raises the potential 
for future growth. For Malaysia, for example, the 
new minimum wage policy envisaged investment 
in technology and increased productivity. But the 
economic	 role	 of	 wages	 goes	 beyond	 this:	 when	
the wages of workers grow, their spending power 
increases. Simply put, they are able to buy more 
goods and services, creating demand for what enter-
prises produce. 
In line with this logic, Malaysia’s new minimum 
wage policy explicitly aims to stimulate domestic 
demand.16 With continued weakness in their tradi-
tional export markets, ASEAN economies will have 
to look for new sources of growth – and internal 
demand is one crucial factor. When wages grow, 
workers will want to spend them. Producers within 
the region are best placed to satisfy the demand from 
16	 Ministry	 of	 Human	 Resources:	 Annual Report 2012 
(Putrajaya,	2013).
ASEAN’s consumer base of 600 million people and 
the aspirations of the region’s expanding middle 
class.17 
Foreign investors have recognized the poten-
tial of the ASEAN as a market. Traditionally, they 
have invested in the region to take advantage of 
low-wage labour, but evidence suggests that they 
are increasingly allocating investment on the basis 
of market opportunities.18 Indeed, the affiliates 
of multinational companies from Japan and the 
United States already present in ASEAN Member 
States are predominantly supplying local markets, 
followed by their home markets, rather than global 
markets.
17	 As	 of	 2013,	 some	 35.1	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 employed	 persons	
in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (which, to a large extent, 
overlaps with ASEAN) were classified as “middle class”, using 
the	criterion	of	per	capita	household	income	of	$4	and	above.	
This	share	is	expected	to	grow	to	44.3	per	cent	by	2017.	See	S.	
Kapsos	and	E.	Bourmpoula:	Employment and economic class 
in the developing world	(Geneva,	ILO,	2013),	p.	47.
18	 S.	Thomsen,	M.	 Otsuka	 and	 B.	 Lee:	The evolving role of 
Southeast Asia in global FDI flows (Paris, Institut Français 
des Relations Internationales, 2011).
Figure 5-12 Likely enterprise reactions to an increase of ten per cent in minimum wages, 
       2013 (responses in per cent)
Note: Respondents were asked “In case minimum wages in your country increased by ten per cent, how likely is it that your enterprise will adopt the following measures?”
Source: ILO: Survey of ASEAN Employers on Skills and Competitiveness (2013).
Very likely                     Likely                    Unlikely                    Very unlikely
Do nothing and simply
carry on as before
Relocate to another province
or region within my country
Try to maintain the same
output with fewer workers
Try to increase output with the
same number of workers
Invest in skills training for workers to 
make them more productive
Close down business
Charge higher prices for
our goods and services
Improve efficiency by reorganizing
work-flow and production processes
Upgrade technology and/or
invest in modern machinery
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%









ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity 81
The increasing role of consumption as a driver 
of aggregate demand, and hence growth, is also 
evident from the model simulations carried out for 
this report. The expansion of trade under the AEC 
scenario enables countries to specialize in those 
activities that they are best at, and hence accelerates 
structural change and boosts labour productivity 
(see	Chapter	3).	However,	trade	as	such	adds	little	
to aggregate demand – rising exports (which add 
to final demand) are largely offset by rising imports 
(which subtract from it). Hence, it is not surprising 
that under the AEC scenario net exports contribute 
far less to GDP growth than additional investment 
and,	in	particular,	consumption	(see	Figure	5-13).
Conclusion
As this chapter has argued, closer economic integra-
tion under the AEC offers ASEAN Member States 
the opportunity to make the transition from low-
wage to high-productivity economies. Such rapid 
structural change does not come without cost. 
Workers in declining sectors will face job losses 
and might find their skills ill adapted for emerging 
growth sectors. Adequate social protection mecha-
nisms will therefore be required to accompany the 
transition – along with the education and skills 
policies needed to equip workers for seizing new 
opportunities.
But growing labour productivity offers an 
enormous potential for shared prosperity within 
ASEAN. Under the AEC Blueprint, the region 
aspires to become a region of equitable economic 
development as well as a highly competitive 
economic region.19 Productivity gains are a precon-
dition to realize this ambition, but they do not 
guarantee shared prosperity. This will depend on 
whether the benefits of closer economic integration 
reach workers through rising incomes and higher 
wages, a key transition mechanism through which 
economic gains are spread. 
As historical experience in ASEAN and beyond 
19 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, Singapore, Dec. 
2007.
Figure 5-13 Contributions to additional GDP growth under the AEC scenario relative to the baseline, 
       2025 (percentage points of baseline GDP)
Consumption                    Investment                   Net exports
Note: The figure shows model results for the marginal impact of the AEC on the components of GDP in 2025, as compared to a baseline scenario 
without closer regional integration. All figures are given in per cent of the GDP in 2025 under the baseline scenario.
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has shown, where strong institutions are missing, 
wage growth often falls short of its potential. In 
addition, there is the risk of economic integration 
exacerbating the trends towards rising inequality. 
As enterprises expect to compete more fiercely for 
scarce talent, high-skilled workers are positioned 
best to benefit from rising wages – and low-skilled 
workers risk being left behind. 
It is therefore essential that ASEAN Member 
States put in place sound wage-setting institutions. 
Well-designed and properly enforced, statutory 
minimum wages can help counter rising inequality 
and ensure that low-paid workers receive a just 
share of the fruits of progress. But in setting wages 
of skilled workers, governments should exercise 
restraint and should instead facilitate collective 
bargaining between those concerned – employers 
and workers.
While enterprises will have to adapt to rising 
wages by investing heavily into technology and skills 
training, they will also benefit from the increased 
demand that comes with rising purchasing power. 
Foreign investors are already positioning themselves 
to take advantage of ASEAN’s consumer base of 
600 million people. Workers in ASEAN can also 
seek opportunities to capitalize on their skills by 
migrating to other countries in the region. Intra-
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The ASEAN region has seen a rapid increase in 
migration – particularly among the Member 
States. Labour migration is affected by two groups 
of factors. One comprises differences between 
countries in their levels of economic and social 
development, and political stability. The second is 
connected to labour force growth and population 
ageing that affect the supply and demand of labour, 
producing additional challenges and opportunities. 
Insofar as these factors are structural, not 
cyclical, labour migration will not diminish in the 
medium term and will probably continue to rise. 
The ASEAN region can look ahead by developing 
robust institutions to support labour mobility. This 
includes pathways for migration that are safer, more 
transparent and cheaper; adequate social protection 
to enable migrant workers to have a decent life and 
opportunities to upgrade their skills; and improve-
ments to labour market information systems that 
can produce reliable and detailed data to better 
enumerate, profile and understand migrant stocks 
and flows. Developing such institutions under 
a long-term regional approach would benefit 
destination and source countries in ASEAN alike 
as well as – and most crucially – current and future 
migrant workers themselves.
The rise of intra-ASEAN migration
Since	1990,	the	stock	of	intra-ASEAN	migrants	has	
risen substantially. As an absolute number, intra-
ASEAN migrants increased from 1.5 million to 6.5 
million	 between	 1990	 and	 2013.1 Over the same 
period, their share of ASEAN’s total migrant stock 
climbed	from	47.8	per	cent	to	68.6	per	cent	(Figure	
6-1, Panel A). A corresponding rise is also observed 
among ASEAN nationals living abroad – for whom 
the	intra-ASEAN	share	rose	from	20.3	to	34.6	per	
cent over the same period (Figure 6-1, Panel B).
In the key destination countries in ASEAN 
more than half of the migrant stock comes from 
other ASEAN Member States – for Singapore 
52.9	per	cent;	 for	Malaysia	61.2	per	cent;	and	 for	
1	 UN:	 Trends	 in	 International	 Migrant	 Stock:	 The	 2013	
Revision Database. Several issues with these data and other 
harmonized sources attempting to provide an aggregate for 
the ASEAN region as a whole are discussed in Annex D.
ASEAN has become a centre for labour migration, with major countries of origin 
and destination. While the ASEAN Economic Community envisages measures to 
facilitate the mobility of high-skilled workers, most of the region’s migrant workers 
are low skilled and many are undocumented. If ASEAN Member States are to reap 
the benefits of labour mobility they will need to manage all types of migration more 
effectively and provide sufficient protection for all migrant workers.
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Thailand	96.2	per	cent.	Similarly,	the	proportion	of	
migrants heading for other ASEAN Member States 
has increased for the major countries of origin. Since 
1990,	intra-ASEAN	migration	from	Myanmar,	Lao	
People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia has 
risen	in	each	case	by	around	40	percentage	points	in	
terms of their total nationals abroad. For Viet Nam 
and the Philippines, however, intra-ASEAN migra-
tion	 in	1990	accounted	for	only	seven	per	cent	of	
their total nationals abroad and has since declined 
further; the main destination countries being in 
the Gulf Arab States, East Asia, Europe and North 
America.
ASEAN has three main migrant destinations – 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Together they 
account	for	approximately	90	per	cent	of	the	region’s	
total	 migrants	 and	 97	 per	 cent	 of	 intra-ASEAN	
migrants. In all three, the migrant stock is domi-
nated	by	a	 single	country	of	origin:	 in	Singapore,	
45.0	per	cent	are	from	Malaysia;	in	Malaysia,	42.6	
Figure 6-1 Intra-ASEAN migration shares, 1990-2013 (per cent of total)
Note: Data on ASEAN give the aggregated shares for the region as a whole.
Source: UN: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision Database.
Panel A: Intra-ASEAN share of Member States’ 
 total migrant stocks
Panel B: Intra-ASEAN share of Member States’ 



























Figure 6-2 Origins of international migrant stock in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, 2013
Source: UN: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision Database.
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per cent are from Indonesia; and in Thailand, 50.8 
per cent are from Myanmar (Figure 6-2).
Dynamics of labour migration in ASEAN
In Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, migrants 




cent of total employment.2 Malaysia had 1.7 million 
migrant	 workers	 who	 made	 up	 13.6	 per	 cent	 of	
total employment in 2012, and Thailand had 1.1 
million regular migrant employees in that year – 
though these exclude, among others, large numbers 
of undocumented workers such that the total share 
cannot be accurately known.3
For ASEAN’s main source countries, the desti-
nations for migrant workers differ. Indonesia and the 
Philippines send some 2 million migrant workers 
abroad each year predominantly to the Gulf Arab 
2	 Singapore	 Ministry	 of	 Manpower:	 Yearbook of Manpower 
Statistics	(Singapore,	2013).
3	 Department	 of	 Statistics	 Malaysia:	 Labour Force Survey 
(Putrajaya, 2012); Thailand Department of Employment 
administrative records.
States and to parts of China. From Thailand and 
Viet Nam, some 160,000-200,000 migrant workers 
each year go mostly to the more developed East 
Asian countries, including Japan and the Republic 
of	Korea.	However,	as	Figure	6-3	shows,	the	intra-
ASEAN share of migrant workers has slowly been 
rising over the past five years or so in most of these 
countries.
The other main countries of origin are Cambodia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Myanmar. 
Many of the workers from these countries migrate 
through irregular channels and many find informal 
employment in Thailand and Malaysia. For the 
period	2009-10,	the	International	Organization	for	
Migration	estimated	 there	were	1,445,000	unregis-
tered migrants in Thailand coming from Cambodia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Myanmar 
compared	 with	 just	 79,000	 regular	 entrants	 and	
932,000	who	were	subsequently	documented	under	
the Nationality Verification process.4 
Most intra-ASEAN labour migration involves 
low- and medium-skilled workers. Indeed, for 
4	 International	 Organization	 for	 Migration:	 Thailand 
Migration Report 2011 (Geneva, 2011)














Source: Indonesia: administrative records of the National Authority for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers based 
on the annual number of workers placed abroad; the Philippines: administrative records of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 
based on daily departures of land-based overseas Filipino workers (including new hires and rehires); Thailand: administrative records of the 
Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour, including all registered workers; Viet Nam: administrative records of the Department of 
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Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, it is estimated 
there are disproportionally more workers without 
tertiary education among those coming from 
within ASEAN than among those from the rest of 
the	world	(Figure	6-4).
Figure 6-5 shows the annual flows of interna-
tional migrant workers from all countries to Malaysia 
and Thailand according to their occupation.5 The 
majority of them enter into medium- and low-skill 
work. In 2012, high-skill occupations (managers, 
professionals and technicians) accounted for only 
10.2 per cent of the overall flow to Malaysia and 
3.1	per	cent	of	that	to	Thailand.
Most of the new arrivals work at the lower 
(manual) end of medium-skill occupations – as plant 
and machine operators and assemblers and skilled 
agricultural, forestry and fishery workers – and in the 
low-skill elementary occupations. Disaggregating 
these same data according to migrants’ educational 
attainment reveals much the same pattern, with the 
majority having attained lower than tertiary educa-
tion and many having only achieved the primary 
level or below.
Large numbers of migrant workers in ASEAN 
from the low- and medium-skill groups are in 
informal employment. However, national policies 
5 The figures are based on national data from migration surveys 
that are broadly representative of both regular and unregistered 
migrants. The alternative of using data from administrative 
records (where such data exist) would be likely to introduce a 
bias towards relatively higher-skilled formal jobs.
can play an important role in protecting and regu-
lating their movements, as evidenced in Indonesia 
(Box 6-1).
Structural causes of migration
Changes in migration patterns in ASEAN are 
driven in large part by structural factors. One is 
demography. In the destination countries, the most 
significant demographic factor has been popula-
tion ageing, which can lead to labour shortages. 
Some countries of origin, on the other hand, have 
rising youth populations that can place pressures on 
job creation, affecting unemployment and under-
employment. Nevertheless, labour force growth 
is projected to slow down in every Member State 
between 2010 and 2025 and even to become nega-
tive in Thailand beyond 2021 (Figure 6-6). While the 
labour forces in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, and Philippines 
will maintain relatively robust growth until 2025, 
the pace of that in Singapore, Thailand and Viet 
Nam is expected to slow down sharply by then. 
Between 2010 and 2025, the total ASEAN labour 
force will grow by some 68.2 million workers (or by 
22.7	per	cent).	Of	this,	29.5	million	will	come	from	
Indonesia, which has a youth unemployment rate 
of 21.6 per cent, and some 15.1 million from the 
Philippines, where youth unemployment is 16.6 
per cent (Annex F, Table F1-5). Many such young 
workers will consider migrating.
Figure 6-4 Estimated share of those with lower than tertiary education among the stock of migrant 
     workers in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, 2007 (per cent)
Note: The figures given for ASEAN include migrants from Timor-Leste, due to data limitations.
Source: A.C. Orbeta: Enhancing labour mobility in ASEAN: Focus on lower-skilled workers, Philippine Institute of Development Studies Discussion 
Paper Series No. 2013-17 (Makati City, Philippine Institute of Development Studies, 2013).
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Figure 6-5 Annual inflow of migrant workers to Malaysia and Thailand by occupational skill level, 
     2007-12 (thousand)






















Note: Skill level is defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08), as outlined in Chapter 4. Malaysia 
covers those residing in private living quarters (this excludes persons living in institutions such as hotels, boarding houses and hospitals, among 
others). Thailand data measure those who migrated to Thailand within the previous year so may include some Thai-born or native return migrants; 
there is a series break between 2009 and 2011, where the figure for 2010 was interpolated assuming a linear trend.
Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia: Migration Survey (Putrajaya, various years); Thailand National Statistical Office, Ministry of Information 
and Communication Technology: Thailand Labour Force Survey (Bangkok, various years); Thailand National Statistical Office, Ministry of Information 
and Communication Technology: Migration Survey (Bangkok, 2011 and 2012).
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Figure 6-6 Projected labour force growth, 2010-15, 2015-20, and 2020-25 (per cent)
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Indonesia is ASEAN’s second largest country of 
origin for migrant workers. In 2013 it had almost 
three million nationals living abroad, nearly half 
of whom were women.1 Every year between 2006 
and 2009 more than half a million women regis-
tered to work abroad, making up around 80 per 
cent of the total flows (see Box Figure 6-1).
Since 2009, however, this profile has shifted 
and the share of women migrants has fallen as the 
Government begun to play a more active role in 
quality assurance on behalf of Indonesian migrant 
workers. This has included a moratorium against 
sending migrant workers without a formal, written 
employment contract from a registered employer, 
and additional regulations for protecting migrant 
domestic workers. The Government is also working 
to regulate migrant domestic workers’ terms of 
references abroad in order to better define and 
remunerate the tasks they are expected to carry 
out. Between 2010 and 2013 the Government cut 
back the share of workers entering employment 
abroad without a formal contract from 73.0 per 
cent to 44.0 per cent. In 2014, it aims to place 
at least 50 per cent of migrant workers in formal 
jobs and will continue to provide competency-
based training, assessment and skills certification 
to support this.
Many of the remaining difficulties for 
protecting women migrant workers relate to the 
regulation of brokerage services and the capacity 
to respond to complaints – particularly for those 
in informal employment. This will require better 
coordination among countries and more respon-
sive services.
Box 6-1 Indonesia: Rising formal employment for women migrants
  1  UN: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision Database.
20132012201120102009200820072006
Box Figure 6-1 Flow of workers from Indonesia to the rest of the world by sex, 2006-13
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As a demographic dividend continues in some 
of these countries in the medium term, a strong 
focus on education coupled with outward migration 
(driven by foreign demand) may provide a viable 
route for lowering unemployment and setting up 
foundations for future growth. Benefits would also 
come to such countries from personal remittances 
received, and when migrants return home with new 
ideas, skills and professional networks – representing 
a “brain gain via a brain drain”.6 Meanwhile, those 
countries whose demographic dividend has already 
expired may want to welcome and encourage inter-
national migrants into particular sectors in order to 
sustain their current levels of output.
Other structural factors behind changing 
migration patterns are economic – notably the large 
differences in output and wages between Member 
States. The GDP per capita for ASEAN as a whole 
is	$5,313	in	2013	(in	constant	2005	prices,	PPP),	
though individual country levels range from only 
$1,611	 in	 Myanmar	 to	 as	 high	 as	 $54,139	 in	
Singapore	(Annex	F,	Table	F2-3).	The	contrasts	are	
significant for average monthly wages, and the avail-
able	data	show	they	range	from	$119	in	Lao	People’s	
Democratic	Republic	 to	$3,547	 in	Singapore	 (see	
Chapter 5, Figure 5-2). Average wages in Thailand 
are around three times those in Cambodia, while 
those in Malaysia are around three and a half times 
those in Indonesia.
Free mobility of professionals
Policies for managing migration flows under the 
AEC are confined to high-skilled workers. While 
this is the case more often than not among regional 
integration initiatives, the AEC can still learn from 
labour mobility policies and models developed in 
other parts of the world (Box 6-2).
The free movement of skilled professionals 
under the AEC is partly driven by the requirements 
6	 T.	 Boeri,	 P.	 Garibaldi	 and	 E.R.	Moen:	The labour market 
consequences of adverse financial shocks, in IZA Discussion 
Papers No. 6826 (Heidelberg, 2012).
of	 the	 1995	 ASEAN	 Framework	 Agreement	 on	
Services, which includes provisions for the move-
ment of natural persons. While this can in principle 
include any form of labour mobility, the current 
provisions mainly refer to business visitors for sales 
negotiations, natural persons on a temporary basis, 
and intra-company transfers of executives, managers 
and other high-skilled professionals accompanying 
FDI. Progress on labour mobility through the 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services has, 
however, been fairly slow.7
The main tools for achieving labour mobility 
under the AEC are likely to be the mutual recog-
nition arrangements (MRAs). These establish the 
skills or experience relevant professionals need to 
gain certification in another country and ultimately 
to work abroad. In support of the MRAs, ASEAN 
is developing the ASEAN Qualifications Reference 
Framework (AQRF) that will enable qualifications to 
be compared across Member States while providing 
a coherent benchmark for current national qualifica-
tions frameworks. The AQRF and its implementation 
strategy	are	due	to	be	finalized	in	2014.
To date, MRAs have been completed for 
eight	 occupations:	 engineering	 services	 (signed	
in December 2005); nursing services (December 
2006); architectural services, and surveying quali-
fications (November 2007); medical practitioners, 
dental practitioners, and accountancy serv-
ices	 (February	 2009);	 and	 tourism	 professionals	
(November 2012). Nevertheless, the MRAs differ in 
the approaches they employ. The MRA on nursing, 
for example, explicitly promotes the exchange of 
expertise, experience, and best practices while those 
on accountancy and surveying only lay down some 
broad principles and frameworks for negotiating 
agreements. Perhaps surprisingly – given their 
overall aim of facilitating regional labour mobility 
7	 D.	 Nilomborirak	 and	 S.	 Jitdumrong:	 “An	 assessment	 of	
services	sector	liberalization	in	ASEAN”,	in	S.	Basu	Das	(ed.):	
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Box 6-2 Labour mobility under other regional integration agreements
Several regional integration agreements have 
assigned different provisions to promote or stem 
labour mobility of various kinds. Some examples 
are provided below as comparators to the current 
provisions provided under the AEC.
CARICOM – The 2006 Caribbean 
Community’s Single Market and Economy 
among 15 Caribbean nations and dependencies 
includes the free movement of goods, services, 
capital, business enterprise and certified skilled 
workers in six categories: graduates of approved 
universities, musicians, artists, sportspeople, 
workers in media and domestic workers (added 
in 2010). The agreement includes provisions on 
a Regional Qualification Framework, leading to 
a CARICOM Skills Recognition Certificate, the 
transferability of social security for wage workers 
and a register of self-employed providers of 
in-demand services as well as a regional social 
security agreement.
ECOWAS – The Economic Community of 
West African States’ 2010 Common Market 
Protocol (Article 10) includes a Protocol on the 
Free Movement of Persons. On 7 December 
2012, ECOWAS adopted the General Convention 
on Social Security and reached a new milestone 
in the implementation of regional free movement 
protocols. It also adopted two action plans – one 
promoting youth employment and the other 
against child labour – as well as a draft supple-
mentary act to create a three-party, regional 
ECOWAS Social Dialogue Forum.
European Union – The free movement 
of goods, capital, workers and services were 
founding principles of the European Economic 
Community in 1957, including (even then) the free 
movement of employees and job-seekers among 
its original six Member States (Treaty of Rome, 
Articles 48-51). Today, the European Union has 
28 Member States whose citizens are entitled 
to equal treatment in access to employment, 
working conditions and all other social and tax 
advantages.1 Those working abroad for up to five 
consecutive years are also automatically entitled 
to permanent residency. The European Union 
works towards harmonization of labour regu-
lations and policies, allowing “Member States 
considerable leeway in the social policy sphere, 
while aiming to prevent what are perceived to be 
some of the more deleterious effects of a ‘race to 
the bottom’”.2
Mercosur – In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay - later joined by 
Venezuela - created the Mercosur, which aims 
to achieve free trade in goods and services and 
the free movement of factors of production. The 
Mercosur Social and Labour Declaration, 1998, 
guarantees the fundamental rights of all workers 
in the region, including migrant workers. The 
2002 Free Movement and Residence for State 
Party Nationals grants nationals of the signatory 
countries the right to reside and work in Mercosur 
Member States as well as Bolivia and Chile.
NAFTA – Established in 1994, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement aims to liber-
alize trade and investment between the United 
States and its two main trading partners – Canada 
and Mexico. It facilitates labour mobility through 
temporary entry for business visitors, traders, 
investors, transferees of multinational compa-
nies, and highly-educated professionals with 
a job offer in one of over 70 occupations. This 
latter group is able to migrate using the bespoke 
Trade-NAFTA visa that is valid for up to three 
years based on mutual recognition of skills and 
qualifications.
SADC – The Southern African Development 
Community is comprised of 15 countries which 
aim to promote, among other activities, regional 
cooperation through worker and student mobility, 
with a focus on achieving migration manage-
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– only the MRAs on architecture and engineering 
prescribe eligibility to apply for a license in another 
Member State, which they set out to coordinate 
through local regulatory bodies.8
Implementation of the MRAs remains difficult 
for several reasons. First, countries vary signifi-
cantly in the education and testing they require 
for granting professional recognition, and profes-
sional associations are often reluctant to alter their 
existing standards or to admit potential competi-
tors from abroad. Moreover, particular professions 
may be licensed in some countries but not in others. 
Second, some countries require such positions as 
8	 S.	Basu	Das	et	al.	(eds.):	The ASEAN Economic Community: 
A work in progress	(Singapore,	ISEAS	Publishing,	2013).
teachers, lawyers, civil servants or soldiers to be filled 
by citizens and explicitly exclude migrant workers 
from these. Third, differences in language, culture, 
and social acceptance can create practical barriers to 
labour mobility beyond any provisions that may be 
set down in law. Finally, MRA negotiations to date 
have generally been conducted bilaterally and most 
contain loopholes for implementation.
Seven of the occupations currently covered 
by	 MRAs	 account	 jointly	 for	 only	 between	 0.3	
per	cent	and	1.4	per	cent	of	 total	employment	 in	
Member States (Table 6-1) (the eighth MRA refers 
to tourism professionals for which there is no single 
occupational category by which to calculate a corre-
sponding share). They thus represent a negligible 
fraction of the total jobs held in ASEAN.
social and legal policies (including harmoniza-
tion of skill systems). The SADC Charter provides 
a framework for regional cooperation in the 
collection and dissemination of labour market 
information, the establishment and harmoni-
zation of social security standards, workplace 
health and safety standards, and the harmoniza-
tion of labour laws.
1 The only explicit restrictions apply in the case of certain public sector jobs considered sensitive in the exercise of national sovereignty and in the 
case of the newest European Union Member States (though only for a limited period of up to seven years).
2 C. Barnard and S. Deakin: “Negative and positive harmonization of labour law in the European Union”, in Columbia Journal of European Law 
(2002, Vol. 8), p. 389.
Table 6-1 Employment in the seven occupations covered by ASEAN MRAs, various years
Employment in the seven occupations 
(thousand)
Share of seven occupations in total 
employment (per cent)
Total Men Women Total Men Women
Cambodia (2012) 70.1 45.5 24.7 1.0 1.2 0.7
Indonesia (2010) 355.3 203.9 151.5 0.3 0.3 0.4
Lao PDR (2010) 37.8 21.2 16.6 1.3 1.4 1.1
Philippines (2011) 454.5 209.5 245.0 1.2 0.9 1.7
Thailand (2010) 295.0 124.6 170.4 0.8 0.6 1.0
Viet Nam (2012) 735.7 345.2 390.5 1.4 1.3 1.6
Note: Sex-disaggregated figures may not add up to total due to rounding; the seven occupations refer to accountants, architects, dentists, engineers, 
medical doctors, nurses and midwives, and surveyors.
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It remains to be seen how much the AEC will 
add to the movements of skilled labour already 
taking place bilaterally.9 At most, it will enable 
professional services providers registered or certi-
fied in signatory countries to have their credentials 
recognized in other signatory countries. Who is 
9	 ADB:	Asian Economic Integration Monitor	(Manila,	2013).
actually allowed to migrate for employment will still, 
however, be determined by Member States’ political 
will and by market supply and demand. National 
admissions and visa policies, the source countries’ 
policies on outward migration, and the recruitment 
policies and preferences of employers in the private 
sector are likely to outweigh any changes to labour 
mobility that the AEC might introduce. 
Box 6-3 Thailand: Heading towards labour shortage – the need for more migrant workers
Migration has been important for Thailand’s 
labour force since the 1980s, especially for 
the construction, fishing, food processing, and 
garment industries and for domestic work. 
Thailand’s ageing population and falling fertility 
rates are expected to contribute further to labour 
shortages that will amount to an estimated 
shortfall of some 4.7 million workers by 2020.1 
According to ILO projections, Thailand’s labour 
force will start to shrink around 2022 and continue 
to do so at an increasing rate (see Box Figure 
6-3 Panel A). Correspondingly, the demand for 
migrant workers is projected to increase over 
this period, with the greatest demand being 
for low- and medium-skilled workers (see Box 
Figure 6-3 Panel B). Based on these projections, 
labour migration will be an important feature of 
Thailand’s sustained growth and development in 
the short and medium-term. As such, Thailand 
will have to implement adequate policies to better 
manage and truly benefit from labour mobility.
Box Figure 6-3 Projections of labour force growth and demand for migrant workers in Thailand
Panel A: Net labour force growth, 2012-30 Panel B: Demand for migrant workers, 2012-21 (million)
High-skilled Low- and medium-skilled
Source: Annex F, Table F1-1; ILO: ILOSTAT Database; NESDB: "Labour demand projection in Thailand", NESDB presentation based on the Labour Market Study for 




























































 1 Thailand Development Research Institute: Designing manufacturing and labour force development strategies for industrial sector demand in 
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In the short-term, the AEC’s provisions on 
labour mobility may therefore have very little 
impact.
Mobility of low-skilled workers
The AEC does not address movements of low-skilled 
workers. One justification sometimes argued is that 
closer economic integration can ultimately lead to 
more efficient production in all countries and cause 
wages to converge, thus removing a key incentive 
for migration.10 However, this “factor price equali-
zation” among trading partners is seldom observed 
in practice and is unlikely to occur in ASEAN on 
any significant scale.11
Economic integration may well contribute to 
greater concentration of economic activity in some 
of the more developed Member States, leading 
perhaps to an initial rise in regional disparities.12 
This would stimulate demand for low-skilled 
workers in specific sectors and create a temporary 
“migration hump”.13 ASEAN migration hubs such 
as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand could thus 
benefit early on from freer trade by employing more 
migrant workers. Trade and migration are thus 
likely to be complementary in these countries and 
may rise together in the short term.
Regardless of the AEC, flows of low-skilled 
10	 P.A.	Samuelson:	“International	trade	and	the	equalization	of	
factor prices”, in Economic Journal	(1948,	Vol.	58),	pp.	163-
184.
11	 B.O.	 Hansen,	 and	 H.	 Keiding:	 How likely is factor price 
equalization?, University of Copenhagen Discussion Paper 
Series No. 08-10 (Copenhagen, 2008).
12	 P.	Krugman:	“Increasing	returns	and	economic	geography”,	in	
Journal of Political Economy	(1991,	Vol.	99),	pp.	483-499;	T.	
Venables	and	R.E.	Baldwin:	“Regional	economic	integration”,	
in	 G.M.	 Grossmann	 and	 K.	 Rogoff	 (eds.):	 Handbook of 
international economics	 (Amsterdam,	 Elsevier,	 1995);	 P.	
Martin:	“Trade	and	migration:	NAFTA	and	agriculture”,	 in	
Policy Analyses in International Economics	(1993,	Vol.	38).
13 Trade can temporarily increase migration when technological 
and infrastructural differences between two trading countries 
make labour-intensive production in one uncompetitive 
against capital-intensive production in the other. See P. 
Martin	and	M.	Abella:	Reaping the economic and social benefits 
of labour mobility: ASEAN 2015, background paper prepared 
for ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better 
jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
migrant workers are likely to continue in the short- 
and medium-term because of demographic factors 
and existing economic disparities. In Thailand, for 
example, the labour force is expected to shrink by 
2022 and the demand for the low- and medium-
skilled migrant workers will rise. Migrant workers 
will be needed to sustain production and raise 
Thailand’s economic growth, unless productivity 
levels	rise	rapidly	(see	Box	6-3).	This	will	require	a	
strategy to manage migration and protect migrant 
workers through increased and affordable access 
to regular migration channels, clear incentives 
for migrant workers to use those channels, while 
ensuring against labour exploitation of migrant 
workers and trafficking in persons.
Over time, the formulation of mutual skills 
recognition arrangements for medium-skill occu-
pations in ASEAN – including construction 
workers, garment workers, fishermen, and planta-
tion labourers – may provide a more manageable, 
transparent, and safer channel for migrant workers. 
Such frameworks could help to legitimize and regu-
late much of the migration already taking place in 
ASEAN as well as to boost the overall calibre of the 
workers coming through. A relevant tool could be 
implemented under the AQRF or through indi-
vidual MRAs. Such frameworks would help to 
address the labour mobility that is already taking 
place in ASEAN – in a way the current AEC largely 
fails to do – while promoting a more sustainable 
mode of managing labour mobility and helping to 
address future needs linked to demographic and 
economic disparities among Member States, as 
discussed above.
Protecting migrant workers
Ensuring equal protection for migrant workers 
promotes economic equity and makes labour 
markets more efficient. Enforcing protection for 
migrant workers ensures that employers who do 
not comply with national labour standards cannot 
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Box 6-4 The Republic of Korea’s Employment Permit System
In 1994, facing labour shortages in sectors that 
involved low-skill work, the Republic of Korea 
established an Industrial Training System. This 
enabled low-skilled migrants to be trained in the 
country for periods of up to two years but was 
replaced in 2004 by the Employment Permit 
System (EPS). This secures migrant workers 
equal treatment in labour rights and protection 
and currently includes 15 countries of origin 
across Asia.
Under the EPS process, workers register 
their professional interests and background in 
their home countries and join a roster of poten-
tial workers. They also have to pass a Korean 
language test and have a medical check-up. 
Registered employers in the Republic of 
Korea then make job offers based on workers’ 
profiles and issue contracts before departure. 
Employment can last for up to four years and 
ten months and under certain conditions can be 
renewed once. Throughout this period workers 
receive support and advice from the Republic of 
Korea’s Human Resources Development Service, 
which also oversees their return to their country 
of origin.
Since 2004, ASEAN Member States have 
sent some 288,000 workers to the Republic 
of Korea, accounting for 68.4 per cent of the 
total from all countries. Of the 15 countries that 
currently have memoranda of understanding to 
participate in the EPS, the top four are Viet Nam, 
Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia (see Box 
Figure 6-4). 
Since its inception in 2004, the EPS has 
recruited over 420,000 migrant workers into 
some 44,000 registered enterprises. The 
scheme has greatly improved the transparency 
of the sending process and reduced the average 
cost of migration from $3,509 in 2002 (under 
the Industrial Training System) to just $927 by 
2011. By providing productive employment and 
equal protection to migrant workers, the EPS has 
also reduced the overdue payment of wages, 
reduced industrial accidents, and improved 
workers’ satisfaction over working hours and 
working conditions.
Note: ADB recognizes “Kyrgyzstan” as the Kyrgyz Republic.


























































Box Figure 6-4 Total migrant workers received under the Employment Permit System 
 by source country, 2004-13 (thousand)
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particularly important to protect workers if govern-
ments apply foreign worker levies – since some 
employers may pass these on in the form of lower 
wages or benefits.
Using low-wage, low-skilled migrant labour 
may offer short-term gains. Nevertheless it can act 
as a disincentive for moving up the value chain and 
achieving higher productivity.14 Such technological 
stalling may not be due to the presence of migrant 
workers as such but to differences in how they are 
treated and the opportunities they have to invest in 
their education and become more productive. Only 
through adequate protection and sufficient oppor-
tunities for training and up-skilling will migrant 
14 Lee cites the abundance of low-skilled migrant workers in 
Malaysia’s manufacturing sector as one of the reasons why its 
electronics industry remains relatively low skill and labour-
intensive.	H.A.	Lee: Developments in the Malaysian labour 
markets	(Mimeo,	2014).
workers gain the chance to improve economic 
outcomes in their host countries, while assisting 
development and poverty reduction in their home 
countries through remittances. Member States’ 
governments can do more to develop efficient and 
transparent systems for managing international 
migration flows in order to provide decent work 
and reduce the risks, costs and conditions placed 
on migrant workers. The opportunity for benefit-
ting migrant workers and local employers mutually 
through a well-designed system for managing labour 
migration is evidenced in the Republic of Korea’s 
Employment	Permit	System	(Box	6-4).
To this end, government intervention is crucial 
in managing labour mobility in ASEAN. Specifically, 
Member States could benefit from actions in three 
key	areas:	ratifying	and	implementing	international	
Conventions, extending the coverage and portability 
Table 6-2 Ratification of Conventions related to migrant workers















of the rights 

























Brunei Darussalam … … … … … …
Cambodia … … 2004(c) … … …
Indonesia … … 2012 1950 … …
Lao PDR … … … … … …
Malaysia 1964(a) … … 1964 … …
Myanmar … … … 1927 … …
Philippines 2009(b) 2006 1995 1994 1994(d) 1994
Singapore … … … 1965 … …
Thailand … … … 1968 … …
Viet Nam … … … … … …
Note: “…” indicates Convention not ratified; the information is valid as of 25 Apr. 2014; (a) only Malaysia-Sabah (also excludes the provisions of Convention 
No. 97, Annexes I to III); (b) excludes the provisions of Convention No. 97, Annex II and III; (c) signature only (not yet ratified); (d) includes branches (a)-(g) 
only.
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of social security, and implementing the ASEAN 
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights of Migrant Workers (known as the Cebu 
Declaration on Migrant Workers).
Ratifying and implementing international 
Conventions
An important starting point for protecting migrant 
workers would be to ratify and implement interna-
tional Conventions. In ASEAN, the only countries 
that have ratified all eight of the Fundamental 
Conventions are Cambodia, Indonesia and 
Philippines. All are net labour-sending countries. 
Conversely, none of the key ASEAN destina-
tion countries have ratified the Discrimination 
(Employment	and	Occupation)	Convention,	1958	
(No. 111), which prohibits distinctions, exclusions 
or preferences made on the basis of a person’s race, 
colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction (including nationals’ place of birth, 
foreign origin, or ancestry) or social origin.15
Beyond the Fundamental Conventions, there 
are several that deal directly with migrant workers’ 
rights, including the Migration for Employment 
Convention	(Revised),	1949	(No.	97);	the	Migrant	
Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 
1975	 (No.	 143);	 and	 the	 United	 Nations’	
International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of	their	Families,	1990,	as	well	as	several	other	key	
labour Conventions ensuring equal treatment for 
all workers in social protection (Table 6-2). Of the 
ASEAN Member States, only the Philippines has 
ratified all six; ratification remains especially weak 
15	 ILO:	Equality and non-discrimination at work in East and 
South-East Asia: Guide (Bangkok, 2012).
in the main countries of destination.16
To ensure sustainable integration through 
labour mobility, and harmonize labour policies, 
ratification and enforcement of international 
Conventions relating to migrant workers is critical. 
Building trust among the ASEAN Community 
will require common ground for the settlement of 
disputes and the oversight to ensure that workers 
and employers fulfil their responsibilities under 
national laws. It is also crucial that countries ensure 
domestic workers – who in ASEAN include many 
women migrants – are recognized as workers in 
their own right and are protected under national 
labour laws (Box 6-5).
Extending the coverage and portability of 
social security
In ASEAN, as elsewhere in the world, many migrant 
workers have no social protection – having forfeited 
their entitlements at home while facing highly 
limited and unequal protection abroad.
The right to social security is included in the 
Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (1948),	
Article 22, and was recalled in the Cebu Declaration 
on Migrant Workers. Since the ILO’s first session 
in	1919,	 there	have	been	31	Conventions	and	24	
Recommendations adopted to make social secu-
rity a reality for all. The most recent instrument 
is the Social Protection Floor Recommendation, 
2012 (No. 202), which Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam have already 
taken measures to implement.
Ensuring that migrant workers – in both 
formal and informal employment – enjoy equal 
access to social security benefits under contributory 
16 Note that Malaysia’s implementation of the Equality of 
Treatment	 (Accident	 Compensation)	 Convention,	 1925	
(No.	 19),	 has	 had	 some	 longstanding	 inconsistencies	
regarding	migrant	workers	reported	by	the	ILO:	Report of the 
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Box 6-5 Protecting migrant domestic workers in ASEAN
Hundreds of thousands of migrants throughout 
ASEAN work in private households as cleaners, 
cooks, drivers, gardeners, gatekeepers, and 
caretakers for infants, the sick and the elderly. 
Although their work is seldom acknowledged as 
such, it allows other women and men to perform 
their own economic roles, thus contributing greatly 
to economic and social outcomes. Nevertheless, 
many ASEAN Member States continue to disre-
gard domestic workers as workers and withhold 
from them the most basic rights and protections. 
This situation is worsened by the fact that some 
migrant domestic workers are undocumented 
and that many more work informally.
Malaysia currently has around 350,000 
migrant domestic workers.1 They are excluded 
from the Employment Act, 1955, and do not 
have access to basic rights including maternity 
provisions, termination benefits, annual and 
medical leave, and regular weekly rest.2 Domestic 
workers are also excluded from the coverage of 
Malaysia’s minimum wage. The Government is 
currently drafting a new regulation on domestic 
workers, but several of its elements unfortunately 
are not in line with the international standards 
set down in the Domestic Workers Convention, 
2011 (No. 189).
Singapore had some 214,500 migrant 
domestic workers registered at the end of 2013.3 
Similar to Malaysia, these workers have no 
coverage under the Employment Act, 2009, or 
the Work Injury Compensation Act, 2008, and 
thus have no guarantees on limits to working 
hours, overtime entitlements, or paid medical 
leave. The Government recently established 
a weekly day of rest for registered domestic 
workers, replacing what had previously been a 
legal monthly day of rest.
Thailand’s official figures recorded approxi-
mately 83,000 registered migrant domestic 
workers in 2011, though the actual figure 
(including undocumented migrants) is probably 
much higher.4 In 2012, a Ministerial Regulation 
extended several rights and protections to regis-
tered migrant domestic workers including a weekly 
day of rest, traditional national holidays, paid 
sick leave and annual leave, provisions on termi-
nation of employment, and new mechanisms to 
redress abuse or harassment. Nevertheless, the 
Regulation excludes limits on domestic workers’ 
working hours, minimum wage and social secu-
rity coverage, rights to paid maternity leave, and 
job security in case of pregnancy.5
While domestic work involves a significant 
share of migrant workers in ASEAN – especially 
women – much remains to be done to protect and 
empower them. One starting point would be to 
follow the Philippines in ratifying and applying the 
Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), 
and the Domestic Workers Recommendation, 
2011 (No. 201). Another would be to acknowl-
edge undocumented migrant domestic workers 
and seek ways to legitimize their status and 
decent working conditions. Skills recognition 
frameworks would also help to certify domestic 
workers’ skills and experience in different work 
areas in order to better distinguish and remu-
nerate them. Harmonized skills recognition 
on a regional scale would also facilitate labour 
mobility and promote formal employment within 
the sector.
1  P. Hangzo and A. Cook: The Domestic Workers Convention 2011: Implications for migrant domestic workers in Southeast Asia, NTS Insight 
(Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, Apr. 2012).
2 Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD): The right to unite: A handbook on domestic worker rights across Asia (Chiang 
Mai, APWLD, 2010).
3 Singapore Ministry of Manpower: Foreign workforce numbers, http://www.mom.gov.sg/statistics-publications/others/statistics/Pages/
ForeignWorkforceNumbers.aspx [accessed 27 June 2014].
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and non-contributory schemes is important. 
Implementing bilateral social security agreements 
within this context could also enable migrant 
workers to maintain their entitlements to pension 
benefits and ensure these are transferrable across 
borders.
Social security laws in Brunei Darussalam 
and Singapore still do not cover migrant workers 
without permanent residency, withholding from 
them	a	number	of	key	protections	(Table	6-3).
The duty to protect migrant workers also 
extends to the countries of origin. Some countries 
already make efforts to do so. Social security laws in 
Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, encom-
pass migrant workers under a range of protections, 
as do the current draft laws in Cambodia, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet 
Nam. In Thailand, although the Social Security 
Act,	 1990,	 does	 include	 migrant	 workers,	 it	 has	
incompatibility with existing migration laws and is 
thus often ineffective. Likewise in Malaysia, though 
migrant workers are covered under the Social 
Security	Act,	 1969,	 employers	 in	 practice	 are	 not	
obliged to register them under the national schemes 
and often outsource the responsibility to commer-
cial providers.
Ensuring better protection for migrant workers 
will require reforms in three key areas. The first 
involves fulfilling the rights of documented migrant 
workers. They continue to face legal and administra-
tive obstacles when registering for social insurance 
schemes, transferring entitlements across borders, 
and obtaining information on their rights and 
avenues for seeking redress for violation or abuse. 
Table 6-3 Coverage of migrant workers under social security by country and branch, 2014
Branch of social security provided overall



















































Singapore • • • • • • • No
Brunei Darussalam • • • • • • • No
Malaysia • • • • • Yes(b)
Thailand • • • • • • • • • Yes
Main source countries
Cambodia(a) • • • • • • • Yes
Indonesia • • • • • • Yes
Lao PDR(a) • • • • • • • • • Yes
Myanmar(a) • • • • • • • • • Yes
Philippines • • • • • • • Yes(b)
Viet Nam(a) • • • • • • • Yes
Note: Information is based on social security laws and acts but does not consider any sub-level decrees or regulations that might hold relevant provisions; 
(a) Social security laws have been adopted though the implementing legal texts are still in draft form. (b) Excludes medical care. “Yes” means migrant 
workers are covered equally with non-migrants. “No” means only nationals and/or permanent residents are eligible. “•” indicates a branch of social security 
is provided within a given country.
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Even though they contribute taxes, migrant workers 
are often also excluded from social assistance and 
universal protection schemes.
Second, there is an urgent need to address the 
rights of undocumented migrant workers – including 
many seasonal workers, domestic workers, rural 
workers, and those in informal or hazardous work 
– who are excluded from social assistance and insur-
ance schemes, compounding their vulnerability to 
exploitation	and	harm.	In	August	2013,	Thailand’s	
Ministry of Health announced a new social health 
protection scheme that covers all migrant workers 
(including undocumented migrant workers as well 
as refugees). The scheme offers the same benefit 
package as under the Universal Coverage Scheme 
but on a contributory basis. It is aimed at migrant 
workers who work or live in Thailand without a 
work permit and therefore do not contribute to the 
Social Security Fund.
Third, ASEAN governments can take steps to 
harmonize their systems for social protection and 
social services. At present, uneven provisions lead 
to opportunism and “free-riding” across borders, 
whereby workers from countries with weaker serv-
ices might place a burden on others. Much of this 
danger can be avoided through equitable and cohe-
sive development under the ASEAN Community, 
coupled with fair and equal access to social security 
for all through national social protection floors.
Implementing the Cebu Declaration on 
Migrant Workers
The Cebu Declaration on Migrant Workers calls on 
both countries of origin and countries of destina-
tion to promote the “full potential and dignity of 
migrant workers in a climate of freedom, equity, and 
stability” in accordance with national laws (Article 
1). In destination countries, the Declaration empha-
sizes “fair and appropriate employment protection, 
payment of wages, and adequate access to decent 
working and living conditions for migrant workers” 
(Article 8). The Declaration also mandates “the 
relevant	ASEAN	bodies	[…]	to	develop	an	ASEAN	
instrument on the protection and promotion of 
the rights of migrant workers” on which it moni-
tors progress during the annual ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (Article 22).
The Cebu Declaration on Migrant Workers 
is a landmark, though non-binding, agreement. 
However more needs to be done to implement it 
and to align national policies with its principles. 
A coherent, functioning ASEAN labour mobility 
policy – with commitment from all Member States 
– is critical for a sustainable AEC. Coordinated 
action can also be targeted towards reducing the 
cost of migration (including employer’s recruit-
ment costs) and the cost of remitting money while 
ensuring that the legal channels for migration are 
accessible and that the different responsibilities 
and rights associated with them are transparent, 
well known and clearly understood. In order to 
deal with labour supply bottlenecks, and respond 
to production demands, destination countries will 
need medium-skilled and low-skilled migration. 
Young workers from the countries of origin could 
take up these jobs provided there is a proper qualifi-
cation framework and facilitated entry.
If the ASEAN region is to harness the full bene-
fits of integration through the AEC, and transform 
into a single production base, Member States will 
need to cooperate through a continuous dialogue 
on labour resources and mobility.17 In this, proce-
dures for implementation and enforcement should 
be decided upon in a time-bound and transparent 
manner.
Conclusion
Intra-regional migration is rising throughout 
ASEAN as its economies become more integrated. 
Driven primarily by structural factors – resulting 
from demographic and economic disparities among 
17 A comprehensive table detailing the existing bilateral 
agreements on labour mobility among pairs of ASEAN 
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Member States – labour mobility will most likely 
continue to rise after 2015. The region’s continued 
and shared prosperity will depend on building safer, 
cheaper and more transparent pathways for migrant 
workers. Better management of labour mobility 
throughout ASEAN would help to address receiving 
countries’ labour market needs while creating 
employment opportunities for migrant workers and 
bringing new skills, ideas and networks to sending 
countries.
Although the AEC provides for the free move-
ment of some groups of highly-skilled professionals, 
its approach stands in sharp contrast with existing 
realities. Labour migration within ASEAN is mainly 
dominated by low- and medium-skilled workers in 
manufacturing, construction, fishing and domestic 
work and it is likely to remain so long into the 
medium term. Recognising additional occupa-
tions under multilateral frameworks could provide 
better channels for such workers, while promoting a 
more sustainable and legitimate mode of managing 
labour mobility, offering benefits for both source 
and destination countries.
Protecting migrant workers on an equal 
footing with nationals can promote both equity 
and efficiency. It reduces labour market segrega-
tion among national and non-national workers 
and ensures that some employers cannot compete 
unfairly. Developing adequate protections in this 
area	 requires	 further	 action	 on	 three	 fronts:	 rati-
fying and implementing international Conventions, 
extending the coverage and portability of social 
security to all migrant workers, and implementing 
existing multilateral commitments including the 
Cebu Declaration on Migrant Workers.
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How will the ASEAN Community change the 
structure of employment, the demand and supply 
of skills, productivity and wages, and the nature 
and pattern of labour mobility? How will this affect 
the lives of women and men through their jobs and 
the world of work? 
These questions are particularly relevant 
because, despite impressive economic growth, the 
ASEAN region is not delivering sufficient quality 
jobs. These will be needed even more in the future 
for those workers leaving agriculture and for the 
new entrants to the labour force between 2010 and 
2025 – estimated to be more than 68.2 million 
women and men, many of whom will be young, 
first-time job seekers. 
The priorities differ from country to country. 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Philippines, 
for example, have expanding working-age popula-
tions and young labour forces, so face pressures on 
the labour supply side. Others, such as Singapore 
and Thailand, have ageing populations and are 
likely to face problems on the demand side through 
labour shortages. The AEC will affect these pres-
sures of supply and demand. 
How can the region best manage its human 
resources,	 estimated	 to	 be	 about	 370	 million	 in	
2025? How can it, as noted in the AEC Blueprint, 
“achieve higher levels of economic dynamism, 
sustained prosperity, inclusive growth and inte-
grated development of ASEAN”?1
The impacts of the AEC on the labour market 
will be conditioned by factors both inside and 
outside of ASEAN. ASEAN factors include rising 
regional connectivity through the development of 
infrastructure, trade facilitation, MRAs on skills 
and qualifications and labour mobility. Particularly 
important for promoting regional cooperation and 
integration in ASEAN are sub-regional economic 
zones such as the GMS, IMT-GT, and BIMP-
EAGA. Key issues outside of ASEAN relate to the 
volatile global economic context affecting FDI and 
exports, and the rising competitiveness challenges 
from China and India. At the same time, labour 
markets need to be responsive to the massive oppor-
tunities provided by the rapid growth of China and 
1 Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, 
Singapore, Nov. 2007.
Integration through the ASEAN Economic Community will only be successful and 
sustainable if it delivers decent work to millions of workers across the region. 
Transforming ASEAN into a single production base and a common market will require 
corresponding adjustments and interventions in the labour market. This chapter 
highlights the report’s main findings and policy conclusions.
Policies for decent work 
in an integrated ASEAN
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India, including the existence of regional coopera-
tion agreements such as CAFTA.
Main findings
This study assessed potential outcomes under the 
AEC by simulating various scenarios and analysing 
existing evidence. It has reviewed the AEC’s existing 
policies, institutions and coordination mechanisms, 
as well as examples from other initiatives for regional 
integration. The main findings of the study are as 
follows:
•	 Increases in output – The AEC will accelerate 
structural change, and create new opportunities 
and challenges. Compared to the baseline trend, 
closer trade integration between the ten countries 
under the AEC could, by 2025, lift aggregate 
output by as much as seven per cent. 
•	 Job losses and gains – The distribution of these 
gains will not be uniform across countries, sectors, 
skill	 groups	 or	 sex.	Overall,	 around	 14	million	
additional jobs could be generated by 2025, but 
jobs will be created in some industries and lost in 
others. Job gains for men could be greater than 
those for women. ASEAN Member States will 
therefore need to address existing problems of 
unemployment, informality and poor job quality 
while simultaneously dealing with challenges 
emerging from closer regional cooperation and 
integration.
•	 Productivity gains – Countries will witness 
significant productivity gains. In Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Thailand and Viet Nam, for example, output 
per worker could double. This would help the 
CLMV countries compete in global markets 
through higher productivity rather than on 
the basis of low wages. Meanwhile, Malaysia 
and Thailand could climb to the next rung in 
the development ladder and reach high-income 
status, avoiding a middle-income trap. 
•	 Greater demand for skills – The AEC will 
accelerate the demand for skilled workers. 
Governments can prioritize education and 
training policies and align these with national 
development and employment policies to ensure 
that gains from integration benefit the most 
vulnerable, including women and young people. 
Otherwise, ASEAN Member States risk suffering 
persistent skills shortages and mismatches. 
•	 Little impact on skilled migration, but contin-
uing medium- and low-skilled migration 
– Labour mobility will be driven primarily by 
demographic and economic disparities between 
countries. Migration in ASEAN will continue in 
the low- and medium-skill segments, primarily 
in manufacturing, construction, fishing, and 
domestic work – often undocumented. In prin-
ciple, steps to free up the movement of skilled 
workers in the AEC framework could lead to 
significant gains. However, current agreements 
on migration policies do not address existing 
realities – being confined to a restricted list of 
eight occupational categories which together 
constitute a tiny share of total employment in 
ASEAN.
•	 The opportunity for shared prosperity – 
Regional integration holds great promise for 
shared prosperity, but could also increase 
inequality. Member States will need to develop 
policies and institutions to ensure inclusive and 
fair outcomes. 
Priority actions 
To ensure that the AEC leads to greater prosperity 
for all women and men in ASEAN, Member States 
should	prioritize	the	following	actions:
A. Facilitate and manage structural change
In many ASEAN Member States, the AEC is likely 
to see increased employment in trade and transport, 
as well as in construction and private services. These 
are sectors often associated with vulnerable employ-
ment and the informal economy. There is also the 
risk that displaced workers will be unable to gain 
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employment in more productive sectors. To this 
end, governments can facilitate and manage struc-
tural change at both national and regional levels so 
as to steer the region towards equitable economic 
growth:
1. Industrial and sectoral policies – Facilitating 
the shift towards higher productivity sectors, 
and the diversification of employment in manu-
facturing, will require well-designed industrial 
and sectoral policies that are coordinated and 
developed in tandem with employment and 
skills policies.
2. Education and training – ASEAN’s shift 
towards higher value-added industries calls for 
academic excellence in science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics, and fostering 
diverse career paths for young women and men. 
Workers need to be equipped with skills for 
present and future jobs and have the capacity to 
adapt to the requirements of fast changing tech-
nology. Education and training systems need to 
improve access and quality. Vocational and core 
skills should also be promoted, particularly those 
relevant to fast growing sectors. 
3.	 Social protection – Effective social protection 
and other labour market policies can help miti-
gate the adjustment costs of structural change 
and address informality, especially for vulnerable 
groups. The extension of social protection should 
include building nationally defined social protec-
tion floors, along with extending the coverage 
and scope of social security systems to include 
migrant workers and other vulnerable groups. A 
sound framework for this purpose is the ASEAN 
Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection, 
adopted	in	October	2013.
4.	 Small and medium enterprises – Maximizing 
the benefits of regional integration will mean 
unlocking the potential of small and medium 
enterprises by strengthening the productivity 
and competitiveness of such firms through good 
management and improved labour practices, 
simplification of administrative procedures, facil-
itated access to finance and business development 
services, partnerships with larger enterprises, 
and integration into the formal economy. SMEs 
in the region will also need information on the 
AEC and its implications, as well as on market 
opportunities in ASEAN. Particular attention 
needs to be paid to women’s enterprises. 
5. Investing in infrastructure – Better infrastruc-
ture would help accelerate regional connectivity 
and economic growth – and simultaneously 
reduce poverty and income disparities. This 
would narrow development gaps between and 
within ASEAN Member States by facilitating 
trade, building supply chains and developing 
financial links, which in turn can foster higher 
productivity. The completion of GMS economic 
corridors as well as the implementation of the 
Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity will 
provide a huge boost to regional cooperation 
and integration.
B. Ensure that economic gains lead to 
shared prosperity. 
The AEC has the potential to lead to higher output, 
trade, employment and productivity. But balanced 
and inclusive growth will need appropriate policies 
and labour market institutions.
1. Strengthening the productivity-wage link – If 
workers can benefit from growth, this will increase 
household consumption and drive domestic and 
regional demand as well as spur inclusive and 
sustained economic growth. This requires effec-
tive minimum wage institutions to help those at 
the bottom of the wage distribution, along with 
better mechanisms for collective bargaining – 
which would also minimize industrial conflict. 
Linking wage growth to productivity growth 
would ensure that workers share in the fruits of 
economic dynamism in ASEAN.
2. Improving opportunities for better quality 
jobs – Skills development initiatives should 
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equip and certify workers, particularly young 
women and men, with the skills demanded by 
employers, especially in high-growth productive 
sectors and occupations. This would provide a 
ladder to higher-skill jobs with better wages and 
working conditions and ease the transition for 
young women and men from the classroom to 
the workplace.
3.	 Promoting gender equality – Without appro-
priate policy action, job creation through the 
AEC could widen existing gender gaps in labour 
force participation and access to quality jobs – 
increasing the disadvantages faced by women. 
ASEAN Member States increasingly realize 
that it is smart economics to utilize all available 
human resources. It is therefore imperative to deal 
with the labour market discrimination faced by 
women. Further policy commitment is required 
along with practical measures based on analysis 
of sex-disaggregated data. This should aim to 
reduce gender disparities and promote gender 
equality in various dimensions – employment, 
education and training, wages and migration.
4.	 Protecting migrant workers – The ASEAN 
Multilateral Framework on Migration can guide 
migration policies, but the main mechanisms 
for facilitating labour migration are likely to be 
bilateral agreements. These need to be simpli-
fied and strengthened to ensure that migrant 
workers are protected and treated fairly. Female 
migration in ASEAN is dominated by domestic 
work so it is important that governments ratify 
the ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 
(No.	189),	and	extend	the	necessary	rights	and	
protections. It is also important to enforce labour 
laws based on principles of equal treatment of 
migrant workers. This would help reduce labour 
market segmentation and minimize dependence 
on cheap foreign workers, while creating a level 
playing field for enterprises. 
C. Strengthen regional cooperation
Realizing the potential of the AEC for better jobs 
and social progress will necessitate deeper regional 
partnerships between governments, workers and 
employers. Regional and bilateral mechanisms can 
promote knowledge exchange and technical assist-
ance, and draw on international best practices and 
policies. The necessary coordination and facilitation 
can be provided by the ASEAN Secretariat.
1. Implementing the Cebu Declaration on 
Migrant Workers and ASEAN Declaration on 
Social Protection – The Cebu Declaration on 
Migrant Workers calls on source and destination 
countries to “Promote decent, humane, produc-
tive, dignified and remunerative employment for 
migrant workers” in accordance with national 
laws. It is important to address the ”legitimate 
concerns” of receiving countries and address 
issues that have hampered the implementa-
tion of this ASEAN Declaration while aligning 
national policies with its principles.2	The	2013	
ASEAN Declaration on Social Protection reaf-
firms the Member States’ commitment to build 
an ASEAN community that is socially respon-
sible and people oriented by, notably, fostering 
national social protection floors in the region 
and recognizing the rights of migrant workers 
and other vulnerable groups to “equitable access 
to social protection that is a basic human right 
and	 based	 on	 a	 rights-based/needs-based,	 life-
cycle approach”.3
2. Expanding mutual recognition arrangements 
– ASEAN-wide understanding and manage-
ment of labour migration would benefit from 
an expansion of mutual recognition agreements 
on skills and qualifications. This would also 
reduce irregular migration. Initially this could 
2 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights of Migrant Workers, Cebu, Jan. 2007, art. 15 and 
para. 7.
3	 ASEAN	 Declaration	 on	 Strengthening	 Social	 Protection,	
Bandar	Seri	Begawan,	Oct.	2013,	principle	1.
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involve medium-skill occupations for which 
there is high potential demand, with a view to 
managing labour mobility in the longer term. 
Towards this end, governments can complete the 
ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework to 
strengthen and benchmark their national quali-
fications frameworks, while developing regional 
model competency standards in key sectors such 
as construction.
3.	 Improving labour market information, 
research and analysis – Regional technical 
assistance should focus on ensuring regular, at 
least annual, production of key sex-disaggregated 
labour market data for all ASEAN Member States. 
This should involve comparative indicators 
based on international definitions – improving 
the measurement of earnings and skills differ-
entials and strengthening the information base 
on gender, informality and inequality, youth 
unemployment and labour migration. Data 
are also needed to address the needs of private 
sector enterprises and must be shared between 
countries as well as between public and private 
sectors to promote evidenced-based research and 
analysis of the AEC labour market impacts.
4.	 Tripartite dialogue – Regional tripartite 
dialogue will help improve any AEC monitoring 
system and the design and implementation of 
labour market policies to complement economic 
and trade policies. This should involve coop-
erating with the private sector and workers’ 
organizations on the potential effects of the AEC 
on businesses and workers. Greater consultation, 
more effective business councils, and increased 
participation of the private sector and workers 
organizations, including those that relate to 
women and youth, in decision-making processes 
would also be beneficial.
Guiding principles
The AEC should help propel the region towards 
a prosperous and inclusive society – with positive 
spillover effects on jobs and working conditions, 
and therefore on the quality of life of women and 
men. The ultimate success of regional integration 
in ASEAN will therefore depend very much on its 
effects on the labour market. The following guiding 
principles	are	relevant	in	making	policy	decisions:
1. Fulfilling ASEAN commitments – ASEAN 
leaders	 have	 met	 regularly	 over	 the	 past	 40	
years and established mutual trust and under-
standing as well as many useful programmes 
for cooperation. They have made landmark 
Declarations such as the ASEAN Declaration on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers and the ASEAN Declaration 
on Social Protection. Implementing these 
Declarations through a common understanding 
at the regional and national levels could be key 
to the AEC’s success.
2. Coherent regional and national policies 
– ASEAN needs to arrive at a sense of the “collec-
tive” in synchronizing regional and national 
priorities and policies. This will be important for 
managing and nurturing human resources so as 
to boost skills and productivity – through a skills 
recognition framework along with measures to 
protect workers and enterprises. The starting 
point is the ratification and enforcement of 
international labour standards to ensure that the 
region creates a level playing field for all workers 
and enterprises, promotes fair competition as it 
turns into a single production base, and avoids a 
race to the bottom.
3.	 Sequencing policies and labour market inter-
ventions – Member States of ASEAN differ in 
many respects – in terms of levels of development, 
demographic transitions and political systems. In 
particular there are sizeable disparities between 
the CLMV and the ASEAN-6 countries. The 
appropriate policy mix will therefore depend on 
the specific needs of each country. Furthermore, 
there will need to be sequencing between short-
term priorities related to integration, job losses 
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and enterprise sustainability and longer-term 
needs of building better labour market institu-
tions. For the CLMV countries creating better 
jobs will mean increasing labour productivity 
in agriculture while other ASEAN Member 
States will aim to enhance labour productivity 
in services.
4.	 Initiating programmes and projects in newly 
connected areas – ASEAN may consider initi-
ating pilot tests or focusing labour market 
programmes and initiatives in areas that are 
based on new economic corridors. These are 
tying the region together and are likely to inten-
sify economic activity.
The AEC could have substantial and lasting 
implications for the labour market in the region. 
Forward thinking supported by an evaluation of 
the benefits and costs of labour market outcomes 
are needed to mitigate risks to workers and enter-
prises, in both the short and long terms, especially 
in the CLMV countries. The ADB and the ILO 
could support the ASEAN Secretariat in its regional 
initiatives which, in the context of the AEC, will 
require greater coordination by supporting mech-
anisms for sharing and discussing regional and 
national roadmaps and policy priorities and their 
labour market impacts. The two organizations 
could also provide technical assistance to countries 
to address their labour market concerns, supporting 
labour market monitoring capacity, and promoting 
dialogue between different stakeholders at national 
and regional levels.
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Annexes
Annex A: The CGE model1
The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used in this report to assess the welfare and labour market 
impact of ASEAN economic integration initiatives is based on a global general equilibrium model developed 
by Dominique van der Mensbrugghe and Fan Zhai.2 The model has its intellectual roots in a long tradition 
of multi-country, applied general equilibrium models.3 A novel feature of the model is its incorporation 
of recent innovations in heterogeneous-firms trade theory into an empirical global CGE framework. The 
model features intra-industry firm heterogeneity in productivity and the fixed costs of exporting, enabling 
the investigation of the intra-industry reallocation of resources and the exporting decision by firms, and 
thereby capturing both the intensive and extensive margin of trade. The model is described in detail below. 
A. Basics of the CGE model 
1. Production and trade
Agriculture, mining and government services sectors are assumed to exhibit perfect competition. In each of 
these sectors, a representative firm operates under constant returns-to-scale technology. Trade is modelled 
using the Armington assumption for import demand. Manufacturing and private services are character-
ized by monopolistic competition, and their structure of production and trade follows the seminal Melitz 
approach.4 Each sector with monopolistic competition consists of a continuum of firms that are differenti-
ated by the varieties they produce and their productivity. Firms face fixed production costs, resulting in 
increasing returns to scale. There are also fixed costs and variable costs associated with exporting activi-
ties. On the demand side, agents have Dixit-Stiglitz preference over the continuum of varieties. As each 
firm is a monopolist for the variety it produces, it sets the price of its product at a constant mark-up over 
marginal cost. A firm enters domestic or export markets if and only if the net profit generated from such 
sales is sufficient to cover fixed cost. This zero cut-off profit condition defines the productivity thresholds 
for a firm’s entering domestic and exports markets, and in turn determines the equilibrium distribution of 
1	 This	annex	is	based	on	M.	Plummer,	P.	Petri	and	F.	Zhai:	Assessing the impacts of ASEAN integration on labour markets, background 
paper for ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity (Bangkok, ILO, forthcoming).
2	 D.	van	der	Mensbrugghe:	LINKAGE Technical reference document: Version 6.0	 (Washington,	DC,	World	Bank,	2005);	F.	Zhai:	
“Armington	meets	Melitz:	 Introducing	firm	heterogeneity	 in	 a	global	CGE	model	of	 trade”,	 in	 Journal of Economic Integration 
(2008,	Vol.	23,	No.	1,	Sep.),	pp.	575-604.
3	 See	for	example	J.B.	Shoven	and	J.	Whalley:	Applying general equilibrium	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1992);	T.	Hertel:	
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non-exporting firms and exporting firms, as well as their average productivities. Usually, the combination of 
a fixed export cost and a variable (iceberg) export cost ensures that the exporting productivity threshold is 
higher than that for production for domestic market, so that only a fraction of firms with high productivity 
export. These firms supply for both domestic and export markets. The number of firms in the monopolistic 
sectors is assumed to be fixed. 
Production technology in each sector is modelled using nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
functions. At the top level, the output is produced as a combination of aggregate non-energy intermediate 
demand and a value added-energy bundle. At the second level, non-energy aggregate intermediate demand 
is split into each commodity according to a Leontief technology. The value added-energy bundle is produced 
by a capital-land-energy bundle and aggregate labour. The capital-land-energy bundle is further decomposed 
into capital-land bundle and aggregate energy. Finally, at the bottom level, aggregate labour is decomposed 
into unskilled and skilled labour, and the capital-land bundle is decomposed into capital and land (for the 
agriculture sector) or natural resources (for forestry, fishing and mining sectors). The energy composite good 
is subsequently decomposed into various fuel components (for example coal, oil, and gas) where relevant. 
At each level of production, there is a unit cost function that is dual to the CES aggregator function and 
demand functions for corresponding inputs. The top-level unit cost function defines the marginal cost of 
sectoral output.
In the six ASEAN Member States for which micro-data files of labour force surveys were made avail-
able (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam), at the 
second level of the production structure, the value-added cum energy bundle is decomposed into less-skilled 
aggregate labour on the one hand, and a capital-land-energy bundle on the other hand. The capital bundle is 
split into its human (or skilled labour) and physical capital components, and the less-skilled aggregate labour 
is composed of semi-skilled and unskilled labour. 
2. Income distribution, demand and factor markets
Incomes generated from production accrue to a single representative household in each region. A household 
maximizes utility using Extended Linear Expenditure System (ELES), which is derived from maximizing 
the	Stone-Geary	utility	function.	The	consumption/savings	decision	is	completely	static.	Savings	enter	the	
utility function as a good and its price is set as equal to the average price of consumer goods. Investment 
demand and government consumption are specified as a Leontief function. In each sector a composite good 
defined by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over domestic and imported varieties is used for final and interme-
diate demand.
There are five primary factors of production. Capital, agricultural land and labour are fully mobile 
across sectors within a region. In natural resource sectors of forestry, fishing and mining, a sector-specific 
factor is introduced into the production function to reflect the resource constraints. In each period the 
aggregate capital stock is predetermined by the investment and savings decision of the previous periods. 
The supply of land and sector-specific factors is assumed to be elastic, with response to the changes in their 
respective prices. 
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Plummer and Fan Zhai, in the treatment of labour markets.5 Usually the supply of labour is assumed to 
be fixed and its market is cleared through wage adjustment. However, for the six ASEAN Member States, 
persistent unemployment for some categories of workers is assumed. The ASEAN economies are differenti-
ated from other regions by distinguishing three labour supply mechanisms according to different skill levels. 
Specially, in the six ASEAN Member States, the supply of skilled labour is fixed in each period, given the 
tight markets for skilled labour in the region. For unskilled labour, infinite supply and a fixed real wage rate 
is assumed to reflect the persistent large-scale underemployment in this category of labour in most ASEAN 
Member States. Semi-skilled labour falls between these extremes; hence, a constant-elasticity supply func-
tion with a unitary elasticity of labour supply with respect to its real wage is assumed.
In this specification, shocks that make ASEAN firms more competitive internationally, including the 
policy changes modelled, enable firms to expand with less binding labour constraints than are typically 
imposed by CGE models. The employment of unskilled workers can expand without limit at constant wage 
rates, and the employment of semi-skilled workers can grow with only moderate wage increases. Unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers can in turn be substituted, to some extent, for skilled workers and other inputs 
whose supply is subject to conventional limits. In the simulations of integration alternatives, this modelling 
approach typically yields solid increases in output, trade and employment, as well as overall benefits in excess 
of the usual gains from trade. 
3. Macro closure
There	are	three	macro	closures	in	the	model:	the	net	government	balance,	the	trade	balance,	and	the	invest-
ment and savings balance. It is assumed that government consumption and saving are exogenous in real 
terms. Any changes in the government budget are automatically compensated by changes in income tax 
rates on households. 
The second closure concerns the current account balance. In each region, the foreign savings are set 
exogenously. With the United States GDP deflator being chosen as the numéraire of the model, equilibrium 
in the foreign account is achieved by changing the relative price across regions, in other words, it is the real 
exchange rate.
Domestic investment is the endogenous sum of household savings, government savings and foreign 
savings. As government and foreign savings are exogenous, changes in investment are determined by changes 
in the levels of household saving. This closure rule corresponds to the neoclassical macroeconomic closure 
in the CGE literature.
4. Recursive dynamics
The model is recursive dynamic, beginning with the base year of 2007 and solved annually through 2025. 
Dynamics of the model are driven by exogenous population and labour force growth, as well as capital accu-
mulation and exogenous technological progress. Population and labour force projections are based on the 
United Nation’s medium-variant forecast. Technological progress is assumed to be labour-augmented, so the 
model can reach a steady state in the long run. 
5	 P.	 Petri,	 M.G.	 Plummer	 and	 F.	 Zhai:	 The Trans-Pacific Partrership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A quantitative assessment 
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Agriculture 55.0 50.0 48.3 -1.7
Industry 14.9 18.1 19.4 1.3
 Mining 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0
 Food processing 1.5 1.3 0.7 -0.6
 Textiles 1.4 1.4 1.7 0.3
 Apparel 5.1 4.8 4.7 -0.1
 Wood products 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1
 Chemicals 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.2
 Metals 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0
 Electrical equipment 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
 Vehicles 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2
 Machinery 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
 Other manufacturing 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1
 Utilities 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0
 Construction 4.7 7.6 8.5 0.9
Services 30.1 31.9 32.3 0.4
 Trade and transportation 15.9 17.5 19.1 1.5
 Private services 5.2 5.3 5.0 -0.3
 Government services 9.0 9.1 8.2 -0.8











Agriculture 37.2 28.6 28.5 -0.1
Industry 20.5 21.9 22.1 0.2
 Mining 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.0
 Food processing 3.3 3.6 3.2 -0.3
 Textiles 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.1
 Apparel 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.0
 Wood products 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.0
 Chemicals 1.7 2.2 2.3 0.1
 Metals 1.7 1.5 1.5 0.1
 Electrical equipment 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0
 Vehicles 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.0
 Machinery 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.0
 Other manufacturing 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.1
 Utilities 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
 Construction 7.0 9.2 9.3 0.1
Services 42.3 49.4 49.4 -0.1
 Trade and transportation 29.3 35.6 35.6 0.0
 Private services 3.2 3.9 3.9 0.0
 Government services 9.8 9.9 9.8 -0.1
























Agriculture 34.8 28.6 29.0 0.4
Industry 16.6 17.3 17.5 0.2
 Mining 0.5 0.4 0.4 -0.1
 Food processing 2.1 2.3 2.4 0.1
 Textiles 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0
 Apparel 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.0
 Wood products 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.0
 Chemicals 1.1 1.0 0.9 -0.1
 Metals 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.0
 Electrical equipment 1.8 2.1 2.1 0.0
 Vehicles 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.1
 Machinery 0.8 0.6 0.6 -0.1
 Other manufacturing 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.0
 Utilities 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0
 Construction 5.6 6.8 7.1 0.3
Services 48.6 54.0 53.5 -0.6
 Trade and transportation 28.3 32.8 32.7 -0.1
 Private services 8.7 10.0 10.0 0.0
 Government services 11.6 11.3 10.8 -0.5











Agriculture 69.0 66.8 66.0 -0.8
Industry 8.5 9.5 10.0 0.5
 Mining 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
 Food processing 2.8 2.7 1.5 -1.2
 Textiles 0.6 0.6 0.5 -0.1
 Apparel 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.1
 Wood products 0.2 1.1 1.4 0.3
 Chemicals 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
 Metals 1.5 1.5 2.0 0.5
 Electrical equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Vehicles 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.7
 Machinery 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1
 Other manufacturing 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1
 Utilities 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.0
 Construction 1.8 2.0 2.1 0.1
Services 22.5 23.7 23.9 0.2
 Trade and transportation 12.1 12.4 12.7 0.3
 Private services 3.5 4.1 4.5 0.3
 Government services 6.9 7.1 6.8 -0.4
























Agriculture 44.7 35.5 35.2 -0.3
Industry 21.9 23.4 23.5 0.1
 Mining 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.0
 Food processing 2.7 3.9 3.7 -0.2
 Textiles 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.0
 Apparel 3.8 4.9 5.0 0.1
 Wood products 1.1 0.5 0.5 -0.1
 Chemicals 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.0
 Metals 1.6 1.0 1.0 0.0
 Electrical equipment 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
 Vehicles 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.0
 Machinery 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.0
 Other manufacturing 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.0
 Utilities 1.8 1.3 1.2 -0.1
 Construction 5.7 7.8 8.0 0.2
Services 33.3 41.1 41.3 0.2
 Trade and transportation 18.4 26.7 28.7 2.0
 Private services 6.6 6.6 5.7 -1.0
 Government services 8.3 7.8 6.9 -0.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
Note: Agriculture includes paddy rice, other grains, other crops, livestock and natural resources.











Agriculture 38.3 33.7 34.9 1.1
Industry 21.5 23.5 24.1 0.6
 Mining 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0
 Food processing 2.4 3.4 3.6 0.2
 Textiles 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.0
 Apparel 2.0 1.9 1.6 -0.2
 Wood products 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.0
 Chemicals 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.1
 Metals 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.0
 Electrical equipment 1.5 2.1 2.1 0.0
 Vehicles 1.3 1.8 2.1 0.3
 Machinery 1.3 1.6 1.8 0.2
 Other manufacturing 1.1 0.7 0.7 -0.1
 Utilities 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.0
 Construction 5.4 6.9 7.2 0.2
Services 40.1 42.7 41.0 -1.8
 Trade and transportation 27.4 31.7 31.0 -0.7
 Private services 3.1 1.8 1.2 -0.6
 Government services 9.5 9.2 8.7 -0.5
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Annex B: Occupational Projections Model6 
The occupational projections model employed in this report follows the widely used Manpower Requirements 
Approach	to	project	occupational	imbalances,	which	involves	three	stages:	(i)	projecting	occupational	demand;	(ii)	
projecting occupational supply; and (iii) comparing demand and supply to identify potential imbalances. 
There	are	two	components	to	occupational	demand:	expansion	demand	attributable	to	growth	in	sectoral	
output	and	employment	and/or	shifts	 in	 the	occupational	 structures	of	 industries,	and	replacement	demand,	
attributable to factors such as deaths, retirements, inter-occupational and geographical labour mobility, among 
others. To project expansion demand by occupation, trends in the occupational distribution of industries over 
time, obtained from the labour force survey (LFS) micro-data files, are assumed to continue into the future. 
Specifically, the industry-occupation coefficients are allowed to change over time using two approaches (using 
a linear and a log-linear regression) whereby time is used as a proxy for technological change. The result of the 
two approaches, as well as the coefficients of the last year of available LFS are applied to the CGE model sectoral 
employment results to obtain a range of projected expansion demand (stock measure) by occupation in 2025. The 
difference between the projected stock measure in 2025 and the corresponding occupational employment in 2010 
is calculated to obtain the projected flow measure of expansion demand over the forecast period. 
Replacement demand, the second component of occupational demand, is not always included in occupa-
tional projections, due to difficulties in assembling the required data (labour market outflows and transitions, 
including retirements, occupational mobility, and others). There are methods with less restrictive data require-
ments, which for instance use age-cohorts to estimate retirements by occupation and exclude transitions from one 
occupation to another. For the purpose of this paper, a simplistic version of these methods is used, which involves 
using the share of workers aged 65 years and older for each occupation as an estimate of replacement demand for 
this occupation. Total occupation demand is then obtained as a sum of the two components.
On the supply side, trends in educational attainment of the labour force for each demographic group are 
applied to the estimated labour force figures in 2025, and education-to-occupation matrix coefficients (occupa-
tional share of workers for each level of educational attainment), which are also allowed to change over time using 
a similar approach as for the industry-occupation coefficients. This provides a range for the projected occupational 
supply (stock measure) in 2025. The difference between the stock measure of occupational supply in 2025 and 
the estimate of occupational supply stock in 2010 is obtained as a measure of the flow measure of occupational 
supply.
The range of projected occupational demand and supply flow measures are compared to identify occupations 
with	projected	labour	market	imbalances	(excess	labour	demand/supply)	for	each	country.	Note	that	compared	
to the baseline, the projected occupational demand under the AEC differs due to a change in expansion demand 
(replacement demand is assumed to stay constant), and labour supply changes only because of the change in 
labour force size (participation rates). Two measures of skills mismatch are also obtained, to provide complemen-
tary information regarding labour imbalances. 
6	 This	annex	is	based	on	S.	El	Achkar	Hilal:	The impact of ASEAN economic integration on occupational outlooks and skills demand, 
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Annex C: Survey of ASEAN employers
The	ILO,	through	its	Bureau	for	Employers’	Activities	(ACT/EMP),	commissioned	a	survey	of	employers,	
industry leaders and development experts throughout the ASEAN region to gather insights with respect to 
skills, labour mobility and enterprise competitiveness associated with integration under the AEC. The survey 
was	conducted	in	October	and	November	2013	by	the	consulting	firm	Emerging	Markets	Consulting.
The survey methodology consisted of two parts. First, the quantitative survey aimed at capturing the 
perceptions	 of	 private	 sector	 companies	 and	 employers	 organizations	 on	 three	 dimensions:	 (i)	 needs	 of	
enterprises in terms of employee skill sets and how these needs are being met by local education providers; 
(ii) perceptions of ASEAN integration, in terms of their understanding of it, and of the opportunities and 
challenges employers believe they will face; and (iii) how enterprises think their competitiveness will change 
once the AEC is in place, and the strategic moves they will utilize to react to these changes.
The second part was a qualitative survey to supplement the quantitative data. The respondents of the 
qualitative survey included diverse experts and leaders from complementary backgrounds in the ASEAN 
region. The interview questions addressed the same dimensions investigated by the quantitative survey and 
questioned recipients on their opinions regarding primary findings extracted from the quantitative survey. 
Some	240	business	leaders	from	enterprises	and	business	associations	spanning	all	ten	ASEAN	Member	
States participated in the quantitative survey, while an additional five respondents were selected for the 
qualitative expert interviews. The majority of the respondents originated from Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, and Singapore. The response rates for Brunei 
Darussalam, Thailand, and Viet Nam were very low and therefore regional averages of survey responses do 
not include these countries. 
Most of the respondents were active in the manufacturing industry (20.0 per cent), followed by services 
(17.0 per cent), finance and insurance (ten per cent) and information and communication (ten per cent). 
Over 80 per cent of these employers represented either privately owned domestic enterprises or wholly 
foreign-owned firms. The participants worked for mainly mature establishments with an average opera-
tional age of 22 years. Companies were contacted via their affiliation to industry associations, chambers of 
commerce, business directories and country-specific business networks. These types of establishments tend 
to	be	larger	firms.	Forty-one	per	cent	of	the	organizations	surveyed	employed	over	300	employees	and	32.0	
per	cent	employed	between	50	and	300	staff	members.	
In sum, the survey consisted of a broad cross-section of respondents from different sectors and coun-
tries across the ASEAN region. However, while the findings give important insights into the perceptions of 
enterprises, they are not necessarily fully representative for the entire business community in ASEAN. They 
















ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity 115
Annex D: Using different bilateral migration 
 estimates
Several valuable attempts have been made to estimate international migrant stocks among global pairs of 
origin and destination countries. Typically relying on national census data and other sources, the resulting 
bilateral migration matrices use various estimation, imputation and harmonization techniques to estimate 
intra-regional international migration.
Three such matrices are those of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
Population Division, the World Bank, and the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization 
and Poverty (Migration DRC)7 Using these to calculate the shares of intra-ASEAN migrants and nationals 
abroad produces a variety of estimates that are outlined below – ranging from 51.2 per cent to 68.6 per cent 
for	migrants	and	24.7	per	cent	to	34.6	per	cent	for	nationals	abroad.





from another Member 
State
Intra-ASEAN share of 
ASEAN migrants (per cent)
World Bank: Global Bilateral 
Migration Database
2000 4 517 322 2 729 908 60.4
UN: Trends in International Migrant 
Stock Database
2000 5 265 008 3 315 514 63.0
Migration DRC: Global Migrant 
Origin Database (v.4)
2000-02 4 888 742 2 504 719 51.2
World Bank: Bilateral Migration 
Matrix
2010 6 700 932 3 954 547 59.0
UN: Trends in International Migrant 
Stock Database
2010 8 683 940 5 871 325 67.6
UN: Trends in International Migrant 
Stock Database
2013 9 497 690 6 513 354 68.6
7	 For	the	methodological	papers	of	these	three	sources,	respectively,	see:	UN:	Methodology for estimating the international migrant 
stock by sex, age and origin	(New	York,	2013);	D.	Ratha	and	W.	Shaw:	South-South migration and remittances, World Bank Working 
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in another Member 
State
Intra-ASEAN share of 
ASEAN nationals abroad 
(per cent)
World Bank: Global Bilateral 
Migration Database
2000 9 798 318 2 729 908 27.9
UN: Trends in International Migrant 
Stock Database
2000 11 400 146 3 315 514 29.1
Migration DRC: Global Migrant 
Origin Database (v.4)
2000-02 10 156 555 2 504 719 24.7
World Bank: Bilateral Migration 
Matrix
2010 12 852 027 3 954 547 30.8
UN: Trends in International Migrant 
Stock Database
2010 17 556 607 5 871 325 33.4
UN: Trends in International Migrant 
Stock Database
2013 18 835 748 6 513 354 34.6
Source: ILO compilation based on various databases listed in the table.
Evaluating the individual figures underpinning these estimates, large differences become clear in the 
values they place on certain groups of migrants. For example, Migration DRC (2000-02), the World Bank 
(2010) and UN (2010) respectively estimate the stock of Myanmar migrants in Thailand to be 0.1 million, 
0.3	million	and	1.6	million.8 Similarly, the respective sources estimate the number of Philippine citizens in 
Malaysia	to	be	308,000,	103,000	and	just	20,000.9
Such wide discrepancies highlight some of the problems in using migration data – especially where 
attempts have been made to harmonize observations from multiple countries into a single source. These 
instances emphasise the need for ASEAN Member States to ensure standardization and robustness of the 
data they collect.10 In time, more accurate data can be used to disaggregate migrant stocks and flows by 
sex, age, labour force participation and various other aspects conducive to evidence-based policymaking on 
labour mobility.
In general, weak or incomplete labour market information systems present problems for cohesion and 
integration – especially when it comes to measuring regional trends in labour mobility. Weak data can render 
certain groups “politically invisible” to the detriment of both source and destination countries.
8	 The	corresponding	figure	is	1,292,862	according	to	the	Thailand	National	Statistics	Office:	Report of the Population and Housing 
Census 2010 (Bangkok, 2010).
9	 The	corresponding	figure	for	2012	is	686,547	according	to	the	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs,	Commission	on	Filipinos	Overseas:	
Stock estimate of overseas Filipinos (Pasay City, 2012).
10 The ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, article 18, also recommends that 
ASEAN Member States “Facilitate data-sharing on matters related to migrant workers, for the purpose of enhancing policies and 
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Annex E: Intra-ASEAN bilateral agreements on
  labour migration
Table E1 summarises the current provisions in various intra-ASEAN bilateral agreements concerning 
migrant workers that are currently in force or under discussion.
Table E1 Overview of existing intra-ASEAN bilateral agreements on labour migration














1999 Workers must be aged 21-40, cannot bring 
family, and must not marry in Malaysia. They 
are responsible for paying for the levy, pass, 
visa, processing fee, medical exam, and travel 
documents. Employers must cover the cost of 
workers’ transport to Malaysia, workers’ salary 
must be clearly stated in the employment contract 
and agreed upon in advance, and coverage must 


















Migrant domestic workers will be guaranteed a 
minimum wage and for contracts to be signed 
before departure. Employers will guarantee health 












2003 Authorized agencies must ensure applicants have 
fulfilled requirements for a visa, work permit, 
health insurance, contribution to a savings fund, 
and taxes (as required). A contract with terms and 
conditions of employment must be signed and 
copies submitted to both Cambodian and Thai 
authorities. Employment must not exceed two years 
(though with a possible two-year extension followed 
by a minimum three-year break). Workers pay 
15.0 per cent of their monthly salary into a savings 
fund and are fully reimbursed within 45 days of 
returning to their permanent address. Workers 
















Migrant domestic workers will be guaranteed a 
minimum wage; one day off per week; limits to 
working hours and the right to retain their passport. 
Regulations concerning fees or other charges made 
by placement companies will also be included.
Annex E: Intra-ASEAN
 bilateral agreem
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2004 Migrant workers must be aged 18-40, demonstrate 
knowledge of Malaysian or English language, pass 
a medical examination, cover the costs of entry visa 
and levy, and sign an employment contract with 
the employer at arrival. Employers pay for transport 
from Malaysia entry-point to the workplace, make 
a security deposit to the migration authorities and 
cover any recruitment agency costs. Employers 
may keep workers’ passports and must provide 
coverage for workers under the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, 1952. Migrant workers are 
granted equal terms on employment conditions 



















Migrant domestic workers must be aged 21-45, 
able to communicate in Malay or English, have 
knowledge of local laws, culture and society, sign 
an employment contract, and keep their passports. 
They must cover the expense of their visa, travel 
documents, medical exam, and accommodation. 
Employers must cover the cost of workers’ transport 
to Malaysia, security deposits, levy and processing 
fees, work pass, medical examination (for renewal 
of the work pass) and provide accommodation with 
basic amenities and adequate rest. Recruitment 
agencies must also provide information and 








2003 Sets a framework for cooperation in the promoting 










2002 [Same conditions apply as under the Memorandum 
of understanding on cooperation in employment 











2003 [Same conditions apply as under the Memorandum 
of understanding on cooperation in employment 










2003 Knowledge of English or Bahasa is not required for 
Vietnamese workers seeking work in Malaysia.
Note: (a) Source countries are given fist, followed by the destination country. ADB recognizes “Vietnam” as Viet Nam.
Source: ILO: Migrant workers in the ASEAN region: Compendium of bilateral agreements, standard employment contracts, complaints mechanisms and 
policies and legislation (Bangkok, forthcoming).
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Annex F: Statistical tables and figures
F1 – Labour market indicators





Table F1-6 – Employment by major economic sector and sex, most recent year (per cent)
Table F1-7 – Employment by status in employment and sex, most recent year (per cent) 
Table F1-8 – Average monthly wages by sex, most recent year (national currency unit and $)
Table	F1-9	–	Migrant	population	and	employed	migrants,	most	recent	year
F2 – Background indicators
Table F2-1a – Population, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2025 (thousand)
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Table F2-1a Population, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2025 (thousand)
2010 2015 2020 2025
ASEAN 596 018 631 858 664 824 694 732
Brunei Darussalam  401  429  454  478
Cambodia 14 365 15 677 16 947 18 120
Indonesia 240 676 255 709 269 413 282 011
Lao PDR 6 396 7 020 7 651 8 253
Malaysia 28 276 30 651 32 858 34 956
Myanmar 51 931 54 164 56 125 57 650
Philippines 93 444 101 803 110 404 119 219
Singapore 5 079 5 619 6 057 6 334
Thailand 66 402 67 401 67 858 67 900
Viet Nam 89 047 93 387 97 057 99 811
China 1356 707 1404 610 1431 221 1451 219
India 1206 000 1283 000 1353 000 1417 000
Japan 126 921 126 344 125 836 123 322
Korea, Rep. of 48 454 49 750 50 769 51 602
Source: UN: World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision Database.
Figure F2-1b Population pyramids by age and sex, 2010 and 2025 (million)
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Cambodia, 2010 Cambodia, 2025
Indonesia, 2010 Indonesia, 2025
Lao PDR, 2010 Lao PDR, 2025
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Myanmar, 2010 Myanmar, 2025
Philippines, 2010 Philippines, 2025
Singapore, 2010 Singapore, 2025
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Viet Nam, 2010 Viet Nam, 2025
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Note: Y-axis refers to ages and X-axis refers to population in million.
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Table F2-2 Gross domestic product, annual growth rate, 2007-13 (per cent)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ASEAN 6.6 4.4 1.6 7.6 4.7 5.7 4.9
Brunei Darussalam 0.2 -1.9 -1.8 2.6 3.4 0.9 -1.2
Cambodia 10.2 6.7 0.1 6.1 7.1 7.3 7.0
Indonesia 6.3 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.3 5.8
Lao PDR 7.8 7.8 7.5 8.1 8.0 7.9 8.2
Malaysia 6.3 4.8 -1.5 7.4 5.1 5.6 4.7
Myanmar 12.0 3.6 5.1 5.3 5.9 7.3 7.5
Philippines 6.6 4.2 1.1 7.6 3.6 6.8 7.2
Singapore 9.0 1.9 -0.6 15.1 6.0 1.9 4.1
Thailand 5.0 2.5 -2.3 7.8 0.1 6.5 2.9
Viet Nam 7.1 5.7 5.4 6.4 6.2 5.2 5.4
China 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.7 7.7
India 9.8 3.9 8.5 10.3 6.6 4.7 4.4
Japan 2.2 -1.0 -5.5 4.7 -0.5 1.4 1.5
Korea, Rep. of 5.1 2.3 0.3 6.3 3.7 2.0 2.8
Note: 2013 figures are preliminary estimates.
Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook Database, Apr. 2014.
Table F2-3 Gross domestic product per capita, PPP, 2007-13 (constant 2005 international $)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ASEAN 4 317 4 455 4 468 4 750 4 907 5 125 5 313
Brunei Darussalam 48 154 46 420 44 862 45 319 45 643 45 979 46 026
Cambodia 1 789 1 882 1 857 1 937 2 040 2 150 2 260
Indonesia 3 425 3 581 3 695 3 873 4 071 4 271 4 458
Lao PDR 1 896 2 002 2 108 2 242 2 376 2 522 2 682
Malaysia 13 122 13 510 13 072 13 767 14 223 14 775 15 192
Myanmar 1 223 1 258 1 313 1 373 1 443 1 521 1 611
Philippines 3 295 3 375 3 357 3 554 3 620 3 801 3 991
Singapore 48 438 48 099 46 609 52 291 53 790 53 358 54 139
Thailand 7 438 7 610 7 423 7 987 7 972 8 463 8 663
Viet Nam 2 415 2 543 2 654 2 807 2 945 3 063 3 195
China 5 174 5 635 6 115 6 708 7 286 7 805 8 356
India 2 606 2 672 2 861 3 122 3 277 3 341 3 444
Japan 31 766 31 417 29 673 31 054 30 885 31 502 32 058
Korea, Rep. of 25 486 25 911 25 833 27 302 28 146 28 563 29 219
Note: 2013 figures are preliminary estimates.
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Table F2-4 Output per employed person, PPP, 2007-13 (constant 2005 international $)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ASEAN 9 173 9 396 9 366 9 868 10 097 10 467 10 812 
Brunei Darussalam 104 964 100 995 97 758 98 831 99 362 100 051 100 015 
Cambodia 3 333 3 427 3 334 3 460 3 619 3 797 3 989 
Indonesia 7 952 8 253 8 439 8 763 9 130 9 486 9 848 
Lao PDR 4 029 4 216 4 399 4 636 4 865 5 115 5 396 
Malaysia 31 907 32 868 31 899 33 344 34 056 35 018 35 751 
Myanmar 2 229 2 282 2 364 2 454 2 560 2 683 2 828 
Philippines 8 841 8 920 8 795 9 152 9 168 9 571 10 026 
Singapore 92 260 90 987 88 751 97 151 98 775 96 573 98 072 
Thailand 12 994 13 205 12 922 13 813 13 666 14 446 14 754 
Viet Nam 4 322 4 516 4 669 4 896 5 082 5 239 5 440 
China 9 227 10 119 11 008 12 092 13 093 14 003 14 985 
India 6 746 7 021 7 596 8 359 8 832 9 073 9 307 
Japan 63 245 62 746 60 055 62 681 63 018 64 351 65 511 
Korea, Rep. of 52 314 53 226 53 514 56 106 57 129 57 262 58 298 
Note: 2013 figures are preliminary estimates.
Source: ILO: Trends Econometric Models, Jan. 2014; World Bank: World Development Indicators, 2013. 
Table F2-5 Output per employed person, annual growth rate, 2007-13 (per cent)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ASEAN 4.3 2.4 -0.3 5.4 2.3 3.7 3.3 
Brunei Darussalam -1.7 -3.8 -3.2 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.0 
Cambodia 6.0 2.8 -2.7 3.8 4.6 4.9 5.1 
Indonesia 3.5 3.8 2.3 3.8 4.2 3.9 3.8 
Lao PDR 4.5 4.6 4.3 5.4 4.9 5.1 5.5 
Malaysia 4.2 3.0 -2.9 4.5 2.1 2.8 2.1 
Myanmar 10.4 2.4 3.6 3.8 4.4 4.8 5.4 
Philippines 4.6 0.9 -1.4 4.1 0.2 4.4 4.8 
Singapore 4.7 -1.4 -2.5 9.5 1.7 -2.2 1.6 
Thailand 2.8 1.6 -2.1 6.9 -1.1 5.7 2.1 
Viet Nam 6.5 4.5 3.4 4.9 3.8 3.1 3.8 
China 13.2 9.7 8.8 9.9 8.3 6.9 7.0 
India 9.1 4.1 8.2 10.0 5.7 2.7 2.6 
Japan 1.6 -0.8 -4.3 4.4 0.5 2.1 1.8 
Korea, Rep. of 3.6 1.7 0.5 4.8 1.8 0.2 1.8 
Note: 2013 figures are preliminary estimates.
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Table F2-6 Foreign direct investment inflows, 2007-13 (per cent of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ASEAN 6.4 3.3 3.1 5.2 4.9 4.8 …
Brunei Darussalam 2.1 2.3 3.5 5.1 7.4 5.1 …
Cambodia 10.0 7.9 5.2 7.0 7.0 11.0 …
Indonesia 1.6 1.8 0.9 1.9 2.3 2.3 0.3
Lao PDR 7.7 4.3 3.4 4.1 3.7 3.2 1.5
Malaysia 4.4 3.1 0.7 3.7 4.2 3.3 3.9
Myanmar 3.9 3.3 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.9 …
Philippines 2.0 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.1 2.4
Singapore 26.5 6.4 13.4 23.6 21.5 20.9 21.6
Thailand 4.3 2.9 1.7 2.7 2.1 2.2 3.8
Viet Nam 9.4 10.5 7.8 7.5 6.0 6.0 3.9
China 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.3
India 2.1 3.6 2.7 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.2
Japan 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Korea, Rep. of 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.8
Note: 2013 figures are preliminary estimates; 2013 figures for Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam include only quarters one and two; 2013 figures for 
Philippines and Thailand refer to approved FDI; India figures refer to equity FDI. “... “ = data not available. 
Source: Official national sources; IMF: World Economic Outlook Database, Apr. 2014; UNCTAD: UNCTADstat Database. 
Table F2-7 Imports and exports of merchandise, 2007-13 (per cent of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ASEAN 126.9 129.0 102.7 108.9 112.6 108.9 ...
Brunei Darussalam 79.8 89.6 89.9 91.9 94.0 100.0 ...
Cambodia 110.3 108.4 96.4 106.2 126.7 136.5 …
Indonesia 47.1 45.8 43.1 53.0 56.1 54.8 41.5
Lao PDR 48.8 52.4 39.6 41.4 44.5 43.1 24.0
Malaysia 167.0 154.3 139.1 147.2 144.3 139.7 139.1
Myanmar … … … … … … …
Philippines 72.6 63.1 50.1 55.1 49.8 46.9 43.3
Singapore 333.4 367.7 265.6 305.1 316.4 286.9 264.9
Thailand 119.0 131.0 108.5 118.0 130.6 130.5 122.5
Viet Nam 156.6 157.4 130.7 147.6 164.7 161.2 154.9
China 62.3 56.7 44.2 50.1 49.7 47.0 45.4
India 30.6 42.1 30.9 33.7 41.0 42.5 41.7
Japan 30.7 31.8 22.5 26.6 28.5 28.3 30.2
Korea, Rep. of 69.4 92.0 82.3 87.9 96.9 94.5 82.4
Note: 2013 are preliminary estimates; ASEAN figures exclude Myanmar; Lao PDR 2013 figure includes only quarters one and two. “... “ = data not 
available. 
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